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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Who is in Debt? The Role of Social Class, the Welfare State, and a Culture of Finance 
By 
Zaibu Nissa Tufail 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
Professor Nina Bandelj, Chair 
 
 
To advance our understanding of debt and credit, my dissertation provides a comprehensive 
sociological examination of household level credit consumption—both within the US and in the 
European Union. I attempt to account for how both supply and demand side social forces—
cultural and structural—simultaneously drive indebtedness. I address three questions. First, how 
does class position mediate the influence of structural and cultural forces on U.S. households’ 
levels of indebtedness? Second, has acceptance of debt in U.S. households changed with 
intensified financialization? Third, how do welfare-state provisions influence households’ 
indebtedness across countries over time? In Chapter 2, I show that credit consumption is class-
contingent. Specifically, using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data for 2010, I find that 
upper class households use their credit to make financial investments, ostensibly in the service of 
wealth creation. The middle classes are interested in using their homes as investment in long 
term security, and the upper middle class (along with the upper class) does use some of its credit 
xiv 
 
to engage in status based, positional consumption. In contrast, the lower classes deploy their 
debts to make ends meet. They use credit to pay for basic necessities and also to fund education. 
In Chapter 3, I approach the issue of debt and finance culture from a longer-term perspective, 
interrogating the contours of the ‘norm of debt acceptability’ over the 1989 to 2016 period, using 
SCF. I extend my examination beyond general debt acceptance levels, by interrogating how 
acceptable households find using credit for 5 specific kinds of purposes. Surprisingly, I find that 
social class membership is less important in patterning how households think about credit than it 
is in determining actual credit consumption and debt. One interesting pattern is that American 
households’ understandings of the appropriate uses of credit shifted substantially in the mid-
1990s, when Americans, regardless of position in the social structure, moved away from seeing 
credit as a means by which households may furnish frivolous/luxury consumption to a view 
where credit is recognized as an important tool to deal with economic constraint. Interestingly, 
credit use in general is considered less acceptable to upper class households, and more 
acceptable to poor households, likely reflecting the structural need to rely on credit. In Chapter 4, 
contrary to most scholarship on the credit/welfare nexus, I find a complementary, rather than 
substitutive relationship between state spending levels and the total amount of household 
indebtedness in European Union countries, using hierarchical linear models of EU SILC data, 
2004-2015. I also uncover that time exerts a positive impact on household debt amount, as does 
degree of financialization. I argue that the welfare regime/household credit tradeoff proposition 
needs rethinking for different institutional environments. On the whole, my dissertation provides 
a multidimensional understanding of debt, and advances economic sociology and the study of 
finance by integrating it with issues of social stratification and by considering how structural and 
cultural forces jointly shape household indebtedness across space and time.   
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
Consumer debt in the U.S. stands at a record 3.33 trillion dollars (Federal Reserve 2015) and one 
in every three households uses credit to pay for basic necessities (Salerno 2012). The United 
States has transitioned from a nation of savers to a nation of borrowers (Carruthers and Ariovich 
2010). One consequence is that credit is becoming progressively more ubiquitous within market 
transactions, rivaling and often superseding real money in usage (Krippner 2005; Carruthers 
2005; Carruthers and Ariovich 2010). Though divergent from the U.S. at the outset, the last few 
decades have seen the advanced European countries converging with the United States in the 
relative importance of credit and in ever soaring levels of households and consumer indebtedness 
(Kus 2015).  
While the ubiquitous nature of both credit and debt is well known, we are less apt to 
recognize that acquiring debt is not a random process. The question of who becomes indebted is 
contingent on a vast array of social forces. Economic sociologists have emphasized that 
economic phenomena are shaped by social structures, culture and politics (Smelser and 
Swedberg 2005). And clearly, credit use—and accumulating debt, in particular—are just such 
economic phenomena. My dissertation investigates how indebtedness is shaped by social class 
position, and by the characteristics of the institutional and cultural environments in which people 
live, particularly those engendered by welfare state provisions and the rise of finance culture. 
Specifically, I address three related questions in individual substantive chapters of the 
dissertation. 
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1. How does class position mediate the influence of structural and cultural forces on U.S. 
households’ levels of indebtedness? 
2. Has acceptance of debt in U.S. households changed with intensified financialization? 
3. How do welfare-state provisions influence households’ indebtedness across countries and 
over time? 
To answer these questions, I conduct Tobit regression analyses and hierarchical linear models 
using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), World Bank and EU-SILC databases, 
which provide information on the indebtedness of households in the US and in the European 
Union member states. All three sources of data also include essential covariates, which I use in 
my analyses along with my central variables of interest, namely class position, acceptance of 
debt and welfare state provisions. 
 In Chapter 2, entitled “Who is in Debt? A Class Based Analysis of Consumption on 
Credit,” I use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to examine household debt in the US. 
Two central questions motivate this work. First, what drives household debt—is it economic 
vulnerability, a culture of debt, status based consumption, or something else? Second, do drivers 
of debt vary by class position? Results from one set of analyses demonstrate that class engenders 
significant variation of structural, institutional, and cultural factors on household credit 
consumption. Findings from the second set of analyses indicate that two relatively new norms 
engendered by financialization—one of virtuous investment, and a second of credit 
acceptability—interact with growing inequality to pattern households’ consumption of credit 
according to social class membership. Specifically, only upper and upper middle classes use 
credit to engage in conspicuous consumption, while upper class households alone use credit to 
fund financial investments. At the same time, the middle classes use credit in ways that may 
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potentially insulate households against future economic insecurity. Lastly, the working class and 
poor deploy their credit largely to overcome structural barriers.   
In Chapter 3, entitled “Finance Culture 1989—2016: How Financialization Reshaped 
Household Credit Consumption in the US,” I examine patterns in how households understand the 
uses of distinct kinds of credit, as well as assessing how they deploy their available credit, in 
ways that change over time, and which vary in class-contingent ways. Financialization involves 
the making of finance capitalism through specific narratives and discourses that emphasize 
individual responsibility alongside risk-taking and calculative assessment in financial 
management. The transition of finance into daily life has been made possible by the 
democratization of finance, whereby financial products and services have been made available to 
large parts of the population. Moreover, ‘popular finance’ projects have facilitated households’ 
participation in financial markets, via capital-funded pension plans, home mortgages, consumer 
credit, and other mass-marketed financial products. In this work, I seek to examine how 
households’ credit consumption reflects the adoption of logics of finance culture over time. First, 
I show that all American households adopted a financialized conceptualization of the function of 
credit. Next, I find that households have embraced the norms of finance culture equally across 
social strata. I do show, however, that structural constraints influence how households deploy 
their credit. The intersection of structure and culture patterns how Americans invest in their 
economic wellbeing using distinct strategies of classed credit consumption. 
In Chapter 4, entitled “Effects of Financialization and Welfare State Spending on 
Household Indebtedness,” I examine the influence of institutional forces—namely, 
financialization and state social spending—on household indebtedness within thirty EU member 
nations.  Household debt levels cross nationally have been converging over time, to higher levels 
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of debt. Deepening neoliberalism and increasing financialization have engendered large shifts. 
Supply side changes such as the democratization of credit along with demand side forces, 
particularly the erosion of social safety nets and shrinking wages increased households’ credit 
reliance. In this chapter, I seek to interrogate the link between welfare state spending and 
household indebtedness. I also ask what impact-if any—does increasing financialization/ 
neoliberalization of societies exert on household indebtedness? My analysis uncovers a 
complementary, rather than substitutive, relationship between social spending and household 
debt. I postulate that this surprising relationship is a result of actors’ increasing orientation 
towards financial investment. I also find that increasing financialization at the state level is 
associated with increased household debt. 
On the whole, my research advances a multi-dimensional understanding of debt. The uses 
and deployment of credit are often less clear cut than other forms of exchange media. This is 
because credit can function as financial capital that facilitates purchases; but it also begets 
financial penalties, often in the form of interest payments (Pressman and Scott 2009a, 2009b; 
Hodson et al. 2014). Thus, the meanings and legitimate uses assigned to credit may be multiple, 
and may perhaps even seem contradictory. Credit is a boon for many, replacing income due to 
economic precariousness. But credit’s uses extend beyond the purely structural; it also serves as 
a means of status differentiation insofar as it can enable increased conspicuous consumption. It 
even functions as a novel investment technique, providing actors a means to translate existing 
advantage into even greater economic benefit. My results shed light on each one of these 
potential uses of credit, and speak to the changes in household indebtedness wrought by a 
nascent culture of finance. Theoretically, my research advances economic sociology and the 
study of finance by integrating it with issues of social stratification and by providing an 
5 
 
economic embeddedness perspective (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990; Bandelj 2008, 2015), which 
considers how structural, cultural and political forces jointly shape household indebtedness 
across space and time. Thus, I am able to move beyond the reductionism of either structural or 
cultural explanations, which currently prevail in our understanding of indebtedness. 
 
TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN THE U.S., 1989-2016 
 The remainder of this introduction uses Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data to 
document trends in household debt and credit use in the U.S. The SCF is conducted triennially 
by the Federal Reserve and is one of the most reliable and detailed sources of economic 
information gathered on families in the US (Pressman and Scott 2009; Fligstein and Goldstein 
2015). Because it oversamples wealthy households, it is not nationally representative (Keister 
2000a). Making use of sampling weights, however, rectifies this, and renders this data 
representative of U.S. households (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). I make use of ten individual 
cross sectional datasets provided by the SCF. This data is in the form of repeated cross sectional 
data, collected and publicly released triennially, with the earliest full survey conducted by the 
SCF in 1989, while the most recent in 2016.  
 The analytic strategy for presenting these data is to use of descriptive comparisons of 
mean debt to income ratios, in the following ways: (1) across time (by each survey year); and (2) 
for both the full sample as well as by class category. The second part of my analytic strategy is to 
conduct several One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple Comparisons, for which 
I ran tests for Bonferroni-corrected as well as associated inferential results indicating significant 
differences among means in each class, for each survey year. I use Bonferroni correction to 
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conduct pairwise tests assessing whether the difference between means of two groups is 
significant.   
 
Variables 
Total Household Indebtedness to Household Income Ratio 
I also provide some descriptive trends on the total household indebtedness (inflation adjusted to 
2013 dollars). Rather than using absolute numerical values of household debt, I follow Fligstein 
and Goldstein (2015) in presenting a more standardized measure of household debt in the form 
of debt to income ratios. Thus, each dependent variable used in this analysis is divided by that 
household’s gross income for the year, before taxes are deducted. Then total household 
indebtedness is represented by said household’s debt to income ratio (d2inc). This variable is 
constructed by totaling the seven distinct classes of household indebtedness that the SCF records. 
These include principal mortgage debt (including the first three mortgages on this property), 
loans on the purchase of secondary properties (not used for investments), home improvement 
loans, vehicle loans, loans for the purchase of goods and services, loans for investments (real 
estate or financial), education, and other unclassifiable debts.  I sum these variables, and adjust 
for inflation using the CPI-U.  
 
Credit Card Debt to Income Ratio 
In addition, I examine use of several important subtypes of total household debt. The first such 
measure is a household’s credit card debt to income ratio (ccbal13inc). Credit card debt is 
defined as a particular household’s balance carried over from previous billing cycle on all 
household credit cards. This includes any monies owed on bank cards, store credit cards, 
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recreational cards (such as Diner’s Club cards) and any other sort of card with a revolving 
balance). This variable is then standardized by dividing total household credit card debt by the 
corresponding household’s gross, pre-tax income. 
 
Educational Debt to Income Ratio 
I also examine educational debt. Total household educational debt divided by gross household 
income. Educational debt is constructed by totaling, for each member of the household, the 
balance on any sort of loan, which is used to pay for educational purposes. The SCF asks, in a 
series of questions, whether any amount of all household loans and sources of credit are applied 
toward educational endeavors for any member of the family. Thus if any portion of a 
household’s total debt—including personal loans, lines of credit (including home equity lines of 
credit (HELOCs)), vehicle title loans, credit cards and even informal loans from friends of 
family—are applied towards educational expenses, this counts as educational debt only. For 
example, if a family reports that they used 1,000 USD of a second mortgage to help pay for a 
child’s college tuition, this would be included in the educational debt amount rather than as 
mortgage debt.   
 
Mortgage Debt to Income Ratio 
The importance of mortgage debt on a family home is well established in the sociological (and 
social science) scholarship primarily because of the wealth effect (Oliver and Shapiro 2006; 
Schwichtenberg 2014). The wealth effect posits that households are increasingly financing 
consumption (of both necessities and more frivolous purchases) by extracting equity from their 
home (Williams 1990; Warren and Tyagi 2003; Conley and Gifford 2006; Oliver and Shapiro 
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2006; Greenspan and Kennedy 2008). Thus, in order to examine the actual patterns of credit 
usage, the largest source of credit available to members of most social classes must be included 
(Dwyer, Hodson and McCloud 2012).  To do so, I assess primary residence debt. This variable is 
constructed by first summing the entirety of household debt owed on primary residence. The 
SCF defines this measure as the total balance owed on each of the first three home mortgages on 
the principle residence. All other types of real estate debt generally fall under the purview of 
investment debt or recreational property debt, captured by total household debt. To calculate the 
debt to income ratio, the total balance on the first three mortgages on the principal residence are 
summed then are divided by household income.  
 
Investment Debt to Income Ratio  
To construct the ratio of household investment debt to income, I use the total amount of 
household indebtedness incurred in the service of financial investment, and divide this figure by 
gross household income. Investment debt is defined by the SCF as any monies owed to any 
institution or actor that are used by the household to make wealth generating investments; in 
other words, “loans for investments and mortgage loans for other real estate”. As is the case of 
education debt, investment debt is constructed to reflect any monies used to make financial or 
real estate (other than primary residence) investments. 
 
Social Class 
Class is partitioned into five categories: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, 
working class, and the poor. The measure of social class was constructed as index variable on the 
basis of income quintiles (Wolff 2012), educational attainment, and occupational category, 
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following standard operationalizations in previous research (DiMaggio and Useem 1978; Marger 
2008; Petev 2013). A categorical measure of respondents’ highest educational attainment is 
already provided by the SCF, and it is partitioned into five categories: less than a high school 
diploma, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post graduate study1. Again 
this scheme is well established in the literature (Warren and Thorne 2012). Closely aligned 
(though not a precise match) with the Featherman-Hauser (F-H) scheme of occupational 
classification—proposed by the authors in 1978—are the categories of this measure constructed 
by the SCF (for an excellent review of the F-H scheme, see: Petev 2013). The variable in the 
public SCF data set relies on 4-digit census codes (2010 codebook n.d.), but collapses these 
occupations into 6 categories: 1) managerial and professional occupations, 2) administrative 
occupations, 3) blue collar and service oriented occupations 5) low wage work/manual labor and 
6) occupations involved in public safety—such as the armed and police forces.2 By combining 
income, occupation and education, I create a single index variable of social class.3  Importantly, 
the five resultant class categories were also constructed to accord precisely with Marger’s (2008) 
detailed description of the three middle classes, such that both the upper class and the poor 
categories flank the entire middle class.  
 
Trends in Household Debt to Income Ratio 
In comparing yearly (for the full sample) mean debt to income ratios of each debt subtype, I find 
that in the ANOVA test, that all debt types had a significant F values. This indicates that there 
 
1 I use the five categories of educational attainment utilized by Warren and Thorne (2012); see Figure 2.2 (p. 29). 
2 Refer to US Census Bureau Appendix F (available online at: 
http://publicdata.norc.org/GSS/DOCUMENTS/BOOK/GSS_Codebook_AppendixF.pdf) for details regarding the 
coding criteria used. 
3Refer to Table 2.1 (p. 58) NEED TO FIX THIS for more information on the distinctions in income, occupation and 
education among each level of the middle class.  
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are differences in the yearly debt: income means in each category of debt purchase. Table 1A 
further parses out precisely which yearly mean debt: income ratios were significantly different 
(than all others4), examining how mean debt to income ratios change from year to year obscures 
the rather critical differences in credit use that occur according to class lines, the patterns which 
do emerge at this level of aggregation are telling. Significant differences that arise between time 
points—within particular categories of credit consumption—are critically important, simply 
because they are robust enough to matter for everyone. Looking first, however, at the differences 
that arise in overall household debt to income ratio across time (from year to year), Table 1A 
underscores several key time points at which stark changes in overall borrowing to income ratios 
occur. Before delving into the specifics, one overarching trend in Table 1A, which I note is that 
we do not see a smooth trend across time towards increasingly overleveraged households, despite 
the rather widely accepted popular notion that American households are increasingly 
overleveraging themselves with every successive year. Instead, I show that overall debt to 
income ratios are the lowest in 1989, and then almost as low both in 2001 (at a ratio of 1.07), and 
at a third low in 2016 (at a ratio of 1.21).  
[Table 1A About Here] 
 
A second, and related pattern which jumps out from Table 1A is that for American 
households in the aggregate—or households overall—the most “popular” kind of purchase to 
make using available credit changes from time point to time point. It is not the case that one 
 
4 Throughout this dissertation, for both clarity, as well as to highlight only the most meaningful trends, I choose to report mean 
debt acceptance or mean debt: income ratios as significant only in the cases where the divergent group mean is significantly 
different in direction from all of the remaining 4 means, which are not significantly different from one another.  The only 
exception is when group means of two classes are similar enough to one another that they are both significantly distinct from all 
remaining three means in their respective group comparison (in the same direction as one another)). In such cases, I will mark 
both means with an asterisk, which denotes they are both significantly different from the remaining three group means.  
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particular kind of good or service remains the one most utilized over the time points included in 
my analysis; rather households tend to expend more credit (relative to income) to one distinct 
class of purchase for either one or two consecutive time points, while moving on to another right 
afterward.  
Turning to more specific yearly trends in overall household indebtedness, we see that 
according to Table 1A, as compared to remaining time points, the year 1989 is one in which 
American households have the lowest total debt to income ratio. Or said more accurately, in 
1989, households in the U.S. had a total debt to income ratio that is significantly lower than that 
of all subsequent time points. Moreover, the size of that change is relatively large; in the time 
period between 1989 and 1992, households in the United States shifted from having a mean total 
debt amount that was lower than their mean income (a debt to income ratio which is below one) 
to a mean household debt which was one and a half times greater than mean household income 
(a debt to income ratio of 1.41). Again, 1989 had the lowest debt to income ratio overall; and 
was the only time point in my analysis in which American households were not overleveraged—
that is, in which mean debt was lower than mean income for US households in the aggregate.  
However, the years 1989—and in particular—1992 highlight that American households 
possessed an extraordinarily high ratio of credit card debt to income in those years. In 1989, the 
mean credit card debt to income ratio for households was a staggering 1.02, and it is nearly 
double this in 1992. Specifically, in 1992, households in the United States reported possessing an 
average credit card debt amount, which was nearly twice their average annual income. 
Strikingly, the mean credit card debt: income ratio drops precipitously in 1995 from 1.92 to 0.04, 
which is approximately what the credit card to income ratio remains from 1995 onward. 
Although I am unable to parse out exactly what kinds of goods and services were purchased with 
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credit cards in 1989 and 1992, the trends in overall acceptability of credit can likely lend insight 
into whether the purchases were necessities or whether they tended more towards luxury or 
frivolous consumption on credit.   
Table 1A also underscores just how unique the year 2010 was, in comparison to any 
remaining year in which the SCF surveyed households. Given popular narratives in the media 
about the overindebted American household and how frivolous their consumption on credit was 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (Warren 2004; Warren and Tyagi 2005), it is unsurprising 
that I find that in 2010, as compared to other time points from 1989 until 2016, American 
households were significantly overleveraged. Specifically, according to Table 1A, in 2010, 
households in the U.S. had a mean total household debt to income ratio which is significantly 
higher than the mean ratio in all other years. Again, given that the SCF survey year reflects 
respondent  information from the prior year, the finding that American families were 
significantly more overleveraged in 2009 than any other time point from 1989 to 2016 meshes 
with the well established facts not just about the subprime mortgage crisis, but about the rather 
stark and pervasive turn to a consumer credit-driven economy.  
 Another less than surprising finding is that the mean ratio of primary residence debt to 
income in American households was significantly lower in 2001 than other time points, while it 
was significantly higher than the rest in 2010. The time period from the late 1990’s into the early 
2000’s corresponds to the dot.com bubble era, in which institutional investment was focused 
squarely on technological innovation—that is, on investment in companies at the cutting edge of 
technology. Home ownership was less emphasized as a source of individual investment, and this 
is at least consistent with the borrowing patterns we see in the early 2000’s in Table 1A. That 
2010 saw significantly higher home debt (to income ratios) than at any other time over the last 
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twenty or so years supports the notion that this period of time is demarcated by expansive 
increases in homeownership. We can also see that those years in which mortgage debt is the 
highest (2010 specifically) are also the time points at which the average American households 
are most overleveraged. It is likely because home mortgages are of course, by far the largest kind 
of debt that Americans undertake.  
 
Classed Debt Levels—Classed Credit Use Patterns  
Within-class Bonferroni comparisons test whether mean aggregate percentages (which are 
devoted to different purchase types) of social classes’ total aggregate debt for each year are 
significantly different from those of the remaining 4 social classes, or in some cases 
significantly, situations in which two social classes have mean percentages that are almost 
identical to one another, but statistically distinct from the remaining three social classes (the 
latter is almost always a case of the poor and working classes, which are generally significantly 
distinct from the other 3 classes, but nearly identical to one another).  
 
[Table 1B About Here] 
 
Upper Class Investment on credit is at its highest in 2016 (46 percent of total debt in 2016) and is 
almost as high in 2013. The second highest proportion is in years 1995 and 2010 (hovering near 
30-35 percent of total household debt in each year); moreover, in the years 1992, 1998, and 2007 
investment on credit was somewhere in between 20-29 percent of yearly household debt 
expenditures. The lowest percentage of investment driven debt (about 17 percent) occurs in both 
1989 and 2004. Other salient patterns, which emerge for upper class household borrowing over 
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time, first involve the proportion of credit deployed in the service of other non-investment real 
estate. This is consistently higher than any other class category as a proportion of total class debt. 
Year to year, only upper class households have significantly higher shares of their aggregate total 
debt (relative to all 4 remaining social classes) devoted toward non-primary residence, non-
investment real estate. The proportion of credit used for the purchase of noninvestment real 
estate is lowest (significantly lower) in the years 2001 and 2016, hovering near 11 percent of 
total upper class household debt. 1989 sees the highest (Significantly higher than other years). 
The proportion remains at about 17-18 percent in the years 2004-2010, and begins to decline in 
2013 (14 percent). Interestingly enough, upper class households also expended a significantly 
larger proportion of overall aggregate class debt for the “other” category from 1989 until about 
1998/2001.  
Overall, both upper middle and lower middle class households expend the majority 
(roughly about 75 percent) of their available credit on their primary residence. In fact, upper 
middle class households deploy 70-80 percent of the total available credit on primary residence 
debt—over time. Similarly, lower middle class households generally expended anywhere from 
65-78 percent of their overall household credit on this category of good across the period 1989—
2016. From 1989 – 2016, the trends stays similar and stable (around 70-80 percent of each social 
classes’ respective total household debt in each specific year), with upper middle class debt 
diverging by 10 percentage points higher than lower middle debt in the years 2007 and 2016, and 
the two mean aggregated percentages of total class debt in each year being essentially equivalent 
in 1989, 1992, 2010, and 2013.  
Credit based consumption in working class households is predominantly fueled by credit 
used to finance the purchase of a vehicle (40 percent of available credit is deployed for this 
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purchase type in 1989) as well as educational loans. The relative amount of total working class 
debt used to purchase a vehicle drops over time to about 20 percent in 2016, while that used for 
educational purposes grows by factor of about 7.4, from a low in 1989 of 7.58% of total debt, to 
55.98% of total working class debt in 2016.   
In terms of working-class educational loans, in the late nineteen eighties, poor and 
working class households use roughly equivalent proportions of their classes’ total credit—
around 6-7 percent. For both classes, the proportion of their total class credit expended on 
educational loans increases over time, but working class households exhibit slower increases per 
year. By 2004, the proportion of working class aggregate debt used for education is half that of 
poor households in that year, although both classes have significantly larger educational loan 
amounts (relative to overall class credit available) than upper, upper middle and lower middle 
class households—at every time point in my analysis. The years 2013 and 2016 see the highest 
percentages of total debt dedicated to education. 
A strikingly large shift is apparent in the relative proportion of poor households’ total 
credit expended in the service of financing an education from year to year, with the lowest 
proportion of total debt a mere 7% of total within class aggregate debt in the year 1989 (Table 
1D). This within-class proportion of poor households’ educational to overall debt in 1989 is 
significantly lower than it is in any subsequent year. In the time period between 2010 and 2013, 
however, educational loans as a portion of total debt nearly doubles. In 2013, educational debt 
represents a staggering 77 percent of poor households’ credit consumption debt immense. This 
drops to slightly to 72% in 2016, although the amount of mean household debt dedicated to 
furnishing an education is statistically higher (distinct from) all previous time points.  As is the 
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case for any other kind of consumption on credit, the relative amounts of educational loans from 
year to year are context dependent. But student loans may be more  
A non-trivial amount of debt overall aggregate debt held by poor households is expended, 
year after year, on “other” purchases; depending on the year, this purchase type accounts from 
anywhere between 7 and 20 percent of poor household debt. Moreover, both poor and working 
class households consistently have the highest (significantly (p=0.00), for each survey year) 
proportions of their total debt employed to purchase “goods and services” when compared to the 
other 3 social class categories. 
 
Deployment of Credit: Debt Types?  
In what ways do the middle classes invest on credit? Do the middle classes differ from upper 
class credit consumption more generally? Consistent with previous work which finds that a home 
is the largest cache of middle class wealth (Dwyer 2007, 2009)—one which serves as an 
investment on credit (Harmes 2001; Langley 2008; Conley and Gifford 2006; Montgomerie 
2009)—is my finding that the greatest proportion of upper middle and lower middle class 
household debt is expended on a family home (Table 1B). The middle class—broadly defined 
(Marger 2008)—is now economically precarious in the absence of sufficient asset holdings 
(Wheary, Shapiro, and Draut 2007; Hodson, Dwyer, Neilson 2014). This condition, along with 
the widespread belief in the future failure of the social security system in the US (Hacker 2004, 
2012), suggests that these classes understand owning a home as a kind of safety net—as an 
investment with the capacity to insulate against financial hardships. Indeed, there is much 
scholarship that arrives at precisely this conclusion (Kemeny 1980; Castles 1998; Conley and 
Gifford 2006; Ansell 2012; Cook, Smith, and Searle 2013).  
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But what about working class and poor households? Unsurprisingly, economic 
vulnerability influences indebtedness for both the working class and for the poor; and they are, of 
course, subject to more severe structural constraints than members of the middle classes. 
According to Fligstein and Goldstein’s (2015) argument, such vulnerability should render 
working class and poor households more likely (than middle class households) to deploy debt for 
the purpose of defensive spending. To understand better the descriptive trends laid out in this 
introduction, the next dissertation chapter examines how social class influences household 
indebtedness in the U.S., using multivariate analyses. 
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CHAPTER 2: Who is in Debt? A Class Based Analysis of Consumption on Credit 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumer debt in the US stands at a record 4.0 trillion dollars (Federal Reserve 2015) and one in 
every three households uses credit to pay for basic necessities (Salerno 2012). Historically, credit 
largely existed as a means through which families could bridge the gap between income and a 
need to purchase specific goods required for subsistence (Carruthers and Ariovich 2010). 
However, near the very end of the Fordist regime—and along with the concomitant loosening of 
federal usury laws in the early 1980’s (Scott 2007)—the United States transitioned from a nation 
of savers to a nation of borrowers (Carruthers and Ariovich 2010: 21). This shift occurred in an 
increasingly financialized economy—one in which credit is becoming progressively more 
ubiquitous within market transactions (Van der Zwan 2014; Kus 2015), rivaling and often 
superseding real money in usage (Krippner 2005; Carruthers 2005).  
Some scholars, particularly in the field of stratification, assert that this shift has occurred 
because credit must be used to replace income lost due to stagnant real wages for households in 
precarious positions (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2007; Pressman and Scott 2009). In contrast, work 
within both behavioral economics and the overlapping field of economic psychology traces the 
rise in household indebtedness to a pervasive “culture of debt” (Lea, Webley, and Levine 1993). 
Both bodies of literature argue that the widespread adoption of consumerism fostered our 
transition from a savings-driven society to one dominated by credit use. A third body of work is 
attentive to the role of status-based consumption in propagating the increase in household 
indebtedness (Campbell 1995). In this view, actors consume goods conspicuously to gain 
status—signaling their membership to a social class category more esteemed than their own.  
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I propose that such accounts are incomplete in their conceptualizations of household 
credit consumption. Using a broadly defined embeddedness framework5, I analyze data available 
from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances to examine household indebtedness in 
the US. In the main, I interrogate how distinct social forces influence household indebtedness. 
First, I try to ascertain the relationship between structural conditions and household credit 
consumption. In particular, I examine pressure on disposable income and the impact of both 
accumulated assets and state transfers. I further investigate the role of cultural understandings by 
assessing households’ consumption of luxury goods and the way ideas about credit acceptability 
may shape indebtedness. Finally, I interrogate whether social class shapes borrowing. Two 
central questions motivate this work. The first asks what drives household debt—is it economic 
vulnerability, a culture of debt, status based consumption, or something else? And secondly, how 
does the impact of institutional, structural, and cultural forces on indebtedness vary by class 
position? In other words, how (if at all) do the drivers of debt differ among households belonging 
to distinct class categories? This focus on the intersection of the use of credit and social 
stratification through a cultural lens also allows me to link two areas of investigation of the 
economy that have yet to be productively linked, namely economic sociology and stratification 
research (Swedberg 2003; Mahutga and Bandelj 2008; Bandelj and Mahutga 2010). 
 
 
 
 
5 Throughout this paper, I use the terms “embeddedness” and “embeddedness framework” strictly as they are 
defined by Zukin and DiMaggio (1990). “Embeddedness”, according to the authors, “refer[s] to the contingent 
nature of economic action with respect to cognition, culture, social structure, and political institutions” (Zukin and 
DiMaggio 1990: 15). Thus, I adhere to a (Polanyian) broadly defined embeddedness framework (1990) rather than 
the customary, narrower Granovetterian understanding of the term (1985) in conceptualizing economic action as 
embedded jointly in social, cultural, and institutional factors. 
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BACKGROUND 
Neoclassical models of consumption have been widely criticized for their inability to account for 
the rise of household indebtedness in the US (DiMaggio 1994; Zukin and Maguire 2004). 
Actors’ and households’ actual credit use—most notably with regard to overleveraging—isn’t 
well explained by these models (Barba and Pivetti 2009). The general response to the failure of 
neoclassical models has been a proliferation of alternative theories from a variety of disciplines 
which privilege either structural, institutional or cultural drivers of indebtedness. I review these 
theories in turn.  
 
Economic Instability: American Households in the Neoliberal Era 
Scholarship contends that consumption on credit, and the ensuing accumulation of debt, has 
become endemic and permanent. This is largely the effect of political policies and structures that 
lead to stagnant wages and declining purchasing power in the face of rising productivity (Warren 
and Tyagi 2003). The structuralist program posits that the rapid escalation of household 
indebtedness—beginning in the 1970’s—is primarily driven by growing income inequality 
(Porter 2012). Because of the decline of Fordism, the proliferation of neoliberal economic policy 
and the process of deindustrialization, wages for the middle class have either been stagnant or in 
decline (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2007, 2014). The bulk of the literature on consumer indebtedness 
theorizes that the gap between income and expenses leads consumers to use credit as a bridge 
(Leicht 2012). Research also finds that indebtedness rises when a household experiences a shock, 
such as job loss, illness or death (Warren and Thorne 2012). Fluctuations in household income 
due to economic instability also contribute to Americans’ mounting debt loads (Leicht and 
Fitzgerald 2014). Rajan (2010) identifies deregulation as the source of both the increased 
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competition for employment and the rising rate of firm turnover. Both factors undergird rapidly 
increasing income volatility, and contribute to rising economic insecurity in American 
households (Carruthers and Kim 2011). Reductions in social safety nets engendered by neo-
liberal reforms, along with the increased volatility of household income render it difficult to 
withstand economic hardship without sufficient asset holdings (Hodson, Dwyer and Neilson 
2014). We can expect that those households with more economic security in accumulated assets 
will be less vulnerable when faced with such adverse shocks.  
Proposition 1a: Lower household income is associated with higher levels of indebtedness. 
Proposition 1b: Higher accumulated assets are negatively correlated with household debt. 
 
Much structurally inclined literature on the welfare state in the US has examined the relationship 
between home equity (secured credit) and the balance between public and private systems of 
welfare. In the context of the equity/welfare tradeoff, equity functions as a substitute for 
inadequate public safety provisions (Castles 1998, Ansell 2012). A more recent line of work—
also focused largely on structural mechanisms—has begun to move beyond research focused 
exclusively on home equity credit (Schwichtenberg 2014). Instead, this research examines the 
tradeoff between social spending and household or consumer credit more generally. By and 
large, the results illustrate a substitutive relationship between various kinds of household credit 
and state transfers. The substitution effect is influenced primarily by wage stagnation and welfare 
retrenchment (Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook 2001) and economic insecurity (Krippner 2005; 
Rajan 2010). Along this vein, Prasad (2012) finds support for the credit-welfare substitution 
effect, but only under circumstances of extensive economic deregulation, as is the case in the 
United States. In countries with weak public welfare states, regulation suppresses credit usage. In 
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contrast, deregulation makes possible the consumption of goods and services on credit—goods 
and services that would have otherwise been purchased with state transfer monies.  
Proposition 1c: The indebtedness of households will be lower if they receive state assistance. 
 
Conspicuous Consumption and Debt   
Status driven accounts of indebtedness draw heavily on the theoretical insights of both Weber 
(1946) and Veblen (1899). Weber’s key insight is that social groups are based on ‘lifestyles’ 
marked by various consumption patterns (Weber 1946: 193). Members of more esteemed groups 
retain status by demarcating social boundaries through varied modes of consumption (Weber 
1946; Lamont, Pendergrass and Pachucki 2015). Similarly, Veblen (1899) postulates that 
boundaries are marked through conspicuous consumption; that is, through signaling membership 
to a higher class and claiming its status through the ostentatious display of wealth (luxury goods) 
(Veblen 1899; Ritzer 2001; Trigg 2001; Fourcade and Healy 2007).  
Contemporary status oriented scholars of indebtedness assert that the democratization of 
credit provides a means through which actors can engage in conspicuous consumption on a large 
scale (Trigg 2001; Scott 2007). Moreover, it is well established that actors will often 
overleverage before reducing their consumption (Traub and Ruetschlin 2012; Fligstein and 
Goldstein 2015). Thus, many such theorists claim that actors incur debt to emulate the 
consumption of classes with more status (Barba and Pivetti 2009). One important stream of work 
(Ritzer 1995, 2001, 2012; Schor 1998, 2007; Barba and Pivetti 2009; Wisman 2013) asserts that 
rising income inequality amplifies the increase in household debt via conspicuous consumption. 
The media inundates consumers with images of the vastly wealthy, and portrays the lifestyles of 
the super-rich as the norm (Schor 1998). Members of all social classes are misled into conceiving 
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of the wealthy as everyone’s appropriate reference group (Ritzer 1995; Wisman 2013). As 
inequality increases, so diminishes the viability of reaching such a target (Schor 1998; Frank 
2007). While the rich ratchet up their consumption of conspicuous luxury goods—including 
highly prestigious brands of jewelry, handbags, clothing, furniture, wine and even cosmetics—
members of other classes attempt to follow suit (Schor 1998; Frank 1999). In many cases, the 
only means through which consumers can furnish the increase in luxury consumption is through 
the use of credit (Schor 2007; Manning 2000). This cycle results in what George Ritzer refers to 
as “hyper-debt” (Ritzer 2012). 
Proposition 2: Households that consume more luxury goods will have higher amounts of debt. 
 
The Debt Culture: How do Norms and Attitudes Influence Indebtedness? 
Scholarship in both behavioral economics and the related discipline of economic psychology 
subscribe to the notion of a so-called “culture of debt” (Lea, Webley and Levine 1993: 83) in 
explaining the growth of household indebtedness. This stream of work proposes that individual 
attitudinal, personality or cognitive failings cause consumers to behave in hedonistic (Fourcade 
and Healy 2007), rather than rational ways (Roberts and Jones 2001; Norvilitis et al. 2006). 
Deemphasizing the salience of structural or economic influences, this perspective argues that 
indebtedness owes to profligate consumption, in which consumers are prey to the culture of 
consumerism in which they are embedded (Manning 2000). In support of this view, Richins 
(2011) finds that materialism leads to attitudinal acceptance of debt, as does the belief that one 
can positively transform her life through the acquisition of material goods. She concludes that 
these beliefs work together to increase overleveraging. Findings by Lea, Webley and Levine 
(1993) point to an attitudinal disjuncture between those who take on debt and those who do not. 
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These authors find non-debtors are less approving of borrowing on credit than are debtors. They 
also find (a smaller) effect of debt acceptability in distinguishing mild debtors from serious 
debtors, with serious debtors holding more debt-tolerant attitudes than mild debtors. Moreover, 
Livingstone and Lunt (1992) find that social and demographic factors play a relatively minor role 
in the accumulation of personal debt. The authors observe that disposable income does not differ 
between debtors and non-debtors, although it does explain how far people are mired in debt. 
Attitudinal factors (seeing credit as problematic but useful), rather than social location predict 
whether actors incur debt. 
Proposition 3: Households expressing that the use of credit is acceptable will be more indebted. 
 
Debt, Inequality and Class Position  
The significance of social class as a theoretical construct is contested. When examining 
processes governing an actor’s consumption, the standard sociological view posits that class 
position and other ascriptive criteria have largely lost their influence over outcomes (Gaartman 
1991; Slater 1997; Carruthers and Uzzi 2000; Ritzer 2001; Zukin and Maguire 2004). By and 
large, sociological accounts of indebtedness do not adequately engage the possibility of classed 
credit usage. Extant research either 1) under-theorizes the importance of class position in 
general, or 2) fails to substantively consider the differences in credit consumption between class 
strata. Generally, studies suffering from the latter weakness either formulate theories or concepts 
specific to one or two classes, or at the other extreme, may apply a theory to all class strata 
monolithically. By ignoring variation in structural, institutional and cultural forces that act 
together—but also in ways that differ by class—research on household debt begets a theoretical 
gap requiring further examination (Dwyer, McCloud, and Hodson 2011). As Swedberg (2003) 
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points out, scholarship in economic sociology is no exception—and for the most part, theorists 
have participated in the unwarranted rejection of class as a salient influence on actors’ 
consumption practices.  
In contrast, a minority of scholars still argue for class’s continued utility in sociological 
research (Petev 2013). A number of influential theorists argue that social class only appears 
theoretically impotent because we are failing to adequately capture its altered dimensions 
(Grusky and Weeden 2001). Along this vein, new class theory, echoing Bourdieu (1984), 
postulates that class must be reconstructed according to the “classed nature of social and cultural 
practices” (Bottero 2004: 989). Though little work directly explores whether indebtedness is 
indeed classed, there is a small body of structurally oriented work on class and debt which points 
to the influence of class (generally operationalized as income) on household credit consumption 
(Keister 2000b; Warren and Tyagi 2003; Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Dwyer 2009; Dwyer, 
McCloud and Hodson 2011). Within this body of work, the central insight of use is simply that 
debt is neither acquired, nor used monolithically across social strata (Dwyer, McCloud, Hodson 
2012). In fact, Hodson, Dwyer, and Neilson (2014) find that both the amounts and kinds of debt 
that households undertake are quite clearly contingent on social class membership.  
I propose that in order to uncover precisely how classed meanings of credit use and 
indebtedness are constructed, a framework of embeddedness (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990) is most 
illuminating. In addition to structural considerations, this conceptual framework allows an 
examination of variations in cultural understandings and institutional norms that may operate 
differently across class strata. To engage in such an endeavor, I follow a largely Bourdieusian 
(1984) new class conceptualization to demonstrate that in the case of consumption on credit, the 
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meanings and deployment of economic action are shaped by class membership—itself based on 
the constellation of cultural, institutional and structural forces that act on various social locations. 
Proposition 4: Structural, cultural and institutional influences on indebtedness vary according to 
social class membership.  
 
Embeddedness and Classed Variation in the Consumption of Credit  
Using an embeddedness framework, I propose several specific propositions exploring how these 
fundamental social forces may impact credit consumption differently according to class 
membership. In the case of both structural and institutional forces, we would expect that, aside 
from the upper class, economic precariousness affects all classes to some extent. This is 
particularly salient when considering the impact of the Great Recession on unemployment for all 
but the upper class (Nau 2013) and on home ownership (Anthony 2012; Cook, Smith and Searle 
2013), the greatest store of wealth for members of the middle class (Dwyer 2007, 2009).   
Proposition 5a: Upper class debt will be uncorrelated with structural forces (namely, income 
liquidity, accumulated assets, and state transfers), while the indebtedness of the remaining four 
classes will be negatively correlated with all three structural variables.  
 
 Status theorists understand borrowing in the context of increasing inequality. An 
extension of this logic implies that classes with fewer material resources should borrow at least 
as much—if not relatively more—than classes with access to more resources. However, an 
embeddedness framework may be more consistent with the opposite notion: that precariousness 
drives down conspicuous consumption on credit.  
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Proposition 5b: Upper class and upper middle class household debt will be positively correlated 
with luxury consumption. 
Proposition 5c: Luxury consumption will be negatively associated with household debt for lower 
middle class, working class and poor households. 
 
Work within the economic psychology/behavioral economics paradigms is valuable 
because it highlights that consumers’ (debt tolerant) attitudes influence their indebtedness. 
However, the “culture of debt” perspective is highly flawed. By and large it, presents an 
oversocialized, latent variable view of culture (Granovetter 1985; DiMaggio 1997). In this work, 
culture boils down to a single norm of materialistic consumerism. Together with widely 
occurring cognitive errors, this “culture” cultivates a monolithic attitude of increased credit 
acceptance. Any potential variability in acceptance—particularly as might exist between 
different social groups—is not generally considered. 
Culturally oriented work within economic sociology provides a way to transcend the 
weaknesses of such a framework. Theorists working within this framework highlight 
interdependencies between shared understandings, institutional norms and actors’ attitudes and 
behaviors. Viviana Zelizer (1989) finds that cultural frames and normative expectations shape 
the meanings that money has; including how it is used and who uses it. Moreover, cultural 
beliefs intersect with structural and institutional forces in shaping how money is understood and 
appropriately used. Other economic objects, processes and actions are similarly embedded within 
cultural understandings (DiMaggio 1997; Bandelj 2008; Wherry 2008; Beckert 2010).  
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DATA AND METHODS 
My research draws on cross sectional, household level data available in the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF). The SCF is conducted triennially by the Federal Reserve, and is one of the most 
reliable and detailed sources of economic information gathered on families in the US (Pressman 
and Scott 2009; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). Because it oversamples wealthy households, it is 
not nationally representative (Keister 2000a). I make use of sampling weights included in the 
main dataset in order to mitigate potentially skewed findings that could result (see Nau 2013; 
Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). Additionally, I employ clustered (Rogers 1993) robust (Huber 
1967, White 1980) standard errors to offset significant heteroscedasticity and within-cluster 
dependence extant in the data.  
To test each of my propositions, six Tobit regressions were run. Model 1 (results in Table 
2C) reflects the full sample Tobit regression analysis, while models 2 through 6 (see Table 2D 
for results) correspond to the Tobit regressions run by each of five class categories. Tobit 
analysis was chosen for both substantive and methodological reasons. The methodological 
rationale centers on my dependent variable: total household debt. It is a limited dependent 
variable—left censored from below—with a significant number of observations clustered at zero. 
The Tobit model is the most appropriate model for a continuous dependent variable in which a 
significant number of observations cluster at some limiting value (McDonald and Moffitt 1980). 
Substantively speaking, however, this model allows me the opportunity to control for the 
distinction between debtors and non-debtors. I am able to model the relationship between my 
independent variables and dependent variable more accurately, since the latent dependent 
variable I assess is conditional on being a debtor. The Tobit model takes the general form 
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, 
 
where  is a latent variable: 
  
 
 
In addition to assessing the influence of three major social forces as they jointly shape 
credit use by class, in this paper I attempt to address a significant weakness plaguing much of the 
literature on household debt. Modeling the latent dependent variable (yi*) rather than dependent 
variable (y) itself allows me to account for the disjuncture between debtors and non-debtors in 
addition to the amount of debt. More specifically, this model captures both the qualitative 
decision to incur debt (using a maximum likelihood function), as well as the quantitative 
measure of indebtedness incurred (via a multivariate linear regression function). OLS regression 
cannot account for the qualitative difference between zero and non-zero debt—which may 
obscure estimates of borrowing as they occur in reality. Thus, tobit regression captures 
borrowing behavior more accurately than OLS, and avoids losing significant explanatory nuance 
with the use of a binomial model. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for my analyses is total household indebtedness in the US in 2010. 
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Information on eight different kinds of household debt is available in the SCF. This 
include principal mortgage debt; monies owed on any secondary (non-commercial) 
properties (excluding properties used as an investment); and the amount a household 
owes toward home improvement loans, vehicle loans, loans for the purchase of goods and 
services, loans for investments (real estate or financial), education loans, and any other 
loans. The sum of these variables is the dependent variable, total household debt. 
Additionally, I include principle residence mortgage debt because of the wealth effect 
(Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Schwichtenberg 2014). The wealth effect posits that 
households are increasingly financing consumption (of both necessities and more 
frivolous purchases) by extracting equity from their home (Greenspan and Kennedy 
2008). Thus, in order to examine the actual patterns of credit usage, the largest source of 
credit available to members of most social classes must be included (Dwyer, Hodson and 
McCloud 2012).  
Total household debt for the purchase of goods and services was calculated using 
credit card and store card balances, balances on lines of credit, home equity lines of credit 
(HELOCs), along with first, second and third mortgages on primary residences. Next, to 
calculate debts owed on the remaining categories of household indebtedness, SCF data on 
investment properties, vacation and recreational properties, monies owed to businesses 
and owed on financial investments, vehicle debt (including recreational vehicles, such as 
yachts or motorhomes), educational loans, and other kinds of installment debt is included 
in the dependent variable.   
 
Independent Variables 
31 
 
Structural Drivers of Credit Consumption  
Previous work has established that both income and assets are key factors influencing 
levels of indebtedness (Wolff 2010). To parse out more fully the structural influences of 
income on debt suggested by both the stratification literature, two distinct dimensions of 
income are included in the analyses. First, to examine the effect of relatively accessible 
income, the measure “income liquidity” is constructed. The summary dataset splits 
household’s income out into eleven distinct variables based on source. In constructing 
income liquidity, I make use of eight such income sources. More specifically, I include 
income from wages earned from paid employment, alimony, profits garnered through 
businesses by the household, returns on investments and interest, dividends, any income 
from the collection of rent, and income garnered through the sale of stocks. Secondly, the 
measure “transfer” is created to examine independently the effect of income provided by 
the state. The “state transfer” variable is based on earnings from three (of the total eleven 
sources of income). One measure includes monies earned via social security payments, 
pensions, retirement benefits, or assistance for disability. I also include income earned 
through public social welfare programs such as TANF. Lastly, I elect to include any 
income in which a member of the household receives remuneration from workers’ 
compensation.  
In order to assess the influence on household debt exerted by wealth, the measure 
“net worth” is created. This variable includes both financial and nonfinancial assets (less 
any debts). Financial assets include money market accounts, call amounts at brokerages, 
transaction accounts, certificates of deposits, mutual funds, stock holdings, bonds (other 
than bond funds), mortgage backed bonds, corporate and foreign bonds, government 
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agency bonds or bills, quasi-liquid retirement accounts, the cash value of whole life 
insurance, and other managed assets (trusts and annuities). This measure also includes 
future proceeds, royalties, futures, non-public stock, deferred compensation, and any 
oil/gas/mineral investments. Nonfinancial assets, such as vehicles, motor homes, 
recreational vehicles, boats, planes and the like) are also included; as are business 
holdings, primary residences, and any other properties (commercial properties, farms, 
mobile homes, vacation homes and the like).  
 
Cultural Drivers of Indebtedness  
To examine conspicuous consumption, I extricate the value of a household’s luxury asset 
holdings from its net worth. Here, I operationalize ‘luxury goods’ in accordance with 
Warren’s (2004) conceptualization of (status-oriented) luxury goods as high priced 
consumer nondurables. Warren argues convincingly against categorizing homes, daily 
use vehicles, and consumer durables as luxury goods used for conspicuous consumption. 
Homes, vacation properties and even vehicles are not exclusively rooted in luxury 
consumption. In addition, I am unable to determine whether households purchase these 
items for conspicuous consumption or another purpose, such as investment (Jianakoplos 
and Bernasek 1998).  I then exclude these items from my analysis. The luxury assets 
measure I use is already constructed by the SCF. This measure of luxury assets includes 
gold, silver, jewelry and gemstones; cars; rare books, art objects, antiques, furniture, 
“oriental” carpets, furs, and wine stores, among other objects.  
I also rely on an attitudinal measure that are most likely to predict indebtedness. 
The SCF asks respondents how they might imagine someone like them feels about using 
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credit for any general purpose. The answer choices include: 1) It is never acceptable, 2) It 
is only sometimes acceptable, 3) It is always acceptable. In order to assess the 
independent influence of acceptability of using credit (which also best corresponds to 
descriptions of the debt culture), I collapse response categories 2 and 3, creating a 
dichotomous variable, coded 1 for those who are accepting of credit usage, zero for those 
who exhibit no credit acceptance. 
 
Controls 
The literature on indebtedness suggests that race is among the most important 
demographic variables affecting debt (Keister 2000b), because access to credit is highly 
racialized (Carruthers and Kim 2011; Fourcade and Healy 2013). To control for the 
potential influence of race, two dummy variables for race are included in inferential 
analyses. One denotes a Latino household while the second denotes a Black household, 
as defined by the SCF. Additionally, scholarship points to the importance of family 
structure on debt (Warren, and Thorne 2012). In particular, the number of children in a 
household, as well as whether a household with children is headed by a single female 
(Goode 2010) are both key influences to hold constant. In this paper, I operationalize 
number of children as a count variable, whereas I construct a dummy variable to control 
for potential effects in which a household is headed by a single female. 
Several highly salient controls are included to help offset the distinctiveness of 
my data, which was collected at the tail end of the Great Recession. One consequence of 
the economic downturn was job loss and unemployment. Thus, employment status is 
included as a control. It is constructed as a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
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head of household is currently employed. Additionally, the ability to procure credit is 
linked directly to indebtedness—particularly in the context of the Great Recession (Petev, 
Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten 2011). Scholars of credit use and indebtedness largely 
agree that access to credit is unevenly distributed across the population (Carruthers and 
Kim 2011) and that certain social groups are excluded more often than others (Oliver and 
Shapiro 2006; Fourcade and Healy 2013). To counteract a potentially confounding effect, 
I include a measure of credit eligibility. I operationalize credit eligibility as a 
dichotomous variable measuring whether a household has been denied credit for any 
reason or has received less credit than applied for at any point over the previous five 
years. Moreover, home ownership status is strongly related to structural independent 
variables in predicting indebtedness (Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook 2001), most 
notably in the year 2009. I include a dichotomous variable for the home ownership 
status—whether the household owns their principle residence—as a control.  
I also make use of demographic factors that are highly related to household 
indebtedness. I include both the average age of the head of household and her/his spouse, 
as well as a squared term for this average age, in order to test for an inverted U shape 
relationship between age and household debt. A positive relationship between age and 
debt is expected up to a certain point; as young people age, they will accrue more debt for 
purchasing investments (Barba and Pivetti 2009). But this should level off and may 
perhaps decline slightly past a certain point; we expect that the elderly will pay down 
their debts (Barba and Pivetti 2009).  
 
Social Class 
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Models 2 through 6 included in this analysis are run separately for each social class. 
Class is partitioned into five categories: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle 
class, working class, and the poor. The measure of social class was constructed as index 
variable on the basis of income quintiles (Wolff 2012), educational attainment, and 
occupational category, following standard operationalizations in previous research 
(DiMaggio and Useem 1978; Marger 2008; Petev 2013). A categorical measure of 
respondents’ highest educational attainment is already provided by the SCF, and it is 
partitioned into five categories: less than a high school diploma, high school graduate, 
some college, college graduate, and post graduate study. Again this scheme is well 
established in the literature (Warren and Thorne 2012: 29). Closely aligned (though not a 
precise match) with the Featherman-Hauser (F-H) scheme of occupational 
classification—proposed by the authors in 1978—are the categories of this measure 
constructed by the SCF (refer to Petev (2013) for an overview of this scheme). The 
variable in the public SCF data set relies on 4-digit census codes (2010 codebook n.d.), 
but collapses these occupations into 6 categories: 1) managerial and professional 
occupations, 2) administrative occupations, 3) blue collar and service oriented 
occupations 5) low wage work/manual labor and 6) occupations involved in public 
safety—such as the armed and police forces.6 By combining income, occupation and 
education, I create a single index variable of social class. Importantly, I constructed said 
categories to align precisely with how Marger (2008: 58) constructs the three middle 
 
6 Refer to US Census Bureau Appendix F (available online at: 
http://publicdata.norc.org/GSS/DOCUMENTS/BOOK/GSS_Codebook_AppendixF.pdf) for details 
regarding the coding criteria used. 
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classes; that is, such that the upper class and poor categories I construct flank the entire 
middle class.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2A presents the mean and standard deviations for all independent variables, 
aggregated by social class. 
[Table 2A About Here] 
 
In general, the results accord with expectations regarding mean liquid and transfer 
income, as well as assets; the aggregate mean for all three measures is highest for the 
upper class, while the poor have the lowest holdings. Luxury assets follow the same 
pattern—which is unsurprising when considering the difference in resources available to 
members of distinct social classes.  
Next, Table 2B displays the percentages of total aggregate debt (within a 
particular class category) for seven broad categories of goods: the discrete loan purpose 
variables the SCF calculates and provides in its publicly available summary extract 
dataset.7 
 
[Table 2B About Here] 
 
Most fundamentally, the results are consistent with the notion that credit consumption is 
classed. The values in Table 2B are standardized, and thus they provide a descriptive 
 
7 The 2010 SCF summary extract dataset may be downloaded at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2010survey.htm.  
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comparison of how patterns of credit use seem distinct among classes in general. Results 
reported in Table 2B, although not inferential, suggest that, in the aggregate, classes may 
use credit to purchase very different kinds of goods. Upper middle class and lower 
middle class indebtedness is dominated largely by mortgage debt. Additionally, the 
percentage of debts expended to purchase vehicles, goods and services, and “other” 
goods increases progressively as class categories decrease in the resources and esteem 
they are afforded. However, it is seemingly important to gauge whether the variation in 
usage is simply a reflection of disparities in material resources, or whether classed logics 
may also play a role. To do so, I examine how the joint influence of cultural and 
structural forces results in distinct—classed—patterns of credit use.  
 
Full Sample Tobit Regression 
Table 2C presents the results of a Tobit regression of household indebtedness on all 
independent variables and controls, over the entire sample of households (n = 32,410).  
 
[Table 2C About Here] 
 
Results for model 1 reveal that increases in income liquidity are positively correlated 
with debt. Thus, the results do not align well with proposition 1a, which predicts that 
lower household income will be associated with higher levels of household debt. The 
relationship between net worth and debt is the reverse. Proposition 1b predicts that lower 
accumulated assets will be correlated with higher debt. Results in Table 2C support this 
proposition; we find that assets exert a negative influence on indebtedness. State transfer 
38 
 
income, like income liquidity, is positively associated with household debt. Proposition 
1c, which predicts that the indebtedness of households will be lower with higher levels of 
state assistance, is not supported in the full sample Tobit analysis. These results suggest 
households borrow when experiencing economic shocks under conditions of low asset 
holdings. It is puzzling that there is not much evidence to support the central structuralist 
claim that economic vulnerability drives indebtedness in US households. These results 
raise more questions than they answer. 
In contrast, the impact of cultural forces in driving indebtedness are more 
uniform, and less surprising than structural ones. Both luxury asset holdings and debt 
acceptability are positively correlated with indebtedness. Possession of luxury goods and 
debt tolerant attitudes are both associated with a significant increase in debt for American 
households. Thus, propositions 2 and 3, which posit that households consuming more 
luxury goods and exhibiting increased debt acceptance will have higher amounts of debt 
(respectively)—are both supported.  
However, significant differences in the levels of household indebtedness 
according to class membership exist. Table 2C presents the results of dichotomous class 
membership variables included as controls. Each dummy variable for class is 
significantly different from all others. In order to get a clearer, more accurate 
understanding of household credit consumption it is important to examine whether 
drivers of debt vary by class position.  
 
Tobit Regressions by Class Category 
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Table 2D presents the results of Tobit regressions for total household debt, run separately 
for each of the five class categories included in this analysis. Results obtained in the split 
class Tobit regressions (models 2-6) present a more nuanced—and more complex—
portrait of the impact of structural, cultural and institutional influences on debt than do 
results obtained in Model 1. Looking across class category, results in Table 2D show 
variation in the forces that are significantly correlated with indebtedness. In other cases, 
independent variables or controls remain significantly associated with debt, but the 
direction of impact reverses according to class membership in comparison to Model 1. 
Moreover, the influence of salient independent variables is patterned by class category. 
That is, the influence exerted by independent variables on debt diverge across social 
class. Therefore, the proposition that structural and cultural effects on indebtedness vary 
with class position is supported. I will now review these distinctions in greater detail.  
 
[Table 2D About Here] 
 
Structural Factors 
According to Table 2D, the relationship between household debt and income liquidity is 
consistent across all classes, except the upper class. Income liquidity is positively and 
significantly associated with indebtedness for members of the upper middle class, lower 
middle class, working class and for the poor. The direction of income liquidity’s impact 
on debt for these classes remains consonant with that in Table 2C. In contrast, income 
liquidity is not significantly related to indebtedness for upper class households.  
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Net worth also operates on indebtedness somewhat monolithically across class 
categories in the split class models—with the exception of upper class households. As 
expected, the direction of this measure’s influence on debt is opposite that of income 
liquidity. Models 3-6 in Table 2D illustrate that significant increases in net worth (less 
any nonfinancial luxury holdings, as defined in this paper) correspond to decreases in 
household debt for all but the upper class. Working class households exhibit the greatest 
decrease in indebtedness for each dollar increase in net worth, while decreases in debt are 
more or less equivalent for those in the lower middle class and for the poor. Net wealth 
does negatively impact upper middle class debt, though this effect is smaller relative to 
the lower middle class, working class and the poor. Again, upper class households buck 
the trend—for these households, net wealth is positively associated with debt. For the 
bottom four classes, these findings are ostensibly consistent with expectations: we expect 
an inverse relationship between accumulated assets and debt in households that are 
economically vulnerable. That is, we expect that assets and household debt behave as 
substitutes for one another—when an adverse economic event occurs, those who are in an 
economically precarious position will not have the option of dipping into assets. Rather, 
they will take on debt for this purpose.  
Models 3- 6 in Table 2D illustrate that state transfers are also consistently similar 
for all classes but the upper class. Strikingly, however, for upper middle class, lower 
middle class, working class and poor households, state transfers are positively correlated 
with household indebtedness. For these class categories, increased state transfers 
correspond to higher levels of debt, rather than less debt. As expected, an increase in state 
transfers is not significantly associated with debt for upper class households. Based on 
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the results from Table 2D, proposition 5a is supported. Upper class indebtedness is 
uncorrelated with both income liquidity and state transfers, while remaining classes 
exhibit negative relationships between debt and both liquidity and transfers. 
 
 
Cultural Forces 
Of all independent variables I examine, luxury assets are the least uniform in their effects 
on debt across class. Results from Models 2 and 3 (Table 2D) illustrate that luxury assets 
are significantly and positively associated with indebtedness for households belonging to 
the upper and upper middle classes. Thus, proposition 5b, which posits that upper class 
and upper middle class household debt will be positively associated with luxury 
consumption, is supported here. Interestingly, the impact of luxury assets on upper class 
debt is smaller than its impact on upper middle class debt. However, there is only partial 
support for proposition 5c—that luxury consumption will be negatively associated with 
household debt for members of the three most disadvantages classes. Luxury assets are 
negatively associated with debt for members of both the lower middle and working 
classes. But for the poor, luxury goods are not significantly associated with indebtedness.  
Little variation among models exists when examining the acceptability of debt. 
According to Table 2D, debt acceptance is positively correlated with indebtedness for 
members of all classes except the poor. The acceptability of debt corresponds to 
diminishing increases in debt in moving from model 2 to 5. As evidenced in the sixth 
model, debt acceptability is not significantly associated with indebtedness for poor 
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households. Model 6 exhibits the only deviation from debt acceptability results in the full 
sample model in Table 2C.  
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Very rarely does the empirical scholarship on indebtedness—in any paradigm—
simultaneously account for both structural and cultural factors (Schwichtenberg 2014). 
Much of the literature promulgates explanations for indebtedness that are either primarily 
structural, or fundamentally cultural; and most work treats institutional forces as 
exogenous. But even when it examines cultural and structural forces together, the 
research largely conceptualizes these two dimensions as mutually exclusive and 
diametrically opposed. At the same time, the small body of literature that examines 
institutional effects on household debt generally ignores or undertheorizes the role of 
culture.  
But previous scholarship—conducted largely by culturally inclined economic 
sociologists—finds that in the context of economic action, cultural and structural 
conditions operate jointly (Zelizer 1989; Fligstein 1996, 2001; Bandelj 2012). Put simply, 
without a joint examination, we are unable to understand how cultural and structural 
drivers of indebtedness concomitantly structure credit consumption. In this work, I 
mitigate limitations posed by unidimensional examinations of credit use by using a 
broadly defined understanding of the economic embeddedness perspective (Zukin and 
DiMaggio 1990) as a primary theoretical framework. Additionally, I employ Tobit 
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regression to control for potential qualitative differences between mild debtors and non-
debtors. In doing so, I am able to correct the second methodological and substantive 
weakness plaguing much social science literature on household indebtedness. Though the 
contemporaneous nature of my data disallow causal conclusions, my findings suggest that 
households understand and use credit differently according to social class. In other words, 
the joint influences of structural forces and cultural understandings are classed in the 
context of household credit consumption. Though the full sample model results (Part I) 
aren’t dissonant with results from the split-class analyses, findings from the full sample 
model obscure the variation illuminated in the sub-sample analyses. More specifically, 
the split-class results presented in Table 2D underscore the importance of class, 
highlighting how independent variables influence debt differently by class category. I 
now turn to a discussion of these results.  
Structural Forces: Stability for the Upper Class, Precariousness for the Rest  
Recall that results from Table 2D demonstrate the upper class is distinct from all others in 
how both structural and institutional forces tested in this paper propel household debt. Of 
these, only accumulated assets exert a statistically significant (positive) influence on 
upper class indebtedness. Neither income liquidity nor state transfers are related to upper 
class household debt. These findings are not surprising; we do not expect upper class 
households will need to use credit to mitigate economic hardship (Wolff 2007, 2010). At 
the same time, there is no theoretically informed reason to expect a positive relationship 
between assets and upper class indebtedness. Instead, I conceptualize one such rationale, 
and delineate it in a subsequent section of this paper. Now recall my finding that in the 
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remaining four class categories, net worth is reciprocally related to debt. In contrast to 
wealthy households, this is precisely what we expect of precarious households, because 
they lack of asset holdings. Clearly, this negative relationship between accumulated 
assets and debt demonstrates that indebtedness is contingent on structural conditions.  
While, the negative link between household assets and debt—for all but upper 
class households—agrees with structuralist predictions, neither the debt-income liquidity 
link nor the debt-transfer income link does. According to the structuralist account, 
insecurity should foster a substitutive relationship between household debt and both 
income liquidity and transfer income for all except the upper class (those endowed with 
financial security via asset ownership) (Warren and Tyagi 2003; Prasad 2012). All else 
constant, the lower a household’s economic capital, the more indebted it should be 
(Pressman and Scott 2009). However, I find an unexpected relationship between these 
two sets of measures; Table 2D reveals both transfer and liquid incomes are positively 
correlated with indebtedness, for households in all but the wealthiest class. Ostensibly, 
then, the structuralist account of household indebtedness is incomplete; it is likely that 
other social forces also drive indebtedness—even in insecure (structurally constrained) 
households.  
 
Status Based Consumption: Trumped by Economic Vulnerability? 
Households adhere to one of three distinct modes of status-based consumption on credit. 
Poor households employ one such approach; working and lower middle class households 
a second; and upper middle and upper class households, a third. Table 2D helps 
characterize each of the three modes of conspicuous consumption, by elucidating how 
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consuming luxury goods relates differently to household debt according to class strata. 
Interestingly, upper and upper middle class households are unique; for these classes—and 
no others—households’ status based consumption is positively associated with their debt. 
Given this, it seems that status-seeking consumption drives at least some degree of upper 
and upper middle class household debt. This may be surprising, since upper middle class 
households—lacking assets—are clearly vulnerable to economic shocks. This 
interpretation is supported by my finding that upper middle class households exhibit 
precisely the same pattern of relationships between structural forces and indebtedness 
displayed by lower middle class households, the working class, and the poor (Table 2D). 
Ostensibly, upper middle class households seemingly deploy some of their available 
credit in ways which align with a strategy used to mitigate the effects of economic 
shocks, but they also seem to use their credit to pursue status via conspicuous 
consumption. This highlights yet another shortcoming of the literature on household debt 
thus far: allowing for the possibility that a single household’s overall debt can be driven 
by divergent—and even conflicting—rationales to address disparate goals. 
In contrast, lower-middle and working class households’ luxury holdings are 
negatively associated with their debt levels. Since greater luxury possession corresponds 
to lower indebtedness within working and lower middle class households, status based 
consumption doesn’t seem to drive their debt. Unfortunately, because my data are cross 
sectional, I cannot rule out another plausible alternative interpretation of my results: that 
those who are more heavily indebted refrain from purchasing luxury items on credit. 
Further work is required to identify which of these two interpretations is correct.  
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Results presented in Table 2D speak to the charge of conspicuous consumption 
commonly leveled at poor households (Traub and Ruetschlin 2012). Strikingly, I find that 
luxury consumption is unrelated to poor households’ indebtedness; ostensibly 
undercutting notion of status-driven indebtedness among the poor. But descriptive results 
in Table 2B help cast doubt on the  “conspicuous borrowing” by households experiencing 
relatively severe economic constraint—the lower middle and working classes, and the 
poor. Table 2B demonstrates that the working class borrows largely in the service of 
educational or professional endeavors. Such borrowing characterizes the indebtedness of 
poor households to an even greater degree; in fact, the least materially advantaged class 
incurs nearly sixty percent of its total debt to fund educational or professional pursuits. 
This finding suggests that both the working class and the poor accumulate debt to 
overcome structural barriers. It also conflicts with the related argument of hedonistic or 
imprudent consumption that is so often used to explain why precarious households 
generally fail to achieve mobility or greater financial stability.  
Beyond Behavioral Economics? Explaining Classed Variations in Debt Acceptability  
Perhaps the least surprising result from both the full sample and split-class tobit analyses 
is that household debt acceptance score and household debt are significantly associated 
(results located in Tables 2C and 2D, respectively). Moreover, the direction of said 
relationship is ostensibly just as predictable; it is, by and large, consistent with the 
“culture of debt” view. Recall regression results found in Table 2D: upper, upper-middle, 
lower-middle, and working class households exhibit a positive correlation between how 
far they are in debt and their level of credit acceptance, while poor households’ debts are 
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uncorrelated with that households’ debt acceptance score. Results for all but the poor 
accord with the assertion that we are embedded in a culture that is increasingly tolerant of 
using credit to fund needless acquisitiveness.  
The degree to which households accept credit use varies by class, even after 
controlling for a panoply of potentially confounding measures. At the very least then, the 
classed nature of debt acceptability suggests that explaining households’ borrowing in 
terms of a pervasive “culture of debt” may be overly simplistic: presenting an account of 
household debt that is either under- or oversocialized (Granovetter 1985). Culture is 
either presented as totalizing—unnecessarily denying borrowers any real agency 
(Hodson, Dwyer and Neilson 2014), or, alternatively, debt is described in terms of 
individual personality traits (Norvilitis et al. 2006) and/or cognitive errors (Roberts and 
Jones 2001; Soll, Keeney, and Larrick 2013). Consumers are either cultural dupes or are 
assailed by enough errors in cognition to preclude rational decision making. Such an 
unsophisticated conceptualization of culture disallows any capacity to account for why 
acceptance scores are patterned by group membership. Results presented in Table 2C 
indicate that understandings about the acceptability of debt are based not on homogenous 
materialism, idiosyncratic personality traits, nor on particularized cognitive errors.   
  In searching for a better explanation, we might try and draw from what a purely 
structuralist interpretation could be. Ostensibly, such a perspective would explain the 
inferential results in Table 2D—the positive relationship between debt tolerance and 
indebtedness—to structural conditions. More specifically, such a framework could argue 
that the act of borrowing, which is necessitated by economic need, would lead actors to 
be more accepting of credit use. Structural exigency, then, would shape cultural 
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understandings or cognitive schemas regarding debt tolerance, rather than the reverse 
process—culture or attitudes shaping action—that underpins the debt culture argument. 
Though I am unable to definitively rule out this structuralist interpretation—because my 
data is limited to a single time point—it still fails to present the most plausible 
explanation. Why is this? First, in my analyses, the indebtedness of the most materially 
and structurally constrained class is entirely divorced from associated debt acceptance 
levels. This seriously undercuts what may be a purely structuralist explanation of debt 
tolerance; namely, that economic need drives acceptance scores rather than the reverse 
mechanism. Secondly, not only is debt acceptability positively related to indebtedness for 
upper class households—households that are financially secure—but out of the five class 
categories, this class of households has the highest aggregate debt tolerance. Combined, 
these findings render explanations of structurally driven borrowing less plausible than 
culturally driven ones. It seems likely then, that cultural understandings about the 
acceptability of indebtedness do, to some extent, drive households to borrow more. 
 
Macro-Micro Link: The Logics of Financialization, Neoliberal Entrenchment, and 
Classed Credit Consumption 
In the remaining sections of the discussion, I examine how norms and beliefs shape 
household borrowing in the context of financialization and the progressive entrenchment 
of neoliberal policies. In the main, my findings suggest that norms of increased credit 
acceptance and virtuous investment are pivotal in shaping classed credit consumption, but 
only when taken together with fears about an ostensibly unrelated set of beliefs regarding 
social spending. More specifically, classed credit consumption is seemingly influenced 
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by the widely held belief that social safety provisions and social security will be 
insufficient in the future. This belief encompasses workers’ (accurate) perception that 
work-based benefits, like retirement and health insurance, are diminishing (Kus 2015). 
But it also includes the widely recognized, and closely related notion that the social 
security system in the US is about to collapse (Hacker 2012).  
Increased Debt Acceptance and Finance Culture  
Though we have identified an important critique of the debt culture perspective, we need 
not stop there. In fact, my results move beyond the question of whether debt acceptability 
is classed; they illuminate how it’s classed. Table 2D showcases the positive association 
between household debt and acceptance that holds for most classes, and reveals important 
distinctions. First, the upper class is the most debt tolerant; secondly, other classes are 
marked by progressively decreasing acceptance scores. How might we explain this? 
Structurally inclined arguments are implausible, and the logics of the “culture of debt” 
reductive. Some work in economic sociology offers a realistic—and nuanced—cultural 
explanation. In the context of the link between culture and credit attitudes, sociologists 
(Davis 2009, Goldstein 2013, Fligstein and Goldstein 2015) find evidence for the 
relatively recent and broad diffusion of a norm characterized by the increased acceptance 
of indebtedness in the U.S. The authors conclude that the acceptability of indebtedness is 
particularly salient for households wishing to maintain their lifestyle in the face of a 
potential downgrade—those households driven to borrow “defensively”. This is true even 
for groups whose income has not declined or has even increased (Fligstein and Goldstein 
2015. This empirical work helps to overcome the latent variable view of culture. It does 
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so by postulating how to understand why debt acceptance levels—despite an 
overwhelming positive correlation with debt overall—are indeed classed.  
Beyond the Upper Class: Borrowing for a Rainy Day  
In what ways do the middle classes invest on credit? Do the middle classes differ from 
upper class credit consumption more generally? Consistent with previous work which 
finds that a home is the largest cache of middle class wealth (Dwyer 2007, 2009)—one 
which serves as an investment on credit (Harmes 2001; Langley 2008; Conley and 
Gifford 2006; Montgomerie 2009)—is my finding that the greatest proportion of upper 
middle and lower middle class household debt is expended on a family home (Table 2B). 
The middle class—broadly defined (Marger 2008)—is now economically precarious in 
the absence of sufficient asset holdings (Wheary, Shapiro, and Draut 2007; Hodson, 
Dwyer, Neilson 2014). This condition, along with the widespread belief in the future 
failure of the social security system in the US (Hacker 2004, 2012), suggests that these 
classes understand owning a home as a kind of safety net—as an investment with the 
capacity to insulate against financial hardships. Indeed, there is much scholarship that 
arrives at precisely this conclusion (Kemeny 1980: Conley and Gifford 2006; Ansell 
2012; Cook, Smith, and Searle 2013).  
But what about working class and poor households? Unsurprisingly, economic 
vulnerability influences indebtedness for both the working class and for the poor; and 
they are, of course, subject to more severe structural constraints than members of the 
middle classes. According to Fligstein and Goldstein’s (2015) argument, such 
vulnerability should render working class and poor households more likely (than middle 
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class households) to deploy debt for the purpose of defensive spending. Although they 
exhibit the same pattern of structural constraints as the upper and lower middle classes, 
the relationships between cultural influences (tested in this paper) and debt are quite 
divergent for working class and poor households. In fact, the cultural drivers of debt I 
examine (Table 2D) run counter to one another in the case of working class households, 
and are entirely decoupled from poor households’ indebtedness. It is apparent that 
structural forces play at least some role in driving how the most vulnerable households 
accumulate debt. In the case of poor households, further empirical investigation is needed 
to identify whether this decoupling of cultural influences used in my analysis occurs 
because structural forces are influential enough to overshadow the impact of cultural 
forces, or whether, net of structural constraints, the poor borrow less because of their 
relatively lower levels of credit acceptance.   
Complementarity rather than Substitution? Financialization, Neoliberalism and 
Everyday Investors  
Thus far, my discussion points to the overall distinctiveness of upper class households’ 
credit consumption. While the forces driving upper class borrowing are relatively 
unambiguous, results for the remaining four classes yielded two puzzling trends. 
Specifically, my analyses yield positive relationships between 1) household income 
liquidity and household indebtedness and 2) household transfer income and household 
debt. These relationships are unexpected—most scholarship finds a negative relationship 
between both these measures and indebtedness (Prasad 2012), the evidence is particularly 
strong in the case of mortgage debt and income (Conley and Gifford 2006; Ansell 2012).  
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In the case of income and overall debt, the mechanism by which they function as 
substitutes is also well documented in the literature (Hacker 2006). The conventional 
structuralist account maintains that deregulation, a product of the increasing 
institutionalization of neoliberal policy, fosters economic insecurity. It is this insecurity 
that cultivates the negative association between 1) household debt and household income, 
as well as 2) debt and state transfer income (Hacker 2006). Insofar as credit functions as a 
replacement for household saving (Carruthers and Ariovich 2010), vulnerable households 
are expected to use credit as a substitute for inadequate income (Leicht and Fitzgerald 
2007; Leicht 2012; Warren and Thorne 2012, Kus 2015). A similar argument undergirds 
the predicted negative association between social spending and household debt. Scholars 
posit that this reciprocal relationship is driven by the comparatively low levels of public 
spending in the US (Prasad 2012). That is, credit is likely used to supplement meager 
social spending and paltry state transfer income at the household level, particularly in the 
context of growing economic inequality and the increasing precariousness of employment 
(Soederberg 2013).  
The Income-Debt Link 
Given previous scholarship finds that income liquidity and household debt are negatively 
linked, what might account for the positive relationship I find instead? Two plausible 
explanations exist. First, because my data is cross sectional, income liquidity may capture 
credit worthiness rather than the impact of wage liquidity, as intended. Households with 
higher incomes are deemed more credit worthy, and so are able to undertake more debt 
(Fourcade and Healy 2013). Though I attempt to control for credit access by including 
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“credit eligibility”, this is not a fine grained measure. If income liquidity indeed captures 
creditworthiness, the income-debt link should be positive. More plausible, however, is a 
second explanation: the positive link is an artifact of greater home ownership rates among 
higher income households within each class category. In the US, homeownership rates 
are high, and mortgage debt comprises a large part of overall indebtedness, particularly in 
middle class households (Warren and Thorne 2012). Unfortunately, I am unable to 
adjudicate between these two explanations without testing them directly. Additional 
analyses are needed to do so.  
The Credit-Welfare Nexus 
Two possible mechanisms may explain the positive association between state transfer 
income and indebtedness. First, it is possible that the positive association between 
transfers and debt is simply an artifact of the increased economic need—precipitated by 
the Great Recession—placed on households already relying on transfer income (Petev, 
Pistaferri and Saporta-Eksten 2011). This explanation is particularly apt in the US 
context, where much of the welfare system is private and hidden (Hacker 2004). That is, 
social welfare provisions, like pensions or medical insurance are provided through 
employment benefits, rather than directly through the state (Hacker 2006; 2012). 
Households that are either very vulnerable or that have experienced an economic shock 
(or both) tend to draw on state transfers to sustain themselves—this is particularly salient 
during economic crises like the Great Recession. Such households likely experienced a 
loss of private workplace benefits, and may have recently begun receiving (or received an 
increase in existing) state transfer income (Hacker 2004).  
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Transfer payments did increase during the Great Recession, via 1) increased 
availability of means tested programs such as TANF/extensions of unemployment 
insurance put forth by the state, and 2) increased up-take rates of unemployment 
insurance and Food Stamps, respectively (Petev, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten 2011). It 
is plausible, however, that even such increases in public spending failed to mitigate lost 
income and fully cover expenses. In such cases, households may have used credit to 
make up the difference; this would account for the positive relationship between 
household transfers and debt.  
In actuality, the increased use of state transfers did stabilize incomes for 
precarious households and those who had recently experienced an economic shock 
(Petev, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten 2011). This suggests that a purely structuralist 
explanation is inadequate. As it turns out, cultural influences are key component of the 
explanation; specifically, households’ beliefs regarding the social safety net and access to 
workplace benefits.  Allon and Redden (2012), like Fligstein and Goldstein (2015), argue 
that consumers are motivated to invest not only in the service of wealth creation, but also 
as a protection against future economic instability. Moreover, both Hacker (2012) and 
Allon and Redden (2012) find that welfare retrenchment provides part of the impetus for 
middle class investments in a primary residence. These authors assert that welfare 
retrenchment, in addition to economic insecurity and the turn toward investment, prompts 
households to fund equity generating investments on credit, in the form of a mortgage. 
Such arguments underscore how cultural forces, along with structural and institutional 
ones drive economic action: shifts in actors’ perceptions about future insecurity, along 
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with altered meanings of both investment and credit work together to render transfer 
income and debt complementary goods rather than substitutes. 
Though further analyses are needed to ascertain more fully what, precisely, the 
positive relationship between income and indebtedness is predicated on, this mechanism 
quite plausibly drives it to some degree. Moreover, it likely also drives the 
complementarity of state transfers and debt, given that households earning transfer 
income do see their public social monies as part of their own wealth or income (Gerba 
and Schelkle 2013). Acting jointly, structural, cultural and institutional forces may drive 
households to cobble together income liquidity, state transfers and available credit to 
invest in a classed fashion. Ostensibly, households display a greater degree of 
instrumentalism and more agency in their use of credit than is acknowledged by principal 
social scientific theories concerned with household indebtedness.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter used data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to examine household debt 
in the US and answer two central questions. First, what drives household debt—is it 
economic vulnerability, a culture of debt, status based consumption, or something else? 
Second, do drivers of debt vary by class position? Tobit regression results from one set of 
analyses demonstrate that class engenders significant variation of structural, institutional, 
and cultural factors on household credit consumption. Findings from the second set of 
analyses indicate that two relatively new norms engendered by financialization—one of 
virtuous investment, and a second of credit acceptability—interact with growing 
inequality to pattern households’ consumption of credit according to social class 
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membership. Specifically, only upper and upper middle classes use credit to engage in 
conspicuous consumption, while upper class households alone use credit to fund financial 
investments. At the same time, the middle classes use credit in ways that may potentially 
insulate households against future economic insecurity. Lastly, the working class and 
poor deploy their credit largely to overcome structural barriers.  It is important to note 
that the period from which the data for these analyses come from is 2009, which is very 
close to the financial crisis of 2008. However, even in light of potential particularity, the 
data strongly show that household indebtedness is shaped significantly by social class. 
The next chapters of the dissertation are going to put these findings in a broader temporal 
and cross-national context. 
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CHAPTER 3: Finance Culture: How Financialization Reshaped Household Credit 
Consumption in the U.S., 1989-2016 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The last thirty or so years have witnessed the shift from Fordism to Neoliberalism as the 
organizing orientation to economic and social life in the United States. Alongside 
deepening neoliberalism in the US as well as globally, we are currently experiencing 
financialization. Like neoliberalism, financialization engenders a unique confluence of 
structural, institutional, and cultural shifts. These are occurring at the global, state, firm, 
and actor levels (Davis and Kim 2013). The rapid proliferation of financial markets in the 
post-war period, and perhaps to a larger extent, their recent and spectacular implosion 
during the Great Recession, has resulted in a burgeoning body of scholarship examining 
the causes, constitutive processes, and consequences of finance capitalism (Krippner 
2005, Davis and Kim 2013, Van der Zwan 2014).  
Yet, we lack a panoramic analysis of the financialization of American households 
over the previous two decades. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contours of 
the culture of finance in US households over time, and also to map out how the influence 
of cultural understandings about credit use and debt may be patterned distinctly by social 
location. I focus on the impact of finance culture on how households think about credit 
consumption in particular. Thus, this work seeks to answer two questions: (1) How does 
the finance culture impact American’s understandings about and use of credit over time? 
And (2) do new patterns emerge in class-specific ways? That is, do financialized logics 
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foster meaningful differences—over time—in how different social classes conceptualize 
credit and debt?  
This chapter extends theorizing about the impact of financialization, and thus a 
culture of finance, on household financial behavior in three distinct ways: First, I focus 
my analysis on the impact of financialization on U.S. household credit consumption. 
Specifically, I examine how the finance culture has resulted in distinct patterns of credit 
acceptance over time, both overall and also in distinctly classed ways. Secondly, very 
little scholarship on household indebtedness looks at data beyond either 2007 or 2010. 
That is, most work on credit use fails to look at what happens in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession. To better understand finance culture in the US, I conduct an 
examination of indebtedness, which begins in 1989, and ends in 2016, thereby including 
crucial information from the post-recession era. Thirdly, I conduct a relatively fine 
grained and detail exploration of how finance culture has engendered shifts in 
American’s attitudes about the proper uses of credit. I do this by examining households’ 
tolerance levels for using credit for five specific functions. I conduct this examination to 
explore credit acceptance of American households over time, according to social class, 
and delineate class-specific patterns over time.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Financialization: A Macro Level Process with Micro Level Implications 
Contemporary economies are shaped simultaneously by three broad macro level forces: 
neoliberalism, globalization, and financialization (Epstein 2005, Foster 2007). Each of 
these three sweeping forces are cut from the same cloth, but when compared with 
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neoliberalism and globalization, financialization is a newer—and relatively understudied 
—concept (Van der Zwan 2014). As defined by Greta Krippner, financialization is “a 
pattern of accumulation in which profit-making occurs increasingly through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005: 181).  
Financialization is understood and examined through various frameworks 
couched in one of three distinct approaches within social science scholarship (Van der 
Zwan 2014). The most prolific approach is largely Marxian in orientation—specifically 
in conceptualizing financialization as a “regime of accumulation” in the postwar era (Kus 
2015). According to this perspective, as profits from productive economy declined, 
finance and financial markets became the new mechanism of economic growth efficiency 
(Boyer 2000). More specifically, this view argues that in large capitalist states, the 
amount of profits possible from the productive economy decline over time When the 
global capitalist class faced falling profits from the real economy, which is an 
inevitability in large capitalist states (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Madoff and Sweezy 1987) 
after the end of World War II, they began using novel financial instruments in a 
concerted and systematic attempt to mitigate stagnating profits in the productive sector. 
Since then, the turn to finance has increased over time (Krippner 2005).  
Somewhat differently, the second stream of work views financialization as an 
outcome of a seismic shift at the organizational or corporate level. Since the 1990s, 
political economists and institutional sociologists (Useem 1996; Fligstein 2001; Davis 
2009), have identified and explored the structural transformation of the US economy 
toward financial markets by focusing largely on firms. More precisely, such scholars 
have homed in on firms’ greater orientation toward their valuations on the stock market. 
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Neil Fligstein (2001) posits that while the rise of large conglomerates from the mid-1960s 
onwards can be described as an emergent “finance conception of the firm,” this 
institutional model gave way to a “shareholder value conception” in the 1980s. The focus 
here is on the role played by the ascendency of the shareholder value orientation; that is, 
the changes brought about as shareholder value replaced “managerial profits” as the 
prevailing logic in corporate governance (Davis 2005, Fama and Jensen 1983; Jung and 
Dobbin 2012; Davis and Kim 2015).  
In contrast, the third line of scholarship takes a decidedly cultural slant in 
explaining financialization, particularly in its consideration of how the process exerts 
influence on actors. Such scholars do so, more specifically, by focusing on the role 
consumers or households play in large scale financial processes (Harmes 2001, Langley 
2007, Allon and Redden 2012; Montgomerie 2010; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). Much 
of this research examines how financialization fosters shifts in cultural understandings 
and practices that involve risk, investment, and credit use.  
 
Financialization—Engendering a Debt Fueled Economy?  
Importantly, consumer credit and financialization are understood to be 
inextricably related—regardless of which of the three main perspectives on 
financialization one subscribes to. Guttman and Plihon (2010) aver that  
“Debt accumulation by the economy’s principal actors – governments, 
corporations, households, and the financial institutions themselves - has now for 
quite some time constituted a key element in the growth dynamic of capitalist 
economies. The composition of debt has evolved continuously as each of these 
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key sources of aggregate demand used debt financing to turn itself into a unique 
engine of growth” (47).  
 
Disparate bodies of scholarship examine consumer debt and its potential links to 
financialization. However, by and large, these analyses limit their focus to debts accrued 
by states, institutions, or corporations. Households debt is, for the most part assumed to 
be related to financial markets, but is excluded from empirical analysis in relations to 
financialization.8We have works which postulate macro-macro and meso-macro 
relationships, but relatively few examining micro-macro linkages (Harmes 2001; 
Montgomerie 2006, 2009; Van der Zwan 2014, Davis and Kim 2015; Kus 2015).  
Literature adhering to either the regime of accumulation or shareholder 
orientation views of financialization envisages the link between financialization and 
households in relatively flat, one-dimensional terms. The connection is driven primarily 
by structural changes that forced relatively large increases in both the number of—and 
extent to which—households participated in financial markets over the last 30 or so years 
(Krippner 2005, 2011; Davis and Kim 2015; Kus 2015). The weakness of the 
accumulation regime view is that it doesn’t even attempt to consider how people may 
differentially negotiate with the dictates of financialization; the same weakness also 
plagues the corporate shareholder value understanding of financialization. In either case, 
actors’ agency is largely ignored—they are not understood to negotiate with the norms of 
financialization as they precipitate downward through the financial markets in which said 
actors are embedded (Van der Zwan 2014). 
 
8 The exception is Fligstein and Goldstein (2015), where the two are linked empirically.  
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The culturally oriented framework—and the related, “financialization of the 
everyday” view (Van der Zwan 2014: 102)—eschews an exclusively macro or meso 
focus. Instead, work in this paradigm sees finance as embodied in actors’ everyday 
practices (Van der Zwan 2014; Harmes 2001; Langley 2007a; 2008). Instead of 
conceptualizing households’ uptake of finance-oriented logics as incidental to increased 
engagement with financial markets and objects, the cultural view understands such logics 
as actively impressed upon households through the action of various agents of 
financialization (Harmes 2001, Langley 2007, 2008; Allon and Reddon 2012; 
Montgomery 2009). According to this view, schools, branches of state governments and 
private financial institutions either passively or actively sold households on the 
importance of financial knowledge. This occurred largely through rapidly burgeoning 
financial literacy programs (Langley 2007b). The nascent cultural shifts that scholars 
understand as an outgrowth of financialization, are described variously as related not only 
to actors’ greater financial literacy and fluency (Harmes 2001; Langley 2008a, 2008b), 
nor only to a democratization of technology which can facilitate financial activity for 
average households (Nau 2013); but such a culture is also understood as households’ a 
measured and strategic use of their own financial resources (Davis 2009).  
That is, scholars adhering to this micro-level lens on finance hold that changes in 
households’ use of financial instruments and services are much more than mere 
consequences of the myriad institutional and structural changes that accompany 
financialization. Rather, such increased reliance on financial instruments is reflective of 
large cultural shifts in the way that people think about and engage with financial activities 
and markets (Martin 2002; Langley 2008; Davis 2009). Indeed, a number of scholars 
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argue that the rise of the finance culture and its associated logics valorizing savvy 
financial investment and increased risk-taking, and normalizing credit use proliferated 
because households’ were drawn into financial market activities by virtue of institutional 
shifts (Allon and Redden 2012; Davis and Kim 2015; Kus 2015). In general, this means 
that financialization corresponds to broadly shared transformations in the meaning of 
economic and financial activity (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Jung and Dobbin 2012, 
and Goldstein 2013). It is in the context of this finance culture that households make use 
of financial strategies, principles, and rationales when managing their own household 
finances. 
When assessing changes—over time—in the extent to which households in the 
U.S. employed instruments of financialization, the critically important study by Fligstein 
and Goldstein (2015) strongly supports the notion that logics of financialization are 
manifest in people’s everyday practices—at least to some extent. Fligstein and Goldstein 
(2015) conceptualize this nascent finance culture as one in which “…households have 
come to actively embrace financial strategies as a means to manage their consumption, 
indebtedness and saving....” (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015: 576). The authors find that 
American household’s participation in the financial system (via the use of financialized 
economic objects) has indeed increased over time. More specifically, the authors found 
that over time, households interacted more frequently with financial professionals when 
making decisions, and they held increasing numbers of credit cards and other accounts 
including mortgages, bank accounts, and equity and mutual funds. Overall, theorists 
examining the financialization of the everyday contend that greater risk tolerance coupled 
with the strategic use of economic instruments is at the heart of a finance cultural 
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orientation (Harmes 2001, Langley 2007, Montgomery 2012, Kus 2014, Fligstein and 
Goldstein 2015).  
However, this is where the overarching adherence to finance culture stops, and 
where the authors find distinctions in finance logics begin to manifest, in ways reflecting 
structural constraint. Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) show, rather unsurprisingly, that 
variations in the degree of financial market involvement are strongly related to 
households’ position within the soceioeconomic order. The most advantaged groups 
generally always employed more financial instruments and services at any point, and 
over time, they deployed such financial tools far more than other, less advantaged social 
strata (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). It is important then, to fully flesh out how such 
differences may change dynamically over time.  
 
 
Debt, Inequality and Class Position 
Credit has provided a boon to households experiencing the woes wrought by Neoliberal 
policies in the US. Within the American context of neoliberal structural shifts which 
engendered stagnating wages, declining purchasing power, growing labor market risks, 
and rapidly increasing income inequality and overall precariousness (Hacker 2012)? 
However, it stands to reason that the specific pressures and constraints households’ faced 
are dictated by households’ position within the social structure. Of course, this means that 
how households understand the appropriate uses of credit depends to some extent on their 
position within the social structure.  
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In the second chapter of my dissertation, I adjudicate between the distinct uses of credit 
among American households in the year 2010. I draw on the Bourdieusian understanding 
of consumption as a lens through which to understand credit consumption in the context 
of social strata, and the complex of different forces acting upon each position therein. 
Importantly, the construction of meaning—often reflected in attitudes—is a 
"product of historical conditions, ideological socialization, and social location" (Goldberg 
and DiMaggio 2015: 2). The premise that economic precariousness is an important 
component of social location—one which functions as a structural constraint in 
economically vulnerable households—guides how credit acceptance may be differentially 
patterned by class membership. Given that the embeddedness frame presupposes an 
interaction between structure, institutions, and cultural understandings, I submit that 
while attitudes of debt acceptability will be widely adopted across class, the extent to 
which distinct classes exhibit such acceptance will not be uniform. 
 
Finance Culture and Credit Consumption: Meanings and Uses of Credit  
Beyond defining the strategic use of home debt—whether via investment facilitated by 
home equity lines of credit or via rental income from investment properties—as 
“financialized”, there is little theorizing about the financialized uses of consumer credit. 
How finance logics dictate the appropriate use of credit on the part of households is not 
properly delineated. In fact, in the limited body of work in which consumer credit at the 
household level is examined, there is no agreed upon definition regarding what the 
financialized use of credit would entail, aside from the diffuse and incomplete notion that 
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it be used for the purposes of investment. The nature of financialized credit use—more so 
than most other financial tools—should be clearly conceptualized.  
Why? Because although consumer credit is one of the most democratized and 
widely available financial tools within reach of American households (Kus 2014, Van der 
Zwan 2014), it is also one of the most complex. It is unarguably less fungible than 
money, because it possesses not just quantity but qualitative differentiations. These 
differentiations vary by credit source, as well as by the functions for which each class of 
credit can be deployed. This is only important, however, because it is only in the case of 
credit that it’s multiple kinds and uses engender highly distinct and unequal potential 
profits and likely risks (Sullivan 2013). What is understood about the varied uses of 
credit suggests that the benefits and risks households incur in their credit consumption is 
inequitable and may exacerbate the extent of economic inequality (Fourcade and Healy 
2013). However, some theorists point out that the inequalities, which may be produced 
through credit consumption can be more opaque than currently theorized. Teresa Sullivan 
(2013) puts it succinctly, stating:  
“Debt has the potential to affect social mobility as well, certainly in the negative 
sense of downward mobility but also in the more subtle ways that debt may be 
used to alter the relative position of two generations. Blue-collar parents who 
incur college debt for their children are an example of a debt that might foster 
social mobility, assuming that the college graduates could achieve a better 
occupational position and income with their degrees.” (p. 37). 
Thus, class contingent conceptualizations of both debt and credit in the context of a 
financialized citizenry must be examined. In the context of the link between cultural 
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understandings and credit attitudes, sociologists (Davis 2009, Goldstein 2013, Fligstein 
and Goldstein 2015) find evidence for the relatively recent—and broad—diffusion of a 
norm characterized by the increased acceptance of indebtedness in the US. Fligstein and 
Goldstein (2015), however, further distinguish between households who use their 
available credit in order to “invest” for the purposes of wealth creation (via the 
households’ home equity lines of credit), and juxtaposition them against households 
which ostensibly deploy their credit to maintain their lifestyle in the face of a potential 
downgrade—those households driven to borrow “defensively”. But, the authors also 
contend that there is evidence that people at the top of the income distribution are using 
their growing economic resources to facilitate increased consumption while it becomes 
progressively more difficult for those less advantaged to keep pace. Clearly, the meaning 
of the new financial culture is quite different depending on where you stand in the social 
structure. Thus, we should see different class effects for how these cultural factors matter 
for the size of household indebtedness, particularly over time. 
 
Proposition 1: Acceptability of debt begins highest for wealthy upper class, and as time 
progresses, acceptability levels increase for middle class households and then for lower 
classes as well.  
 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, scholars documented the rapid and substantial 
deleveraging on the part of American households (Wolff 2013). The dominant narrative 
claimed that households engaged in irresponsible borrowing—to facilitate 
consumption—in the years leading up to the housing crisis. Once the Great Recession 
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began in earnest, American households were savvy enough to reduce their consumption 
(on credit), reduce costs and increase savings (Federal Reserve 2010). Consistent with 
this explanation, research finds that, in fact, households may be more willing to increase 
debt during times of greater economic prosperity (Dynan and Kohn 2007: 4). The late 
1990s and early 2000s were just such a period (Kus 2015) but due to severe losses and 
foreclosures for individual households due to the financial crisis (Montgomerie 2009; 
Fligstein and Goldstein 2012; Wolff 2007; 2012). Such a consumer-demand driven 
account of Americans’ post-recession deleveraging would suggest that acceptance levels 
for debt would decline across classes.  
Proposition 2: After the financial crisis of 2008, acceptability of debt levels decreases for 
all classes. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
My research draws on cross sectional, household level data available in the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is conducted triennially by the Federal Reserve and 
is one of the most reliable and detailed sources of economic information gathered on 
families in the US (Pressman and Scott 2009; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). Because it 
oversamples wealthy households, it is not nationally representative (Keister 2000a). 
Making use of sampling weights, however, rectifies this, and renders this data 
representative of U.S. households (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). I make use of ten 
individual cross sectional datasets provided by the SCF. This data is in the form of 
repeated cross sectional data, collected and publicly released triennially, with the earliest 
full survey conducted by the SCF in 1989, while the most recent in 2016.  
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 The analytic strategy for this project is simple. I make extensive use of descriptive 
comparisons of mean levels of household debt acceptability, and supplementary analyses 
of mean debt to income ratios, in the following ways: (1) across time (by each survey 
year); and (2) for both the full sample as well as by class category. I also examine debt 
acceptability across distinct categories of credit funded consumption. The second part of 
my analytic strategy is to conduct several One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and 
Multiple Comparisons, for which I ran tests for Bonferroni-corrected as well as 
associated inferential results indicating significant differences among means in each 
class, for each survey year. I use Bonferroni correction to conduct pairwise tests 
assessing whether the difference between means of two groups is significant.   
 
Variables 
Overall Debt Acceptability Score 
To assess households’ general level of debt acceptance, as a way to capture the finance 
culture, I rely on an attitudinal measure that is used to assess attitudes about how 
acceptable the use of credit is to make purchases (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). The 
SCF asks respondents the question: In general, do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea 
for people to buy things by borrowing or on credit?  The answer choices include: 1) It is 
never acceptable, 2) It is only sometimes acceptable, 3) It is always acceptable. In order 
to assess the independent influence of acceptability of using credit (which also best 
corresponds to descriptions of the debt culture), I collapse response categories 2 and 3, 
creating a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for those who are accepting of credit usage, 
zero for those who have exhibit no credit acceptance. 
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Specific Debt Acceptability Measures  
I also make use of several additional variables that measure the acceptability incurring 
debt in the service of five rather specific and distinct kinds of purchases. Each of the 
below are dichotomous variables (with 0= “No”; 1= “Yes”) that respondents use to 
answer the question: do you feel it is all right for someone like yourself to borrow money 
in order to? These specific debt acceptability scores ascertain the acceptability of debt to: 
1) Cover the expenses of a vacation trip (2) cover living expenses when income is cut? 
(3) Finance the purchase of a fur coat or jewelry? (4) Finance the purchase of a car? (5) 
To finance educational expenses? 
 
Social Class 
Class is partitioned into five categories: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle 
class, working class, and the poor. The measure of social class was constructed as index 
variable on the basis of income quintiles (Wolff 2012), educational attainment, and 
occupational category, following standard operationalizations in previous research 
(DiMaggio and Useem 1978; Marger 2008; Petev 2013). A categorical measure of 
respondents’ highest educational attainment is already provided by the SCF, and it is 
partitioned into five categories: less than a high school diploma, high school graduate, 
some college, college graduate, and post graduate study9. Again this scheme is well 
established in the literature (Warren and Thorne 2012). Closely aligned (though not a 
precise match) with the Featherman-Hauser (F-H) scheme of occupational 
 
9 I use the five categories of educational attainment utilized by Warren and Thorne (2012); see Figure 2.2 
(p. 29). 
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classification—proposed by the authors in 1978—are the categories of this measure 
constructed by the SCF (for an excellent review of the F-H scheme, see: Petev 2013). The 
variable in the public SCF data set relies on 4-digit census codes (2010 codebook n.d.), 
but collapses these occupations into 6 categories: 1) managerial and professional 
occupations, 2) administrative occupations, 3) blue collar and service oriented 
occupations 5) low wage work/manual labor and 6) occupations involved in public 
safety—such as the armed and police forces.10 By combining income, occupation and 
education, I create a single index variable of social class.11  Importantly, the five resultant 
class categories were also constructed to accord precisely with Marger’s (2008) detailed 
description of the three middle classes, such that both the upper class and the poor 
categories flank the entire middle class.  
 
 
RESULTS 
Mean Debt Acceptability Scores 
The first trend that I report on concerns overall debt acceptability scores. We can 
see that there is more variation among social classes in how acceptable they find debt 
generally, and much more agreement between classes in their acceptance of debt 
subtypes. Whether a particular debt purchase type is more or less acceptable, social 
 
10 Refer to US Census Bureau Appendix F (available online at: 
http://publicdata.norc.org/GSS/DOCUMENTS/BOOK/GSS_Codebook_AppendixF.pdf) for details 
regarding the coding criteria used. 
11Refer to Table 2.1 (p. 58) for more information on the distinctions in income, occupation and education 
among each level of the middle class.  
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classes seem to be much more monolithic in how they think about specific classes of 
credit use versus debt in general.   
[Table 3A About Here] 
 
A strikingly rapid (and complete) reversal in what kinds of debt is acceptable, and which 
sort is not, occurs sometime between 1992 and 1995. The overall shift is one in which 
credit moves from being appropriately used for leisure and luxury consumption (in 1992) 
to an economic object, which is instead, appropriately used to help households to survive 
structural hardships (1995). More specifically, although the acceptability of debt in 
general doesn’t shift much from 1992 to 1995, the acceptability of debt subtypes is 
almost perfectly inverted within that time period. The mean acceptance scores of using 
credit to finance a vacation drops from .40 and then 0.34 in 1989 and 1992, respectively, 
to a mean acceptance score of around 0.15 in 1995.  
Similarly, the mean acceptance score of using debt to buy a luxury item (namely, 
a fur coat or jewelry) drops from an aggregate mean acceptance score of 0.41 in both 
1989 and 1992, to a mean acceptance of 0.07. Both these new low mean acceptance 
scores remain as low or further decrease in all time points after 1995. In that same year 
we see the complementary, sharp and long-lasting increase in the mean acceptability of 
using credit to supplement lost wages, as well as to finance a vehicle. These new 
increases also remain stable (or further deepen) across subsequent time points after 1995.  
Lastly, it is interesting to note that the acceptability of using credit to fund one’s 
education remains somewhat more stable across the points of time I include in my 
analysis. Although the mean acceptability of incurring debt to finance an education is 
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significantly lower in 1989 and 1992 as compared with most other time points, the 
amount of change in mean acceptance score is far smaller. In other words, we see a much 
smaller increase in the average acceptance score of educational-related debt in 1995, 
when compared to the large changes in the acceptance scores of all other debt types. 
Lastly, according to Table 3A, the mean acceptability of debt-financed education drops to 
0.76 in 2016. Though it is important to note that his score is not significantly different 
from scores in other years (aside from 1989 and 1992).  
 
Time Trends in Normative Understandings of Credit 
Importantly, we see absolutely no class-based distinctions in mean acceptance scores of 
any of the debt subtypes (only within the acceptability of debt generally) within any year 
after 1992, until 2016. In 2016, we see large and significant distinctions between classes’ 
acceptance levels for using debt to supplement lost wages, to finance a vehicle, and for 
the first time point in my dataset, there are class-contingent differences in how acceptable 
it is to incur debt to finance an education. It is also rather noteworthy—and perhaps 
somewhat surprising—that the acceptance of student loans have been the only debt 
subtype, which stayed relatively (and monolithically) high, without any significant 
differences in mean acceptance for the full sample or by class over time, except in 2016.    
 
[Table 3B About Here] 
 
Table 3B results highlight an overall trend towards declining acceptance levels of 
American households in the aggregate as time passes.  
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[Figure 3B About Here] 
 
Although the mean overall acceptance score for American households is significantly 
lower in 2010 than any other year, there is still a clear trend downward, over the 20 year 
period, in how accepting Americans are of debt generally. This undercuts Fligstein and 
Goldstein’s (2015) assertion that those who need to borrow to stay afloat economically 
are more accepting of incurring debt.  Results in Table 3B and Figure 3A also 
demonstrate why I reject Proposition 1, which holds that the acceptability of debt begins 
highest for wealthy upper class, and as time progresses, acceptability levels increase for 
middle class households and then for lower classes as well. Additionally, results in Table 
3B demonstrate that in 1989, the upper class is actually the least accepting of debt overall 
as compared to the remaining 4 social classes (see Figure 3B). I also reject Proposition 1 
because both WC and poor households’ aggregate debt acceptance levels are significantly 
higher than those of more advantaged social classes in 1989, 1992, and even as late as 
1995. These findings, taken together, characterize precisely the reverse of what is 
expected according to Fligstein and Goldstein’s (2015) description of finance cultural 
logics as they pertain to household credit consumption. 
This finding also suggests that the overall (significantly) high(est) acceptability 
score of US in general in 1989 can be attributed to two alternative explanations. One 
plausible explanation is that working class and poor households’ relatively higher mean 
acceptance of debt generally pulls the mean acceptance of debt generally up high enough 
in 1989 that it becomes significantly higher than any other year. A second explanation 
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would be that using debt in general cannot be understood as a simple amalgam of all the 
distinct debt subtypes; i.e. this would imply that it is not advisable to sum across the debt 
acceptance subtypes to arrive at an approximate acceptance level of debt generally. Debt 
in general would then be a different theoretical construct than is incurring debt in the 
service of reaching some specific goal. However, the first explanation is unlikely, since in 
1992, the full sample acceptability for debt in general is 0.34—not significantly higher 
than other years, but the classed pattern is even more exaggerated than it is in 1989. More 
precisely, the acceptability of debt generally is significantly higher among poor 
households in 1992, and upper class households are more accepting of using debt this 
way than in 1989.  
Next, the mean aggregate debt acceptance score of debt in general for upper class 
households in 1989 is significantly lower than that of all other social classes (0.37 p < 
0.005). This is seemingly driven by the only real class distinction in mean acceptance of 
any sort of purchase type. In 1989, aside from debt to finance a vacation; there are no 
significant differences between the mean acceptance levels of any social class. Moreover, 
the data in Table 3B clearly highlights that both upper middle and lower middle class 
households’ aggregate acceptance of debt generally is significantly less than that of poor 
and WC households and significantly higher than that of UC households in 1989. The 
acceptability of using debt in general remains statistically indistinct from that of other 
classes (largely) after this point in time; even in 2010 onwards.  
I also reject my second proposition, which predicts that the debt acceptance levels 
of households belonging to all five social classes (overall but also for various purchase 
types) will decline significantly in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
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Interestingly enough, while for the full sample of US households the mean acceptability 
of using debt generally is actually the lowest (significantly) in 2010 as compared to any 
other year, acceptance scores (for any of the 5 debt purchase subtypes) of Americans in 
2007 are not significantly different than those in 2010. Moreover, results in Table 3B 
highlight the fact that there are no social class categories for whom any one of their debt 
acceptability scores in 2010 is significantly different theirs in 2007. Thus, it appears as 
though debt acceptance was unchanged by the financial crisis.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Undiminished after Crises: The Need for Credit 
Two plausible explanations may account for the fact that I observe no statistically 
significant declines in the acceptance of incurring debt from 2007 to 2010 for any 
specific social class category (although there is a significant decline for all Americans, in 
the aggregate, when asked about the acceptability of just accruing debt generally). One 
possibility is that the deleveraging that researchers and empiricists chronicled in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession was simply not a product of consumer demand, but 
rather reflected supply-side constraints. Lenders may have slashed the credit they made 
available to consumers. The less palatable possibility is that households deleveraged 
rapidly because they lost their homes to foreclosures in the midst of the sudden economic 
insecurity. It is perhaps unexpected that there is no significant shift (not even in the 
positive direction) of classed debt acceptance scores that would be consistent with the 
exigency characterizing either one of the supply-driven deleveraging accounts. Perhaps 
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the cognitive and cultural drivers of debt acceptance are less affected by structural 
conditions than expected.  
 
Over Time--Finance Culture for All: Classed Uniformity in Debt Acceptance 
Across time, class-contingent attitudes about the acceptability of using credit for different 
purposes helps to clarify a great deal about the contours of the finance culture in 
American households. A direct examination of how households occupying distinct 
positions within the social structure perceive how acceptable it is to deploy credit for 
distinct reasons may lend greater insight into the extent to which the logics of finance are 
embraced. This direct exploration of how members of disparate social classes really 
understand their credit is preferable to using only information about real debt 
consumption to try and deduce what normative understandings households really have.  
Table 3B displays results from both the descriptive tables of debt acceptance as 
well as the corresponding inferential statistics about their significances presented in the 
Bonferroni corrected ANOVA. Several statistically significant trends which emerge in 
overall debt acceptability over time, suggest important revisions must be made to current 
understandings regarding the finance culture in the scholarship. First, despite Fligstein 
and Goldstein’s (2015) argument that the wealthy and upper middle class have embraced 
the logics of the finance culture to a greater extent than other households is less 
consistent with the results of my analysis for this chapter. At least not in the case of how 
American households conceptualize taking on credit, as opposed to how they actually 
deploy their credit, which is the yardstick with which Fligstein and Goldstein’s (2015) 
measure households’ adherence to the dictates of finance culture. This overall pattern of 
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relatively high intra-class homogeneity of acceptance levels—of attitudes towards 
incurring debt—as compared with very distinct, class-contingent credit consumption 
patterns suggests that only differences in access to credit (both amount and particularly 
important—kind) drive classed differences in indebtedness and credit use.  
 The single, dramatic shift in how all households—regardless of their structural 
position—understood the appropriate functions and meanings of credit overall is a critical 
juncture in understanding how norms of finance shape understandings about credit 
consumption. It is clear that substantively, within a three year period, the general 
understanding of what consumer debt could and should be deployed for was turned on its 
head. Before 1995, American households conceptualized credit as a consumption 
enabling tool; one which was most appropriately used to facilitate luxury and/or leisure 
goods or services. That is, to furnish consumption of frivolous items or services which 
were out of reach with households’ standard economic resources. Americans abruptly 
reversed course, and by 1995, the overarching meaning of credit, and its appropriate uses, 
had shifted according to the dictates of financialization—both cultural and ostensibly also 
structural. It would appear that, by 1995, households understood credit as an important 
financial tool, which was to be deployed calculatively, in the service of households’ 
economic health. Of course, household economic wellbeing encompasses both defensive 
spending on credit (to help mitigate the impact of any structural exigencies engendered 
by neoliberal polices—welfare state rollbacks combined with labor market precarity 
which befall a household) as well as future-oriented strategies for increasing household’s 
economic standing (mobility-oriented).  
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Thus it seems that the norms of finance culture were absorbed relatively rapidly 
across all social strata to shape understandings about how credit should be used in 
homogenous ways. This is in contrast with notion that financial logics are not equally 
embraced (constrained either by differences in financial literacy or attributable to 
structural constraints patterning beliefs as well as action (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015).  
Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) posit that, “those who are facing downward income 
mobility have always had a more open attitude towards taking on debt in order to support 
their lifestyles. In the face of income decline, they have always been willing to go into 
debt to support their current lifestyle. What has changed is that those whose incomes are 
constant or rising agree in increasing numbers over time that it is permissible to go into 
debt to support one’s lifestyle” (2015: 145).   
The ostensibly counterintuitive results of class-contingent acceptance of debt 
generally over time undercuts the argument that structural location in some way inhibits 
households which are less advantaged from adopting finance cultural norms and frames. 
That those households belonging to the most financialized strata—the most advantaged 
strata—hold the least accepting attitudes about incurring debt (while borrowing the most 
in absolute terms, and no less than others in relative terms), and those who are least 
finance-savvy are the most accepting may truly reflect each classes’ underlying degree of 
adoption of the debt acceptance norm. Those in relatively more advantaged social strata 
make greater use of financial products; they also rely on finance professionals to the 
highest degree. The least disadvantaged strata are of course, the least financialized in 
terms of what they borrow and for what purpose.  
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On the other hand, these results may actually be demonstrating differential 
engagement in finance culture. This would be the case if the acceptance pattern we see 
(the reverse of what is predicted) reflects that upper class households are most financially 
savvy and recognize more clearly the pitfalls associated with debt. Thus, they may simply 
be more discerning in terms of the kinds of credit they find it appropriate to deploy and 
may be more calculative in the kinds of purchases they make with said credit (low risk, 
high yield for example). This interpretation would square with hoe upper class 
households actually make use of their credit (not driven by structural pressures as are 
other social classes).  
 
CONCLUSION 
I argue that the classed credit consumption patterns which I find evolving over time arise, 
to a large degree, as a consequence of the unequal structural barriers to accessing 
divergent kinds of credit instruments, which fosters novel forms of inequality. Both 
economic inequality as well as economic volatility have increased significantly in the 
neoliberal era. Financialization has exacerbated both these processes, via increasing 
macroeconomic instability in which households are subject to progressively more 
financial crises as time moves forward. At the household level, norms of finance 
culture—those valorizing calculative investment and economic independence in order to 
fend for one’s own financial health in era of increasing economic precarity are absorbed 
across the social strata rather equally, in terms of credit use. However, when you pool this 
homogenous credit acceptance with the constraints of social location, such logic is highly 
problematic for households unable to access the kinds of credit, which carry the most 
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benefit and the least risk. The result is a deepening of economic inequality—since the 
increased drive to borrow in the service of preserving economic health transcends class, 
but the credit available to those who are economically constrained yields further 
constraint rather than economic prosperity (Fourcade and Healy 2013).  
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CHAPTER 4:  The Welfare State/Consumer Credit Link in an Era of 
Financialization 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Household debt—both consumer as well as mortgage—has been steadily increasing over 
time. Until about the late 1990’s, the juggernaut that is proliferating household 
indebtedness was largely an American phenomenon; some theorists attributed 
American’s high debt to some anomalous feature of US culture—ranging from hedonistic 
materialism (Ritzer 2013) to an excessive focus on positional competition (Schor 2007). 
Others attributed household overleveraging to institutional or structural deficiencies 
unique to the American case. Some scholars emphasized how the lack of American health 
care access led to higher than normal consumer credit use in the US (Prasad 2012), while 
others focused the high levels of primary residence mortgage debt. However, the tide 
began to shift in the late 1990s. Household debt levels cross nationally have been 
converging over time, to higher levels of debt. Kus (2015: 212) argues that “the rising 
household indebtedness is a global phenomenon that is part and parcel of the neoliberal 
reorganization of the state–economy–society relationship.” 
There are several ways in which the neoliberal turn may have impacted household 
indebtedness; although this process is still best exemplified by the American case, it is 
widely applicable to any state.. On the supply side, the deregulation of credit markets 
made a larger supply of credit available to a larger pool of people. With less rigid 
regulations, the financial sector and credit markets became more aggressive in pushing 
high-risk loans – particularly to citizens in the lower end of the income distribution 
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(Montgomerie 2009; Soederberg 2013). On the demand side, the erosion of social safety 
nets and shrinking wages increased citizens’ credit reliance (Crouch 2009; Rajan 2010; 
Kus 2013; Montgomerie 2009; Leicht and Fitzgerald, 2014a, 2014b). At the same time, 
increasing demand for consumer products during the late 1990s and early 2000s – a time 
of high growth in many Western nations, particularly in the United States – caused 
middle-class families to save less and spend more on credit (Schor 1998; Frank 2007; 
Cynamon and Fazzari 2008; Davis 2009).  
The supply and demand side factors have likely interacted as well. The increased 
access to credit moderated the effects of decline in real purchasing power, and rising 
inequality by enabling households to pay for a variety of necessities and conveniences 
using credit. For many middle and lower-income American households, however, this 
meant a new form of socioeconomic insecurity that came with paramount levels of 
indebtedness – what Leicht and Fitzgerald (2014a, 2014b) call “the hidden crisis of the 
American middle class. 
 Although much scholarship delineates the expected impact of both supply and 
demand side forces on actor level debt (Kus 2014, Davis and Kim 2011), there is still 
very little in the way of sociological work, which directly examines the impact of both 
supply and demand side forces on overall (rather than exclusively mortgage) debt 
incurred by individual households.  
Prasad’s work (2012) is unique in that it expands the welfare/state social spending 
tradeoff literature beyond the narrow focus on mortgage debt. Prasad (2012) chooses to 
examine overall consumer debt rather than exclusively looking at primary residence debt. 
This is certainly necessary. Scholars of financialization have argued persuasively that the 
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democratization of credit fostered by deepening neoliberalism globally, along with new 
norms of consumer investment engendered by the nascent finance culture have drastically 
altered how households think about and use various (sometimes novel) kinds of credit 
available to them. However, a major gap remains, as Prasad (2012) looks at aggregated 
consumer debt--at the state level—rather than at the household level. The questions 
which remain, and which I will address in this chapter, include: What is the relationship 
between state level social spending and total household level (rather than aggregated) 
indebtedness? Moreover, what impact-if any—does the degree of state-level 
financialization exert on household indebtedness?  
To answer these questions, I employ hierarchical linear models using annual data 
for the years 2004 through 2015 from both the World Bank and EU-SILC databases, 
which, together, provide household and country level data for 30 European Union 
member nations. The EU-SILC provides relatively fine grained information on EU 
member nation households, particularly in terms of information on families’ finances. 
Thus, I have relatively comparable information on the important financial aspects—
including income, economic insecurity, and overall, as well as some specific subclasses 
of indebtedness—of households in the US as well as in 30 EU members states. The 
World Bank provides reliable and detailed data on state level measures I use in this 
chapter. Both sources of data also include essential covariates, which I use in my analyses 
along with my central variables of interest, namely welfare state provisions and 
household level transfer income. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Welfare State Institutions 
In his seminal work, Esping-Anderson (1990) posits that welfare states have distinct 
organizations based on a variety of priorities involving different understandings about 
what constitutes the optimal degree of a state’s responsibility to ensure its’ citizens’ well 
being (Esping-Andersen 1990). As such, different welfare regimes are a result of 1) a 
state's unique established tradition of intervention into the market (Freeman 1995; Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Hicks & Kenworthy 2003), (2) the manner in which policy has developed 
over time and has become institutionalized, and (3) the distinct cultural understandings 
which dictate how much or how little state intervention is ideal in ensuring citizen well 
being. Esping-Andersen (1990) delineates a typology consisting of three distinct, 
overarching welfare state types. He posits that welfare states are either liberal, 
conservative or social democratic in terms of the different value orientations around their 
provision of care to citizens. 
More specifically, Esping-Andersen (1990) asserts that within Western states, 
welfare state regimes diverge in their cultural understandings regarding the optimal mix 
of publicly guaranteed social rights and ‘private initiative’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 78). 
The author avers that social democratic states foster policies that underscore the vital 
importance of equality. In contrast, liberal welfare states implement targeted policies. 
That is, it institutes policies in which need is the central consideration for who should 
appropriately receive welfare monies. In the United States—the quintessential liberal 
welfare state—recipients of state transfers are not eligible for benefits if their income 
exceeds a particular threshold (Schwichtenberg 2014). In fact, most theorists argue that 
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America’s social welfare policies are the most limited in eligibility, coverage and cost 
among the major Western powers’ (Rodgers 2006: 77).  
In contrast, liberal welfare states offer the most spartan protection in comparison 
to all other welfare state regimes. In these states, social programs designed as means-
tested and targeted to citizens—as such, they require  those receiving transfer monies 
from the state not to exceed maximum levels of income in order to receive such benefits. 
Benefits, when offered are generally spartan—and can be considered paltry. modest 
amounts. DiPrete and McManus observe, “American welfare benefits are modest and of 
short duration, which motivates individuals to rely on their own actions and on the 
actions of family members to offset adverse employment events and the negative 
consequences of losing a partner” (2000; 344). The United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Australia are all examples of liveral welfare states.  
Conservative welfare states are differentiated by low decommodification efforts 
on the part of the state, as well as by a strong emphasis on non-state intervention based on 
community, religious, or family sources of support. This may be explained by the 
conservative state’s history with the Catholic Church (Esping-Andersen 1990; p.73).  
Corporatist nations spend more than liberal nations on social programs, and have lower 
inequality rates overall (Taylor-Gooby 1991). Italy, France, Germany and Belgium 
exemplify conservative welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Last, the social democratic welfare state typifies universalist policies, strong 
decommodification policies, and an overt, clear and explicit commitment to equality 
among citizens. Previous research (Korpi & Palme 1998; Esping-Andersen 1990) 
demonstrates that social democratic states have the lowest rates of poverty, in comparison 
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to states which fall under either liberal or conservative regimes types. In social 
democratic welfare state regimes, countries devote the highest percentage of their 
expenditures toward social services, have higher percentages of their budget allocated 
toward social spending programs, promote full employment, and a goal of limited 
inequality between citizens relative to states of other welfare state regime types. 
Examples of social democratic nations include Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and 
the Netherlands. 
 
The Welfare/Credit Nexus 
Two separate fields of research over the past 30 years wrestle with uncovering the link 
between welfare state provisions and credit at the household level.  The most established 
body of work examines the specific link between welfare state—social spending, and 
consumer’s mortgage debt (Kemeny 1981; Castles 1998; Conley & Gifford 2006). The 
second is a relatively nascent body of work, in which a few empirical pieces have 
extended their examination such that “credit” now encompasses all consumer credit (e.g. 
Prasad 2012; Kus 2011). Both strands of scholarship argue that increased state spending 
on social programs can decrease the amount of debt citizens take on. It is important to 
note, however, that work in the latter tradition identifies conditions under which the 
tradeoff either does not exist at all, or in which it reverses course. That is, the tradeoff 
doesn’t always hold. 
 
Linking Welfare Provisions to Household Debt: The Influence of Macro Level Social 
Spending  
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Much literature on the welfare state in the U.S. has examined the relationship between 
home equity and the balance between public and private systems of welfare. In the 
context of the equity/welfare tradeoff, equity functions as a substitute for inadequate 
public safety provisions. Kemeny (1980) and Castles (1998) find that homeownership 
may be associated with a weak welfare state, specifically in states with low public 
pensions, such as the United States. Kemeny (1980) pointed to the notion that 
taxpayers—specifically those who own homes rather than rent—resisted more expansive 
social spending. That is, because homeowners have higher up-front costs during a time 
when incomes are relatively low in the life cycle, they are less amenable to policies of 
generous pension provisions. Generous public spending engenders higher tax rates for 
homeowners. Ansell (2011) findings concur with this argument, finding that in the United 
Kingdom, households that acquired a home became unsupportive of higher taxes to 
finance benefits. Speaking more explicitly to the substitutive relationship between 
mortgage debt and welfare, Castles (1998) argues that the tradeoff between housing and 
public welfare monies results from the fact that a weak welfare state provides incentives 
to use homeownership as a financial asset. Homeownership, then, acts to substitute 
inadequate state transfers—it is a social insurance mechanism. Conley and Gifford (2006) 
corroborate this finding using cross-national time series data. The authors test whether 
high levels of homeownership are primarily due to a substitution effect—where equity 
functions as a substitute for low social spending—or an income effect. The authors 
conclude that indeed, homeownership is a substitute for insufficient social spending, and 
that mortgage debt is inversely related to social welfare spending. Little scholarship 
exists which directly examines the impact of welfare state policies on household 
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indebtedness more generally (Schwichtenberg 2014). Although it does not examine total 
or overall credit as it is consumed at the household level, a nascent line of work has 
moved beyond the theoretical limits imposed by restricting the examination of the 
welfare state/credit tradeoff beyond mortgage debt. This line of work examines the 
tradeoff between social spending and some specific kind aggregate consumer credit. 
Johanna Montgomerie (2006a) argues that higher levels of household debt are the result 
of a political strategy employed in neoliberal economies to implement non-inflationary 
growth policy. This includes relatively weak public social welfare provisions 
(Montgomerie 2006a). Credit is a substitute for various economic shortcomings 
engendered by a complex of neoliberal policies—of which low social spending is a part. 
Soederberg (2013) looks specifically at the credit card debt in the aggregate, homing in 
on the features of households that possess larger ratios of credit card debt to other kinds 
of consumer credit. The author not only attributes the credit-welfare link to both wage 
stagnation and welfare retrenchment, at a time in which credit policies became more lax. 
He argues that the current mode of accumulation—within the context of deepening 
neoliberalism—purposively positions credit cards to serve just such a substitutive 
function for the most insecure strata in society: the underemployed and unemployed. 
Specifically, scholars argue that neoliberal policies give rise to (Peck, 2001; Wacquant, 
2009) a specific set of structural constraints—namely wage stagnation and falling 
purchasing power across the board, the commodification of public goods and services, an 
increasing share of low-wage jobs within the labor market—specifically pink collar jobs, 
and the turn to workfare from welfare—which ousts progressively larger proportions of 
the population to the ranks of the under and unemployed. In this vein, earlier work 
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(Barbo and Pivetti 2009; Warren and Tyagi 2003; Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook 2011) 
has proposed that in the U.S., weak public spending, along with relatively easy access to 
credit and bankruptcy results in credit assuming the function of public welfare for those 
in need. Krippner (2005) and Rajan (2010) focus on the substitutive function of credit as 
it pertains to the middle classes. Both theorists argue that politicians advocated for the 
employment of credit as a response to middle class demands for greater economic 
security. Thus, consumer and mortgage credit are increasingly used as a substitute for 
both stagnant wages and insufficient state transfers.  
What about the relationship between welfare state spending and overall or total 
consumer credit? One of the only empirical works to explicitly extend its examination of 
the welfare/credit relationship beyond mortgage debt is Prasad (2012). Prasad (2012) 
argues that a there is a balance between relying on credit and relying on the welfare state 
that varies among industrialized nations. Prasad (2012) finds that when deregulation 
occurs in states with less developed welfare policies, these states experience a rapid 
proliferation in household indebtedness in comparison to more developed welfare states. 
On the whole, Prasad (2012) finds support for the credit/welfare tradeoff. However, she 
also provides a nuance to this finding by taking account of an important contextual 
influence, which mediates how debt and social spending are related. She finds that the 
substitutive relationship between aggregate social spending and household debt exists 
only under circumstances of extensive deregulation—such as is the case in the United 
States. More specifically, she finds that where the welfare state is weak, regulation 
suppresses credit usage. But deregulation makes possible the consumption of goods and 
services on credit—goods and services that would have otherwise been purchased with 
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state transfer monies As she writes, “In the postwar period this led the United States to 
develop a heavily regulated economy that was also marked by high demand for credit, 
while it led to an increasingly strong welfare state in Europe” (Prasad 2012: 243).  
 
 
Beyond the US: Welfare State Provisions’ Impact on Micro Level Total Indebtedness  
Some scholars assert that the distinction between the US and European welfare 
provisions is not one of amount, but of kind. Hacker (2002: 21) notes that “the share of 
the U.S. economy devoted to social welfare spending is not all that different from the 
corresponding proportion in even the most generous of European welfare states.  
What is most distinctive about American social welfare practice is not the level of 
spending but the source (Hacker 2006). In fact, in the U.S. context, much of the welfare 
system is private and hidden (Hacker 2004; Leicht 2012; Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014; 
Prasad 2012). That is, state transfers are provided through the employment within the 
labor market (via pensions, healthcare, and the like), rather than directly through the state 
(Hacker 2004). Households that are either very vulnerable or that have experienced an 
economic shock (or both) tend to draw on state transfers to sustain themselves. Many 
households are then prey to income volatility that has been increasing due in no small 
part to organizational restructuring in service of the shareholder value orientation that 
dominates American workplaces (Jung and Dobbin 2012). Due to the private nature of 
the U.S. welfare regime, many middle class and lower class households have experienced 
a loss of private workplace benefits, providing an impetus for greater consumer 
borrowing than households in European states (Hacker 2004, 2006).  
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Rethinking the Credit/Welfare Link? Financialization at the State Level and its Impact on 
Household Level Economic Action  
Shifts in Household Understandings—Complementarity Rather than Substitution 
Although the credit/welfare tradeoff literature has documented a substitutive relationship 
between welfare spending and household debt in many scenarios, there may be good 
reason to expect a positive relationship between welfare and debt in other cases. Rona-
Tas and Guseva (2018): 59 explicitly claim that, depending on context “high rates of 
borrowing may, in fact, correlate with generous welfare provisions.”  
The authors lay out numerous examples in which a complimentary, rather than 
substitutive, relationship between aggregate consumer (or aggregate household) credit 
and welfare spending has emerged. First, Finland’s consumer debt rose despite its’ 
unchanged robust welfare spending (Oksanen et al. 2015, p. 232). Schelke (2012) 
chronicles the case of France, in which the 2008 financial crisis was preceded by a 
housing bubble even larger than that in the US. After the crisis, even though their welfare 
state is far stronger than that of the US, France experienced greater precarity and 
increased short term borrowing than the US. 
Next, the authors delineate lay out numerous conditions in/circumstances under 
which a complimentary relationship is expected, since generous welfare provisions can 
even stimulate greater consumer borrowing (Rona-Tas and Guseva 2018). In fact, there 
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are good reasons to believe that generous welfare provisions can actually encourage more 
borrowing in general. One reason is that purchasing power may be greater in countries 
with smaller welfare states; one important reason may be because a weaker welfare state 
is associated with lower taxation (Prasad 2012). Whatever is driving households’ credit 
consumption—whether conspicuous consumption or to bridge structural gaps in the fact 
of economic shocks—economic uncertainty and weak social safety net provisions can 
stifle households’ inclination to borrow, and instead prompt them to save real monies 
(Zavisca 2012). A related but distinct possibility, which is just now starting to be 
explored, rests within the changes wrought by financialization and its associated finance 
culture within the neoliberal context. Prasad (2012, p. 228) delineates posits that  
“A welfare state can itself raise the level of credit in an economy if welfare funds 
are invested in credit instruments. And... people should be more willing to take on 
high levels of debt if they do not feel it necessary to save for their own future 
health care and pension needs.” 
Cultural economists contend that welfare retrenchment, in addition to economic 
insecurity and the turn toward investment prompts households to fund equity generating 
investments on credit. Focusing on the middle class, empirical work conducted within 
both structuralist and culturally oriented traditions find that these households purchase 
primary residence homes on credit. Such a result squares with previous work, which finds 
that a home is the largest cache of middle class wealth (Warren and Tyagi 2003; Wolff 
2010, 2012)—one which serves as an investment on credit (Harmes 2001; Langley 2008; 
Montgomerie 2009; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015).  
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Scholars spanning various traditions within the social sciences have identified and 
delineated a broad American trend towards growing homeownership (Warren and Tyagi 
2003. They have increased their efforts to invest in a single residence home for two 
purposes. The first is to engage in “defensive spending,” while the second reason is to 
save for the future. Allon and Reddon’s (2012) findings support this interpretation. They 
find that consumers are motivated to invest on credit not only for the purpose of gaining 
mobility through wealth creation—nor simply as a solution to current instability 
necessitating defensive consumption on credit (Goldstein 2013)—but also to prevent 
economic instability in the future. These authors, as well as others (Langley 2007, 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c; Montgomerie 2009) assert that that the contraction of welfare provisions, 
in addition to economic insecurity and the turn toward investment prompts households to 
fund equity generating investments on credit. In particular, both Montgomerie (2009) and 
Allon and Reddon (2012) find that welfare retrenchment provides part of the impetus for 
middle class households’ investment on credit. 
Neither Allon and Reddon (2012) nor Montgomerie (2006, 2007a) explicitly 
postulate the direction of the association between welfare monies and credit usage. They 
do, however, find that welfare retrenchment, along with households’ fear of safety net 
rollbacks, provide part of the impetus for middle class households’ investment on credit. 
Arguments proposed by Allon and Reddon (2012) and Montgomerie (2007) then also 
give us reason to move beyond current work, which finds a substitutive relationship 
between transfers and credit. By and large, this scholarship (Prasad 2012) limits its 
examination of influencing variables to immediate structural exigencies (resulting from 
economic instability). Instead, the insights offered by culturally oriented work suggests 
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that structural forces—in particular—economic insecurity and the changing nature of 
work is not enough. Rather, attempts to understand the welfare/debt nexus must be based 
on a framework of embeddedness. That is, ascertaining the impact of welfare provisions 
on household debts should consider structure, but also the normative aspects of culture 
engendered by financialization. To this end, it is wise to consider how finance culture—
specifically, norms of credit acceptance may exert considerable influence on this link.  
I examine 30 industrialized nations—all members of the EU—with the goal of 
better understanding how welfare state regimes impact household level debt. This cross-
national perspective is important because most literature so far focuses on the U.S. case 
(Kus 2015). But the US and UK possess relatively weak social safety net systems, and 
also embrace neoliberal logics, which valorize norms of risk taking and rationality 
(Goldstein 2013; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015) and personal responsibility for 
households’ finances (Harmes 2001). This may be different in other states with stronger 
welfare state traditions. Thus, it is important to assess how the relationship between debt 
and welfare state as well as financialization and the institutional context therein shifts in 
the context of historically established welfare regimes and direct social provisions to 
individual households, and the relationship between welfare state provisions and 
household indebtedness is an empirical question. Two propositions will be examined:  
Proposition 1 - Debt/Welfare Tradeoff: Households in countries with stronger welfare 
provisions, will have lower levels of indebtedness.  
Proposition 2 – Debt/Welfare Complementarity: Households in countries with stronger 
welfare provisions will have higher levels of indebtedness.  
 
96 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
I pool together data from two sources I use data from two different sources, EU-SILC and 
World Bank country indicators. At the first level, each of my approximately 2.4 million 
(N = 2,343,885) unique observations are identified by their membership to a specific 
household ((“household ID), and each of these unique observations is clustered by both 
the country in which they live, as well as the year in which they are surveyed (this is time 
series, rather than panel data, since the households surveyed are different each year).  
My central HLM model makes use of household level measures from the EU-
SILC (microdata) database. This data is a restricted access dataset with highly detailed 
economic and social information on survey respondents. I employ the data file on 
households, rather than on individuals. This is due to the household level dataset I use, 
which has very limited information on demographics outside of some selected household 
economic controls I utilize in the central HLM models (Table 1). However, I do include 
the most pertinent controls, ensuring that omitted variable bias isn’t a pressing concern at 
the household level. Additionally, because my model has a relatively complex structure, 
overfitting is a serious concern at the micro level. I address my attempt to balance the 
dangers posed by both overfitting and omitting important variables by reporting on 
results from a number of robustness checks (see Appendix), as well as sensitivity tests 
and solutions (Appendix) I conduct. The household data from EU-SILC is cross sectional 
data. Thus, my final dataset then is time series data, with information on household 
finances from years 2004 to 2015.  
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Although the time period I employ in this analysis is largely data-driven, it 
captures a time frame that is well suited to my investigation. This 11 year period is one 
during which financialization had just begun to proliferate in earnest and to exert 
powerful global influence, as a macroeconomic process related to—but theoretically 
distinct from—deepening neoliberalism (and widening globalization). The years 2005-
2015 are ideal, since I seek to explore the relationship of financialization (as a distinct 
theoretical construct) with welfare state provisions and to attempt to delineate it’s unique 
impact on household debt cross nationally. I use the following countries in my analyses 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, 
Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this project is overall, or total, household indebtedness 
amount. Household debt is a continuous variable, and the EU-SILC household data file 
reports this measure in inflation adjusted euros. However, because data on economic 
measures is often skewed, and may violate assumptions of normality, I transform the 
dependent variable such that hhdebt is measures as the (base 10) log of household debt in 
euros.  
 
Independent Variables 
Level 2: Independent Variables 
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I include time (specifically, survey year) as an important independent variable, in 
addition to employing it as a second level clustering dimension (entirely distinct, of 
course, from country, the other second level clustering dimension in my analysis). Year, 
as an independent variable, consists of each of the 12 possible values—one for each year 
for which I have data, which is namely: 2004 up to, and including, 2015.  
Social spending is the first of two key independent variables at the second level of 
data. The variable I call “socspend”—is defined as state-level social benefits, which 
consist of transfers, in cash or in kind, to households and individuals to relieve them of 
the burden of a defined set of risks or needs; administration costs, which represent the 
costs charged to the scheme for its management and administration; other expenditure, 
which consists of miscellaneous expenditure by social protection schemes (payment of 
property income and other). It is calculated in current prices, and then is reported as a 
percentage of each state’s GDP.  
The second key level 2 predictor I include, “finanzn” is a proxy measure of state 
level financialization. More specifically, the variable finanzn is the extent to which the 
financial sector provides each state’s domestic credit. In general, domestic credit 
provided by the financial sector as a share of GDP measures banking sector depth and 
financial sector development in terms of size12. The financial sector includes monetary 
authorities (the central bank) and deposit money banks, as well as other financial 
institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept transferable 
deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other 
 
12 The data on domestic credit provided by the financial sector are taken from the financial corporations survey (line 
52) of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International Financial Statistics or, when unavailable, from its 
depository corporations survey (line 32). 
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banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions, finance companies, 
development banks, and building and loan associations.”  
The fourth level 2 independent variable I include in my central analyses—GDP 
(gross domestic product)—reflects the total value of all goods and services produced less 
the value of goods and services used for intermediate consumption in their production. 
Expressing GDP in PPS (purchasing power standards) eliminates differences in price 
levels between countries, and calculations on a per head basis allows for the comparison 
of economies significantly different in absolute size. Purchasing power standard is an 
artificial common reference currency unit used in the European Union which eliminates 
the differences of price levels between countries. So, a PPS allows to buy the same 
volume of goods and services in all the countries. This unit allows significant 
comparisons in volume of economic indicators between countries. The aggregates 
expressed in PPS are calculated by dividing the aggregates expressed in current prices 
and in national currency by the Purchasing Power Parities (PPP). 
 
Level 1: Independent Variables 
My analyses include two key independent variables at the household level. The first, 
“income”, is total disposable household income, which is a continuous variable measured 
in inflation adjusted Euros. More specifically, household income is defined, by EU-SILC 
as “the total disposable income minus total net transfers (i.e. minus unemployment 
benefits; old-age benefits; survivor' benefits; sickness benefits; disability benefits; 
education-related allowances; family/children related allowances; social exclusion not 
elsewhere classified and housing allowances. The sum for all household members of 
100 
 
gross personal income components (gross employee cash or near cash income; gross non-
cash employee income; gross cash benefits or losses from self-employment (including 
royalties); value of goods produced for own consumption; gross income components at 
household level (imputed rent); income from rental of a property or land; interests, 
dividends, profit from capital investments in unincorporated business; income received 
by people aged under 16) minus (employer’s social insurance contributions; interest paid 
on mortgage; regular taxes on wealth; regular inter-household cash transfer paid; tax on 
income and social insurance contributions).” 
The second key independent variable at the household level is “transfer” which is 
simply the total transfer income that a household received in the previous year (inflation 
adjusted and reported in Euros). I constructed “transfer” by combining four separate 
transfer income measures that the EU-SILC includes in its household level data file 
across all years, namely, (1) social benefits, which is comprised of income received for 
(a) “family/children related allowances”, (b) housing allowances (c) social exclusion not 
elsewhere classified; together with (2) regular inter-house cash transfers. Regular inter-
household cash transfers are defined as regular monetary amounts received, during the 
income reference period, from entities outside the household13. Social benefits are 
defined as current transfers received during the income reference period by households 
intended to relieve them from the financial burden of a number of risk or needs, made 
through collectively organized schemes, or outside such schemes by government units 
 
13 This includes compulsory alimony and child support, voluntary alimony and child support received on a regular 
basis; regular cash support from persons other than household members; and regular cash support from households in 
other countries. 
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and NPISHs (Non Profit Institution Serving Households)14. The Family/children Function 
refers to benefits that provide financial support to households for bringing up children, 
and/or provide financial assistance to people who support relatives other than children15. 
The Housing Function refers to interventions by public authorities to help households 
meet the cost of housing. An essential criterion for defining the scope of a Housing 
allowance is the existence of a qualifying means-test for the benefit16. Social benefits in 
the function ‘social exclusion not elsewhere classified’ refer to the "socially excluded" or 
to "those at risk of social exclusion". General as this is, target groups may be identified 
(among others) as destitute people, migrants, refugees, drug addicts, alcoholics, victims 
of criminal violence17. 
Lastly, I include in my analyses the continuous measure “fingap” which gets at 
the difference between households’ actual net income and the income it needs to stay 
afloat. I construct this variable by subtracting each household’s gross income (including 
transfer income) from the value it gives as a response to the EU-SILC’s survey question 
 
14 In order to be included as a social benefit, the transfer must meet one of two criteria: (1) Coverage is compulsory 
(under law, regulation or a collective bargaining agreement) for the group in question; (2) It is based on the principle of 
social solidarity (i.e. if it is an insurance-based pension, the premium and entitlements are not proportional to the 
individual exposure to risk of the people protected). 
15 It includes: (i) Income maintenance benefit in the event of childbirth: flat-rate or earnings-related payments intended 
to compensate the parent for loss of earnings due to absence from work in connection with childbirth for the period 
before and/or after confinement or in connection with adoption; (ii) Birth grant: benefits normally paid as a lump sum 
or by instalments in case of childbirth or adoption; (iii) Parental leave benefit: benefit paid to either mother or father in 
case of interruption of work or reduction of working time in order to bring up a child, normally of a young age; (iv) 
Family or child allowance: periodical payments to a member of a household with dependent children to help with the 
costs of raising children; (v) Other cash benefits: benefits paid independently of family allowances to support 
households and help them meet specific costs, such as costs arising from the specific needs of lone parent families or 
families with handicapped children. These benefits may be paid periodically or as a lump-sum. 
16 It includes: rent benefit: a current means-tested transfer granted by a public authority to tenants, temporarily or on a 
long-term basis, to help with rent costs; benefit to owner-occupiers: a means-tested transfer by a public authority to 
owner-occupiers to alleviate their current housing costs: in practice often help with paying mortgages and/or interest. 
17 It includes: income support: periodic payments to people with insufficient resources. Conditions for entitlement may 
be related not only to the personal resources but also to nationality, residence, age, availability for work and family 
status. The benefits may have a limited or an unlimited duration; they may be paid to the individual or to the family and 
provided by central or local government; other cash benefits: support for destitute and vulnerable persons to help 
alleviate poverty or assist in difficult situations. These benefits may be paid by private non-profit organizations. 
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asking households to estimate their perception of the lowest net monthly income (in 
euros) needed to ‘make ends meet’. Since fingap is intended, in a general sense, to 
capture households’ economic insecurity—specifically, the gap between a household’s 
expenses and their ability to meet them—more positive values indicate greater economic 
need which goes unmet even when including transfer income. 
 
 
 
Control Variables 
“Home ownership, of course, does not cover all types of asset or equity accumulation; 
however, it may be the most important one, since home equity represents the modal form 
of household wealth (Wolff, 1996). While modeling total net worth itself might be more 
comprehensive, cross-national data on net worth are thin (Wolff, 1996). By contrast, 
home ownership is a categorical variable that is readily comparable across time and place 
(with some minor comparability issues) and is collected periodically on many national 
surveys” (Conley and Gifford (2006): 56). In terms of control I include the dichotomous 
variable “tenstat”, which has information on the tenure status of the household in relation 
to their current dwelling. Respondent answers are categorized as one of 4 distinct 
categories, based on whether a member of the household: (1) currently owns his/her 
current place of residence, (2) is a tenant or subtenant paying rent at prevailing or market 
rate (3) the accommodation is rented at a reduced rate (lower price that the market price), 
or (4) accommodation is provided free. I recode this variable to create a dichotomous 
variable such that 1 = owner, and 0 = all other categories. Another dichotomous measure 
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in my analyses is “dwelltype”, captures the type of residence in which the household 
resides. Dwelltype is coded such that a response of 1 signifies that the household resides 
in a detached, semi-detached or terraced home; while a response coded 0 is given when a 
household lives in an apartment. Two additional control variables at the household level 
are: tothouscost and hhsize. The former, a continuous variable measured in inflation-
adjusted euros, gives us information regarding the total cost of a household’s primary 
residence. The latter is an interval level variable and captures the number of people who 
belong to the household.  
 
Analytic Strategy 
HLM Models 
The central analysis in this project is a set of hierarchical linear models, because my data 
fall into two distinct levels (at the household level as well as at the state level). Each of 
the approximately 2.4 million observations in my data are organized according to the year 
and country to which each belongs. I employ a cross-classified (or “crossed”) HLM 
(hierarchical linear model) design, because although there are three identifier variables in 
my data (namely: household, country, and time), there are only two levels in my data. 
Since the author is not aware of any convincing theory or argument which suggests either 
that time should be nested within country, or the reverse (that country should be nested 
within time). Additionally, the crossed model is appropriate for this project because 
households—the level 1 identifier—are nested within country as well as within time 
rather than the more commonly used nested HLM model design, because the 
observations in my data are classified by two distinct types of clusters, which are not 
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hierarchical18 (nor nested within one another. Specifically, the identifier (clustering) 
measures in my data are 1) time—or rather, ‘year’, and 2) country membership. The 
analyses are mixed models (run in Stata using the “xtmixed” command). This type of 
advanced model is so named because it incorporates a mix of both fixed and random 
effects. Mixed models are the most appropriate models to use for this project. 
 
1. Model 1: First a simple random intercept model (only includes the dependent 
variable—household debt).  
2. Model 2: This is a model that only considers the household level independent 
variable on the outcome. 
3. Model 3: This model is a crossed multi-level model in which I include both GDP 
and state level social welfare spending (PPP corrected and standardized) at the 
country level in addition to household level independent variables included in 
model 2.  
4. Model 4: Include the addition of “year” as an independent variable. 
5. Model 5: The last model simply includes my measure for state’s degree of 
financialization.  
 
Data Transformations 
Because the model structures I employ in this project are rather complex, they are 
susceptible to a greater variety of serious model modeling errors; and certain weaknesses 
are intrinsic to HLM models whenever utilized. To ensure that the models I employ in 
 
18 Note: A nested three level model is not employed here because it is inaccurate to use. It is not accurate to 
conceptualize “year” as constituting a higher level of organization than country. 
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this work are robust, and that any and all claims I make based on these are sound and 
valid, I delineate the multitude of the well-established diagnostics I ran in order to parse 
out as many potential weaknesses as possible, and I describe the measures I have taken to 
address potential weaknesses I did observe.   
To get a sense of whether or not multicollinearity is an issue plaguing my data, I 
obtained the VIF (or variance inflation factor) scores of all my independent variables 
after running my analyses. VIF scores estimate how much the variance of a coefficient is 
“inflated” because of linear correlation with other independent variables. Although there 
is some disagreement as to how high a VIF score must be to become problematic, Paul 
Allison (available at: https://statisticalhorizons.com/multicollinearity) tends to take a 
conservative view, suggesting a VIF of 2.50 or over is problematic (since a VIF of 2.50 
corresponds to an R2 of .60 with the other variables). The highest VIF of any 
independent variable in my analysis is 1.74, which helps to ensure that multicollinearity 
is not a significant issue in my data19.  
 Heteroscedasticity is another concern when employing HLM models.  The most 
pressing issue that it presents involves standard errors. Standard errors are biased when 
heteroscedasticity is present. This in turn leads to bias in test statistics and confidence 
intervals. To address potential effects of heteroskedasticity, I log transform my dependent 
variable (logdebt) as well as mean-center all independent variables. 
 Another, related problem plaguing HLM models are is that of influential cases or 
extreme outliers obscuring the true nature of relationships. Of course, unusual or extreme 
cases can distort results, just like OLS. The potential of influential data points is rather 
 
19 Refer to Table B4.1 in Appendix B for VIF scores of all independent variables in this project. 
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pronounced in country level data, and I took several steps to address this potential 
concern. I ran preliminary outlier diagnostics in stata, constructing a plot of influential 
points which exhibited leverage (by country membership organizing cluster) after 
running my final set of models and after transformations and after incorporating weights. 
The results (which are reported in Table B4.2 in Appendix B), demonstrate that I had 
only 10 observations out of approximately 2.4 million that were influential.  
 
RESULTS 
Looking at simple country-specific distinctions in household debt as presented in Figure 
1, it appears that these differences could be driven at least in part by country economic 
development level, with states like Norway and Denmark having high overall household 
debt levels, compared to Czech Republic, Croatia, Romania and Malta, having less. 
Therefore, it makes sense that models control for GDP/capita.  
 The results from my key analyses for this project are in Table 1 below.  
 
[Table 120 About Here] 
 
 
Household (Level 1) Measures 
The link between household income and household debt is consistent with structurally 
oriented scholarship on debt. Looking at Table 1, we see that in all models containing 
 
20 Since only the dependent variable is log-transformed, I report all coefficients in Table 1 as percentages. I do this by 
exponentiating the coefficient, subtracting one from this number, and multiplying it by 100. This gives the percent 
increase (or decrease) in the response for every one-unit increase in the independent variable. 
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predictor variables (models 2, 3,4, 5 and 6), household income, across countries, is 
significantly and positively related to household debt. Specifically, I find that every 
(inflation-adjusted) Euro increase in household income is expected to correspond to a 
0.09 percent decrease in household indebtedness. This is ostensibly a sizeable decrease in 
households’ overall indebtedness level, but it likely varies substantially between 
countries.  
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
The relationship between households’ transfer income and their indebtedness level across 
all my HLM models (Table 1) demonstrates that there exists a much more complex 
relationship between transfer income and household indebtedness, when compared to the 
straightforward and robust negative relationship between household income (less 
transfers) and household debt. In models 2-5, household transfer income is the only 
independent variable that is not significantly associated with household indebtedness.  
 Next, according to Table 1, there is a rather robust link between fingap and debt; 
one which is stable across all 5 models in my analysis. We see that for every euro 
increase in the gap between a household’s cost of living and their real net income (which 
includes all social monies), there we expect to see a 0.011 (p = 0.000) increase in 
household debt.  
Measures related to household residence are crucially important in the validity of 
any analysis in which household level indebtedness is the dependent variable of interest 
(Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). However, it is of particular import in accurately 
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conceptualizing the influence of state social spending on household debt, because 
“patterns of home ownership are integrally linked with government social welfare efforts 
designed to intervene in inequitable social and market outcomes” (Conley and Gifford 
2006: 56). Tenure status is another key dimension to control for when examining 
household debt. In model 6 (Table 1), I find that dwelling type (dwelltype) is positively 
associated with debt. Living in a home—regardless of tenure status (that is, irrespective 
of whether the household owns, rents, or is living in a home provided by the state for 
free/at a subsidized rate)— corresponds to about a five percent increase in a household’s 
annual debt, as compared to living in apartment. 
 As the total monthly cost of a household’s primary residence increases by one 
euro (which is not an insignificant increase, given that the mean monthly cost for 
households across state and over time is about 390 euros), we expect see a .04 (p =0.000) 
percent increase in a household’s debt, across countries. Size of household is significant 
as well. With every additional member in a household, household indebtedness increases 
by about 8 percent. 
 
Country (Level 2) Measures 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is a dearth of sociological scholarship which 
focuses on examining overall household (micro level) indebtedness, rather than focusing 
exclusively on mortgage debt. There is even less empirical work which directly and 
explicitly examines the impact of both state level and household level forces on total 
household debt, particularly within the same analysis. However, the link between state 
level (aggregate) consumer or household debt and gdp is more than well established in 
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the literature (Prasad 2012). According to this line of work, we would expect a positive 
relationship between GDP and aggregate debt levels. Economies that are more developed 
are also generally more financialized, and thus should also have a greater availability of 
consumer credit (Krippner 2005, Kus 2014, Prasad 2012). It is intuitive then, to imagine 
that this established expectation extends to household—or micro level—debt as well. 
And a significant and positive relationship between GDP and household indebtedness 
across countries (and time) is precisely what I find. Across all 5 models in Table 1, I find 
that with each additional million purchasing power standards of GDP, we expect to see a 
.005 (p = 0.000) percent increase in household indebtedness, across country and over 
time. This is a rather sizeable increase in indebtedness and demonstrates quite clearly the 
rather consequential impact that supply side factors at the state level exert on actor level 
economic outcomes. 
Turning to socspend, the independent variable most central to this project,  I find 
that my results align with the less well established body of work within the welfare/credit 
nexus literature. Rather than a strongly substitutive relationship between social spending 
provisions and consumer credit use (Prasad 2012), I find a robust, complementary 
relationship between social spending at the state level and total household level (both 
consumer and mortgage) indebtedness. Results for the link between social spending and 
micro-level debt are consistent over all 5 HLM models (see Table 1), and the impact of 
social spending on debt remains positive and significant across all models with country 
level predictor variables—namely, Models 3-521. More specifically, in Models 3-5, I find 
 
21 See Appendix B  for more about the robustness of my social spending results  
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that as social spending increases (relative to GDP) by one percent, we expect to see 
approximately a 4.52 (p = 0.000) percent increase in (mean) household indebtedness.  
In Model 4, I add the variable “year” in order to explore the independent 
influence that time may exert on mean total debt across households belonging to EU 
member nations22. I find that a significant, and rather sizeable time trend exists. 
According to my results, survey year exerts a significant (p = 0.000) and positive effect 
on total household indebtedness, across EU nations. Specifically, I find that the passage 
of each additional year in time corresponds to a predicted 8.5 percent increase in total 
household debt, for households in the 30 nations included in my analysis (results in Table 
1, in Models 4 and 5). 
 The results of my fifth HLM model (results for Model 5 are in Table 1), in which 
I add the last second level predictor variable I include in my analysis: finzn (the degree of 
yearly state level financialization) are quite telling. I find that with every 1 percent 
increase in the proportion of domestic credit furnished by state’s financial sector, we 
expect to see a 1.75 percent increase in household debt across all states. Interestingly, the 
effect of time remains significant and positive after the addition of a separate measure for 
the effect of financialization.  
 
DISCUSSION  
This goal of this chapter was to address the following three questions: What is the 
relationship between state level social spending and total household level (rather than 
 
22 Again, time, operationalized in my analysis as “year”, is the second level 2 dimension which I expect my level 1 data 
to cluster. “Country” is the other level 2 dimension along which my household data is clustered. 
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country-aggregated) indebtedness? Moreover, what impact-if any—does increasing 
financialization/neoliberalization exert on household indebtedness? 
Scholars have debated the relationship between welfare state provisions and 
indebtedness. Previous research at the country level has mostly suggested that taking on 
debt serves as a substitute for lack of social provisions by weak welfare states (Prasad 
2012). In contrast, my analysis shows a robust positive relationship between household 
indebtedness and social provisions at the country level, controlling for household level 
factors that account for the income and financial situation as well as size of the 
household, among others. How to explain these findings?  
Indeed, rather than focusing on structural contingencies brought about by 
macrostructual or institutional forces, and the welfare/debt tradeoff, some scholars have 
pointed to how such structures (in particular, neoliberalism, financialization and 
shareholder value processes) have fostered nascent cultural valuations of investment. 
Adam Harmes (2001) proposed the concept of a “culture of mass investment”; 
postulating that it originally arose out of the turn from defined benefit pension plans to 
defined contribution plans. Since then, neoliberal institutions have done a great deal to 
promote and advertise the virtues—and have even espoused the necessity—of financial 
literacy (Harmes 2001; Langley 2007, 2008b; Van der Zwan 2014). Influential political, 
institutional and economic actors have linked investment to positive qualities such as 
self-expression, responsibility, success and the capitalist spirit (Harmes 2001). 
Investment is also effectively linked with achieving self-realization through freedom and 
security (both economic and otherwise) that the act of investing provides (Langley 2007, 
2008a, 2008c). The context within which the act of investment has been imbued with 
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both material and intrinsic personal value is one characterized by relatively rapid and 
widespread proliferation of financialization (Krippner 2005). Inherent to the principles of 
a financialized system, a culture of investment includes the strategic deployment of credit 
to fund investment. 
As concerns the debate about increasing financialization and neoliberalization and 
their impact on households, my study does substantiate ever greater indebtedness over 
time for EU member nations. But my analysis demonstrates, quite explicitly, that this is 
not simply a story of increasing liberalization over time but that state level 
financialization processes exert independent effects on household level debt.  
As Davis and Kim (2011) argue, processes of financialization occur at 
supranational (macro), state (meso), and micro (household) levels. The findings from my 
analyses suggest it is likely that the kinds of financialized systems formed in different 
countries depend both on national-level institutions, as well as on supra-national forces. 
Such national financialized systems could be closely linked to other existing national 
institutions, such as welfare provisions. Therefore, in countries with stronger social 
systems, such as Denmark and Norway, whereby expected state support can be counted 
on, taking on debt may be viewed as extending the ability of households to use debt as 
leverage, or as investment, rather than primarily as a need-based instrument in conditions 
of financial need. As such, more generous welfare provisions could be linked with more 
household debt, and the relationship between institutions is complementary, as I found in 
my analyses, rather than a tradeoff.  
I am unable to parse out the relative impact of supranational versus state level 
financialization in the present study. An examination of the disparate impact of macro 
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level and meso financialization on household level economic outcomes would be a 
fruitful endeavor, since the scholarship on financialization has yet to conceptualize much 
about state level financialization in general (Davis and Kim 2011).  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined the influence of institutional forces—namely, financialization 
and state social spending—on household indebtedness within thirty EU member nations.  
Household debt levels cross nationally have been converging over time, to higher levels 
of debt. Deepening neoliberalism and increasing financialization have engendered large 
shifts, both at the state level, in terms of institutional policies and changes in structural 
conditions, as well as at the household or actor level, in terms of the changing 
conceptualizations of moral, or socially honorable action in the credit market (among 
others) as well as virtuous, desirable economic action, about what the appropriate use of 
financial tools that may be. Supply side changes such as the democratization of credit 
along with demand side forces, particularly the erosion of social safety nets and shrinking 
wages increased households’ credit reliance. In this chapter, I sought to interrogate the 
link between welfare state spending and household indebtedness. I also asked what 
impact, if any, increasing financialization/ neoliberalization of societies exerts on 
household indebtedness. My analysis uncovers a complementary, rather than substitutive, 
relationship between social spending and household debt. I postulate that this surprising 
relationship is a result of actors’ increasing orientation towards financial investment. I 
also find that increasing financialization at the state level is associated with increased 
household debt. Future research needs to interrogate better how national institutions, and 
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perhaps credit regimes, interact with welfare state institutions to account for different 
kinds of welfare/debt relationships at the national level. 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusions  
 
Macroeconomic growth depends on debt (Guttman and Plihon 2008). Much of this debt 
is incurred at the micro level (Preda and Knorr-Cetina 2012; Kus 2015). Examining the 
logics governing credit use is crucially important, given that much literature on 
financialization—regardless of theoretical orientation—identifies consumer credit 
consumption as the engine that propels much macroeconomic growth in today’s 
financialized economy. So what determines household debt? There are many competing 
theories, but scholarship is generally divided into two camps: structural and cultural 
theories of debt. Structural theories posit that economic constraint determines household 
debt. While culturally inclined explanations argue that people engage in conspicuous 
consumption or subscribe to a “culture of debt.” My dissertation is an attempt at 
understanding consumer credit use in the modern era, whereby I propose that cultural and 
structural forces operate jointly in shaping economic outcomes (Zelizer 1989, Zukin and 
DiMaggio 1990, Bandelj 2012). 
 Debt in the U.S. has registered a substantial rise in the past several decades 
(Carruthers and Ariovich 2010). Major macroeconomic shifts—namely neoliberalism and 
financialization—have engendered massive shifts in cultural as well as structural 
conditions which precipitated this massive rise in consumer debt—at first in the US, and 
now also in various EU member states across Europe (Kus 2015). Neoliberalism, or a 
series of policies aimed at liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of economy, 
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fueled both supply and demand side structural conditions, which then have driven the 
exponential rise in consumer credit use since the 1970s, and particularly after the 1980s.  
In terms of supply side shifts, the relatively recent mass democratization of 
consumer credit is one of most important structural conditions underpinning the 
stratospheric increase in consumer credit use at the household level. On the demand-side, 
the changes in consumer credit use are largely a product of business-friendly neoliberal 
policies and the associated cultural ethos. Neoliberal policies in general have engendered 
pervasive and proliferating economic inequality, and to an even greater degree, growing 
volatility in households’ economic position. The neoliberal program has resulted in 
pervasive wage stagnation, social safety net rollbacks, and a labor market in which the 
current model of work is part-time, contract work without workplace benefits. The 
structuralist explanation of credit consumption hinges on the idea that households often 
use credit in the absence of adequate social safety net provisions—to make ends meet in 
the face of some economic shock or unforeseen structural pressure. 
 Cultural forces—in the shape of normative understandings and prescriptions—are 
just as important in shaping credit consumption at the household level. Cultural 
explanations offer three disparate lines of thought. One view holds that households use 
credit to engage in conspicuous consumption in order to signal membership to a more 
advantaged social stratum. A second view points to the role of hedonistic consumption. A 
third, newer view asserts that households have absorbed the logic of a culture of finance, 
which prompt them towards calculative investment. Situated in these theoretical debates 
that emphasize the role of structural and cultural forces, my dissertation examines how 
household indebtedness is shaped by social class position, and by the characteristics of 
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the institutional and cultural environments in which people live, particularly those 
engendered by welfare state provisions and the rise of finance culture.  
 
Determinants of Household Debt in the U.S. 
I divided the second chapter into two distinct components. In the first part of chapter 2, I 
used the embeddedness perspective (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990) to examine how 
Americans consume credit, across social strata. I focused on parsing out how structural 
and cultural forces drive debt for Americans in the year 2010. My results for the full 
sample of households in the US demonstrated that indebtedness is driven by both cultural 
and structural forces. However, my results also demonstrated that to understand how 
Americans borrow on credit, and the different types of credit, theorists must account for 
relative social class position. 
Following the Bourdieusian notion that consumption is patterned by the 
confluence of forces all acting on various social locations, I expected social class to 
differentially influence how households understand and use credit. Results of classed 
consumption analyses I conducted are very consistent with a classed consumption, and 
therefore classed indebtedness, framework. That is, social class membership does indeed 
differentially pattern how households understand and use credit. The overarching portrait 
of borrowing which emerges illuminates the extraordinary difference of structural 
constraints in shaping the credit use of more disadvantaged social groups relative to more 
advantaged ones, and specifically, the sharp distinction between the upper class and the 
remaining social classes. Upper class households are driven to use credit for conspicuous 
consumption, and their indebtedness is also driven by an adherence to the debt culture 
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mentality. Although they do not borrow to address economic insecurity, structural forces 
influence their borrowing, nevertheless: said forces facilitate their increased credit use for 
leverage. Upper class households borrow more as their wealth increases, but unlike all 
other social classes (upper middle class, lower middle, working class and poor), upper 
class households do not borrow more in order to bridge a sudden and unfortunate gap 
between expenses and income. Instead, upper class households seem to borrow in order 
to make wealth-generating investments. This result helps illuminate the often obscured 
way credit use has begun to engender new (and perhaps worse) forms of social 
inequality, and are consistent with analyses of increasing income inequality in the U.S., 
in particular, that the top 1 % has doubled the overall income share, while poverty has 
held steady (Saez and Zucman 2016).  
 
Debt and the Rise of Finance Culture in the U.S., 1989-2016 
Neoliberalism, globalization and financialization are large-scale processes, which define 
contemporary times. The empirical work that has been conducted thus far on the topic of 
financialization can be categorized as belonging to one of three distinct but related 
theoretical frameworks (Van der Zwan 2014). The first broad perspective—the 
accumulation view—focuses on social class. In particular, this view is concerned with the 
role of elites in helping to engender global inequality through bringing about the process 
of financialization. The second view sees financialization as a result of the shareholder 
value orientation—which theorists argue leads to increasing socioeconomic inequality 
that arise in response to the disproportionately increased precariousness and benefits in 
lower skilled versus skilled jobs (Kus 2015). The third view—that of the financialization 
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of everyday life—is important, since it helps account for precisely how financializing 
shapes households’ economic action, and examines the very real role that households 
play in reciprocally shaping financialization.  
This line of thought allows scholars to begin to think about how households 
negotiate with the dictates of financialization. What theorists have uncovered, however, is 
that financialization espouses—through media channels and via institutional policies—a 
particularly calculative orientation to ones’ household finances. This cultural orientation 
engendered the proliferation of “pop finance” (Harrington 2010) and is an orientation in 
which households are expected to be “everyday investors” (Harmes 2001). Throughout, 
investment for the purposes of economic gain is valorized (Davis 2009). However, the 
underlying ethos is one of households or individuals being responsible for their own 
economic health—particularly for arranging their own safety net provisions in an 
environment of high volatility and precarity, and in which households are fully aware of 
the specter posed by future insecurity (Hacker 2012). It is important, then, to extend 
current sociological scholarship on this crucial process of everyday financialization. I 
focused on credit consumption, because it is the most widely available and utilized 
financial tool by households, and because my second chapter pointed to clearly classed 
patterns of consumption on credit in a cross sectional analysis of American households in 
the year 2010. Thus, in my third chapter I investigated the extent to which 
financialization—specifically, nascent norms of finance culture—has influenced classed 
credit consumption over time.  
It is well established that more advantaged households display a greater adherence 
to neoliberal values, specifically those of the capitalist spirit, business savvy and the use 
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of strategic investment used to grow individual wealth. But what about the logic of 
finance culture? To what extent (and how) do these distinct norms and understandings 
play out across the social structure? Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) find that the wealthy 
are also the most financialized segment of the social structure. Specifically, they find that 
upper class households were the only ones, which appreciably adhered to wealth-growing 
logic of finance culture, particularly by displaying greater risk tolerance and use of 
financial instruments and patronage of financial experts.  
 These insights are interesting, but the extent to—and manner in—which the logics 
of finance culture are adopted across the socioeconomic structure in the specific case of 
consumer credit use remains an open question. Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) offer 
preliminary directions. Using only one measure of credit acceptance (specifically: the use 
of credit to supplement lost wages) they find that there is a new norm of credit 
acceptance, but structural forces constrain its adoption across social strata. Because the 
exact nature of this constraint remains unclear from that scholarship, I set out to 
empirically test how exactly credit acceptance is classed, and how this may vary over 
time. The expectation going into this analyses, based on previous research, was that there 
is diffusion of general finance cultural norms of virtuous investment over time—
specifically, that acceptability of debt begins the earliest (in time) for wealthy upper class 
and then diffused to more disadvantaged classes progressively over time.  
This was not supported by my analyses. Instead, I show that debt acceptance in the U.S. 
by class membership is rather monolithic in the 1989 to 2016 period for which I have 
data. Apart from in 2016, there is no significant difference in (for any year) mean 
acceptance of incurring debt to 1) supplement lost wages, 2) to finance a vehicle, 3) to 
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purchase luxury/frivolous goods, or 4) to finance an education. Acceptance for all of 
these is relatively high. It is telling that the year 2016 is unique in that the mean class 
acceptance score by debt type (within each year) are all significantly different from one 
another. This finding may suggest upcoming shifts in the uses of credit as patterned along 
the social structure. This new divergence could be capturing that potentially a new pattern 
of debt use is afoot. Or it may capture some sort of signal for a novel kind of closure 
mechanism in the field; which opposes the tide of growing democratization of credit 
access. Alternatively, it could hint at divergence in how classes consume on credit. It is 
interesting that upper class households have the lowest mean acceptance scores at all time 
points from 1989 until 2016.  
Consumers often increase credit consumption when the economy is healthy; and 
in the aggregate, they decrease debt loads during an economic downturn. Aligning with 
this trend, households did deleverage significantly in the wake of the Great Recession 
(Federal Reserve 2010). What underpins these trends? Two possibilities exist.  The first 
is that structural factors—whether the widespread foreclosures (Wolff 2012) or falling 
into arrears on any number of credit types—force deleveraging. The second alternative is 
that cultural shifts—namely, decreased acceptance of credit use, fosters the reduction of 
household debt. I investigated which explanation is more likely, via testing the second 
proposition in my third chapter. I found that after the financial crisis of 2008, levels of 
debt acceptability decreased for all classes.  
In fact, my results are somewhat inconsistent with a cultural explanation 
underpinning the deleveraging which 2010 witnessed; particularly when taking class into 
account. Firstly, it is interesting to note that acceptance scores (of each social class) are 
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not significantly different in 2010 as compared to 2007. This is the case for each specific 
debt subtype. In contrast, when examining the acceptance scores of debt generally pre- 
and post- recessions, we see that while the upper class’ scores are not significantly 
different, those of the remaining social classes are significantly different when comparing 
the mean debt acceptability of debt generally in 2007 and 2010. More specifically, the 
mean acceptance levels of upper middle, lower middle, working class and poor 
households is significantly lower in 2010 as compared to 2007. These results point to an 
interesting feature of attitudes about debt: using credit is often more acceptable when the 
type or purpose of said debt is specific and concrete. Attitudes about debt in general—as 
a diffuse idea—are distinct, and often generate more variability. This seems to be the case 
for across class as well as over time comparisons 
 
Welfare Policies and Household Indebtedness in the European Union Countries, 
2004-2015 
Although previously the US was far ahead of any European state in aggregate household 
debt, recently the EU nations have been closing the gap (Kus 2015). Country context—
and, the institutional environment engendered by welfare state policies--affects 
indebtedness. The influence of state level (and even global) changes is not yet well 
theorized in the European context (Kus 2015, Davis and Kim 2013). Therefore, I 
examined in my fourth chapter the relationship between state social spending and overall 
household indebtedness. There are a variety of global, regional and state level 
institutional changes afoot, which we should expect to influence household debt among 
EU nations.  
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 There is a body of literature, which examines the tradeoff between credit at the 
household level and state level social spending. This work argues that when state social 
safety net spending is low, particularly in a country characterized by high inequality and 
precarity, households generally use credit to substitute for shortfalls in public spending. 
The central finding is that credit and welfare are substitutes (Prasad 2012). Thus, in 
Chapter 4, using EU SILC data and hierarchical linear models, I tested the welfare regime 
proposition to examine whether countries with greater spending on social programs as a 
share of GDP will have lower overall debt holdings at the household level. A relatively 
unexpected and robust finding emerged, that goes against the welfare/debt trade off 
proposition. 
Indeed, when considering the widespread internalization of norms of investment 
(Harmes 2001, Langley 2007, 2008), and of the acceptability of debt (Fligstein and 
Goldstein 2015), along with fears about potentially losing work benefits or widely held 
belief in the future collapse of the social security system (Hacker 2012), we may have 
reason to believe that households use transfers and credit together to insulate against 
future insecurity. If they do, we would expect to see a complementary relationship 
between transfer income and indebtedness—and between state social spending and 
household debt. I found evidence that aligns with this perspective. Specifically, 
households in countries with stronger welfare provisions show higher levels of 
indebtedness.  
 My key empirical finding in Chapter 4 is that social spending and household debt 
are compliments rather than substitutes. One other important result for my analysis in 
chapter 4 is that time is positively related to household debt across country and that the 
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degree of state financialization is also positively linked to credit consumption at the 
household level. My key empirical finding, however, is that there exists a complimentary, 
rather than substitutive link between state social spending and aggregate household debt 
in thirty European Union countries, in the 2005 through 2015 time period. My results are 
consistent with emerging work that problematizes conceptualizing the relationship 
between welfare state spending and consumer credit as a tradeoff. In his preliminary 
work, Wiedermann (2019) argues that such a characterization is a gross over-
simplification. Instead the author argues that financial markets and welfare states are 
linked, and so credit regimes interact with welfare state regimes to pattern the 
relationship between state social spending and household debt in a variety of ways in 
addition to a substitutive one. Based on my analyses, this seems to be a fruitful direction 
for future research to explore. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
My analyses have contributed to the advancement of our understanding of household 
indebtedness and how everyday financialization interacts with class inequality. One 
extremely consequential dimension of consumer credit that I was not able to adequately 
address with the data I had available is households’ use of payday and bad-credit loans. 
This kind of credit is one, which is most strongly stratified—and not coincidentally is the 
most exploitative. Such “bad/no” credit is essentially created to be employed by only the 
most disenfranchised and disadvantaged members of the social structure; those who often 
are barred from using credit that is easily attained by anyone with a bank account. This 
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closure mechanism is helping to create a novel underclass, whose contours and dynamics 
remain unexplored (Fourcade and Healy 2013; Wherry, Seefeldt and Alvarez 2019).  
Secondly, it would be instructive to disaggregate the distinct types of credit consumption 
that households in distinct EU member states engage in, as well as households’ 
understandings about the appropriateness of various kinds of credit. This information 
would help shed light on both institutional differences within states as they pertain to 
credit use and debt, as well as illuminating any distinct state-specific understandings 
about credit and its appropriate functions. Just as in the US case, it would be critical to 
track how such consumption shifts according to class membership across time. 
 On the whole, my dissertation has applied the economic sociology perspective on 
consumption through credit. Economic sociologists define the economy as “…institutions 
and relations of production, exchange, and consumption”, (DiMaggio 1994: 28) and 
many scholars assert that consumption is fundamental to modern life (Zelizer 2004; 2010; 
Zukin and McGuire 2004). But the study of consumption has traditionally occupied a 
marginal position in the field of economic sociology, (Swedberg 2003; Zelizer 2004, 
2005, 2010; Zukin and McGuire 2004; Bandelj 2008), focusing on markets and 
organizations, rather than consumers or households, as proper sites of examination 
(Carruthers and Uzzi 2000; Zelizer 2010). The goal of my dissertation was to add to the 
literature on consumption in economic sociology by linking it with stratification, and by 
conceptualizing someone economic action as related to class position, and as co-
constituted with cultural, structural, and institutional forces.  Much research is still 
needed to advance our understanding of household debt. Still, one thing is certain: that 
the use of consumer credit, because of the credit scoring mechanisms on which it relies, 
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has distinct and consequential effects on social inequality. Consumer credit, as an 
institution, allows differential access, all the while it puts differential constrain, across the 
SES spectrum in which social closure becomes salient through the quantity and the kind 
of credit available to households across the social structure.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 3A. Full Sample Debt Acceptance Across Time, by Debt Type 
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Figure 3B. Mean Acceptability Score of Debt Generally by Social Class, Over Time 
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Figure 4A. Social Spending on Household Debt, By Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
146 
 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1A. Full Sample—Mean Differences Within Category, Over Time 
 
 Mean Debt ___: Income Ratio: 
Year 
Total 
Household 
Debt 
Primary 
Residence 
Debt 
Credit Card 
Bal 
Education 
Loan Amt 
Loan Amt for 
Investment 
1989 0.91*** 0.81 1.02*** 0.02 0.06 
1992 1.42 0.82 1.93*** 0.04 0.04 
1995 1.27 0.80 0.04 0.04 0.03 
1998 1.32 0.73** 0.06 0.09 0.07 
2001 1.07** 0.59*** 0.05 0.03 0.05 
2004 1.43 0.92 0.05 0.06 0.05 
2007 1.34 0.90 0.05 0.07 0.04 
2010 1.63*** 1.03*** 0.04 0.13* 0.19*** 
2013 1.41 0.79 0.04 0.35*** 0.03 
2016 1.21* 0.70 0.03 0.18** 0.03 
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Table 1B. Debt to Income Ratios: Differences between Social Classes, by year and purchase type 
 
Year   
Total 
Household 
Debt 
Primary 
Residence 
Debt 
Credit Card 
Bal 
Education 
Loan Amt 
Loan Amt 
for 
Investment 
1989 UC 0.94 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.17*** 
  UMC 1.90*** 0.80 10.07*** 0.02 0.05 
  LMC 0.73 0.81 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  WC 0.36 0.80 0.03 0.03 0.00 
  P 0.19*** 0.82 0.01 0.08*** 0.00 
1992 UC 1.60*** 0.82 0.01 0.00 0.11*** 
  UMC 1.63*** 0.82 10.62*** 0.01 0.03 
  LMC 1.06 0.82 0.04 0.03 0.01 
  WC 0.48*** 0.82 0.05 0.06 0.00 
  P 0.23*** 0.81 0.03 0.12*** 0.00 
1995 UC 1.83*** 1.20*** 0.01 0.00 0.08*** 
  UMC 1.62*** 1.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 
  LMC 1.16 0.88 0.05 0.02 0.00 
  WC 0.57*** 0.17* 0.08 0.09** 0.00 
  P 0.35* 0.01*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.00 
1998 UC 1.33 0.65 0.02 0.00 0.20*** 
  UMC 1.33 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.05 
  LMC 1.65 1.14*** 0.09* 0.08* 0.00 
  WC 1.51 0.60 0.11** 0.25*** 0.00 
  P 0.47*** 0.00*** 0.05 0.27*** 0.00 
2001 UC 0.91 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.14*** 
  UMC 1.23 0.97 0.04 0.02 0.01 
  LMC 1.31 0.95 0.07 0.04* 0.01 
  WC 1.48*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.00 
  P 1.25 0.00*** 0.04 0.07*** 0.00 
2004 UC 1.33 1.17 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.14*** 
  UMC 1.66*** 1.38*** 0.05 0.04 0.02 
  LMC 1.27 1.18 0.09* 0.05 0.01 
  WC 1.57*** 0.15 0.07* 0.14*** 0.00 
  P 1.42 0.00*** 0.04 0.13*** 0.00 
2007 UC 1.44 0.92 0.02 0.01*** 0.10*** 
  UMC 1.91*** 1.55*** 0.08** 0.05 0.01 
  LMC 1.57 1.18** 0.08** 0.07 0.00 
  WC 0.48*** 0.05 0.05 0.14** 0.00 
  P 0.41*** 0.00 0.03 0.25*** 0.01 
2010 UC 2.40*** 1.48 0.02 0.01*** 0.75*** 
  UMC 2.16*** 1.65 0.06 0.07 0.03 
  LMC 1.76*** 1.36 0.07 0.11 0.02 
  WC 0.59*** 0.08*** 0.04 0.23*** 0.00 
  P 0.51*** 0.00*** 0.03 0.34*** 0.00 
2013 UC 1.41 0.93 0.01 0.02*** 0.11*** 
  UMC 1.64 1.28 0.04 0.09 0.01 
  LMC 1.63 1.24 0.06 0.16 0.00 
  WC 1.18 0.12*** 0.05 0.83*** 0.01 
  P 1.08 0.00*** 0.04 0.97*** 0.00 
2016 UC 1.22 0.74*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.07*** 
  UMC 1.66** 1.28*** 0.04 0.08 0.03*** 
  LMC 1.38 0.92*** 0.06 0.19 0.00 
  WC 0.75*** 0.03*** 0.04 0.46*** 0.00 
  P 0.61*** 0.00*** 0.02 0.44*** 0.00 
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Table 1C. Within Class Percentage of Aggregated Indebtedness According to Purchase Category 
across Survey Years 1989-2016 
Year 
Social Class 
Category 
Primary 
Residence 
Real 
Estate*** 
Home 
Improve 
Vehicle 
Goods & 
Services 
Invest Education Other 
1989 UC  44.28 25.32 2.87 2.59 1.98 17.45*** 0.11 5.40 
. UMC   70.58*** 2.12 1.80 7.60 3.80 3.33 1.14 9.63 
. LMC  71.61*** 0.00 2.84 15.18 5.65 0.90 1.50 2.33 
. WC 24.36 0.73 1.81 40.09*** 15.07 0.45 7.58*** 9.91 
. P 0.40 83.86 0.02 2.44 3.23 0.42 6.41*** 3.23 
. Total 48.60 21.18 2.69 4.47 2.61 14.23 0.49 5.72 
1992 UC  32.41 29.09 1.24 1.01 1.73 25.02*** 0.08 9.41 
. UMC  79.39*** 4.26 1.99 4.96 4.67 1.37 1.26 2.09 
. LMC  78.64*** 0.51 1.85 9.50 5.55 0.37 2.26 1.33 
. WC 19.06 1.40 0.69 34.56*** 20.05 0.18 17.48*** 6.58 
. P 37.71 7.37 0.00 4.13 13.68 0.15 19.95*** 17.00 
. Total 39.82 24.55 1.34 2.23 2.46 20.85 0.56 8.19 
1995 UC  24.37 21.20 0.79 1.86 5.83 33.60*** 0.05 12.29 
. UMC  79.40*** 6.07 2.16 4.77 3.47 1.39 0.72 2.02 
. LMC   74.30*** 1.68 2.27 9.10 6.50 0.86 3.16 2.13 
. WC 25.97 2.26 3.51 31.36*** 17.25 0.47 13.79*** 5.39 
. P 10.50 9.94 0.01 9.94 20.81 0.62 30.90*** 17.29 
. Total 31.53 18.59 1.00 2.73 5.81 28.98 0.45 10.90 
1998 UC  41.23 15.75 0.92 4.33 2.09 25.45*** 0.10 10.13 
. UMC  76.32*** 4.69 2.08 5.99 4.65 3.74 1.35 1.18 
. LMC  72.37*** 0.00 2.50 10.30 8.84 0.44 3.56 1.98 
. WC 16.07 0.91 0.49 33.22*** 17.98 0.62 27.14*** 3.57 
. P 0.63 3.97 0.01 7.66 25.67 0.01 48.37*** 13.69 
. Total 46.91 13.27 1.14 5.22 3.05 21.01 0.89 8.51 
2001 UC  37.06 11.60 0.75 3.21 4.26 36.53*** 0.09 6.50 
. UMC  80.57*** 2.35 2.25 6.63 4.84 0.92 1.78 0.66 
. LMC  73.99*** 0.11 2.00 11.81 7.26 0.55 3.43 0.86 
. WC 15.61 0.54 0.38 36.12*** 19.31 0.15 23.15*** 4.72 
. P 0.00 0.00 0.34 7.53 29.92 0.04 32.56*** 29.61 
. Total 42.47 10.10 0.94 4.22 4.63 31.26 0.64 5.74 
2004 UC  45.35 17.86 1.39 9.22 6.05 17.45*** 0.11 2.58 
. UMC  83.14*** 0.00 2.21 6.28 4.58 1.04 2.24 0.51 
. LMC  77.82*** 0.00 1.40 9.13 6.34 0.37 3.57 1.36 
. WC 14.39 0.00 0.30 29.92 19.23 0.13 26.50*** 9.52 
. P 0.04 0.00 0.00 12.22 25.22 0.00 46.54*** 15.98 
. Total 51.05 14.39 1.48 9.12 6.08 14.67 0.83 2.38 
2007 UC  43.69 17.06 1.46 5.40 1.55 28.92*** 0.27 1.65 
. UMC  80.22*** 1.40 2.82 5.53 6.41 0.66 2.52 0.43 
. LMC  71.85*** 0.79 2.15 9.71 7.82 0.33 4.99 2.35 
. WC 9.35 1.73 0.39 34.64 15.76 0.16 28.99 8.99 
. P 0.11 0.00 0.17 7.77 18.51 8.98 44.09 20.37 
. Total 48.38 14.64 1.63 5.75 2.42 24.60 0.95 1.62 
2010 UC  34.47 19.00 1.27 6.42 7.46 30.61*** 0.17 0.61 
. UMC  76.19*** 5.72 2.07 4.43 5.22 1.57 4.06 0.73 
. LMC  75.46*** 1.63 1.14 6.52 6.33 0.65 7.07 1.20 
. WC 11.83 0.53 0.25 22.65 14.82 0.04 40.13 9.75 
. P 14.80 0.89 0.16 4.49 16.31 0.63 49.07 13.65 
. Total 41.46 16.15 1.34 6.35 7.24 25.02 1.64 0.80 
2013 UC  33.68 14.83 1.61 2.31 3.66 42.05*** 0.48 1.39 
. UMC  75.12*** 6.56 1.82 4.69 3.54 2.27 6.01 0.00 
. LMC  73.76*** 1.49 1.24 7.13 5.10 0.16 11.12 0.00 
. WC 15.74 0.17 0.22 21.66 10.99 0.82 50.40 0.00 
. P 0.02 0.00 0.03 4.47 12.05 0.10 77.30*** 6.02 
. Total 40.62 12.85 1.59 3.13 3.87 34.38 2.70 0.86 
2016 UC  33.98 11.41 1.90 2.31 3.85 45.02*** 0.15 1.39 
. UMC  75.84*** 5.35 1.82 4.69 3.54 2.27 5.83 0.67 
. LMC  66.76*** 1.49 1.24 7.13 5.10 0.16 18.12 0.00 
. WC 9.18 0.17 0.22 19.13 14.50 0.82 55.98 0.00 
. P 0.02 0.00 0.03 3.97 15.01 0.10 71.73*** 9.14 
. Total 37.16 3.68 1.04 7.45 8.40 9.68 30.36 2.24 
* Table includes Significance of Mean Ratios via Bonferroni Corrected Comparisons of Means (Within Purchase Type and Year), 
calculated as a percentage of total aggregate debt held by each social category, excludes any real estate used as an investment; limited 
to properties used for vacation/leisure. 
149 
 
Table 1D. Within Class Percentage of Aggregated Debt According to Purchase Category, by Year+ 
1989 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 44.28 25.32*** 2.87 2.59 1.98 17.45*** 0.11 5.40 
Upper Middle Class  70.58*** 2.12 1.80 7.60 3.80 3.33 1.14 9.63 
Lower Middle Class 71.61*** 0.00 2.84 15.18 5.65 0.90 1.50 2.33 
Working Class 24.36 0.73 1.81 40.09*** 15.07*** 0.45 7.58*** 9.91 
Poor 0.40*** 83.86*** 0.02 2.44 3.23 0.42 6.41*** 3.23 
Total 48.60 21.18 2.69 4.47 2.61 14.23 0.49 5.72 
1992 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 32.41 29.09*** 1.24 1.01 1.73 25.02*** 0.08 9.41 
Upper Middle Class 79.39*** 4.26 1.99 4.96 4.67 1.37 1.26 2.09 
Lower Middle Class 78.64*** 0.51 1.85 9.50 5.55 0.37 2.26 1.33 
Working Class 19.06 1.40 0.69 34.56*** 20.05*** 0.18 17.48*** 6.58 
Poor 37.71 7.37 0.00 4.13 13.68 0.15 19.95*** 17.00*** 
Total 39.82 24.55 1.34 2.23 2.46 20.85 0.56 8.19 
1995 
        Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 24.37 21.20*** 0.79 1.86 5.83 33.60 0.05 12.29*** 
Upper Middle Class 79.40*** 6.07 2.16 4.77 3.47 1.39 0.72 2.02 
Lower Middle Class  74.30*** 1.68 2.27 9.10 6.50 0.86 3.16 2.13 
Working Class 25.97 2.26 3.51 31.36*** 17.25*** 0.47 13.79*** 5.39 
Poor 10.50 9.94 0.01 9.94 20.81 0.62 30.90*** 17.29 
Total 31.53 18.59 1.00 2.73 5.81 28.98 0.45 10.90 
1998 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 41.23 15.75*** 0.92 4.33 2.09 25.45*** 0.10 10.13*** 
Upper Middle Class 76.32*** 4.69 2.08 5.99 4.65 3.74 1.35 1.18 
Lower Middle Class 72.37*** 0.00 2.50 10.30 8.84 0.44 3.56 1.98 
Working Class 16.07 0.91 0.49 33.22*** 17.98*** 0.62 27.14*** 3.57 
Poor 0.63 3.97 0.01 7.66 25.67*** 0.01 48.37*** 13.69*** 
Total 46.91 13.27 1.14 5.22 3.05 21.01 0.89 8.51 
2001 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 37.06 11.60*** 0.75 3.21 4.26 36.53*** 0.09 6.50 
Upper Middle Class 80.57*** 2.35 2.25 6.63 4.84 0.92 1.78 0.66 
Lower Middle Class 73.99*** 0.11 2.00 11.81 7.26 0.55 3.43 0.86 
Working Class 15.61 0.54 0.38 36.12*** 19.31*** 0.15 23.15*** 4.72 
Poor 0.00 0.00 0.34 7.53 29.92*** 0.04 32.56*** 29.61*** 
Total 42.47 10.10 0.94 4.22 4.63 31.26 0.64 5.74 
2004 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 45.35 17.86*** 1.39 9.22 6.05 17.45*** 0.11 2.58 
Upper Middle Class 83.14*** 0.00 2.21 6.28 4.58 1.04 2.24 0.51 
Lower Middle Class 77.82*** 0.00 1.40 9.13 6.34 0.37 3.57 1.36 
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Working Class 14.39 0.00 0.30 29.92*** 19.23*** 0.13 26.50*** 9.52*** 
Poor 0.04 0.00 0.00 12.22 25.22*** 0.00 46.54*** 15.98*** 
Total 51.05 14.39 1.48 9.12 6.08 14.67 0.83 2.38 
 2007 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 43.69 17.06*** 1.46 5.40 1.55 28.92*** 0.27 1.65 
Upper Middle Class 80.22*** 1.40 2.82 5.53 6.41 0.66 2.52 0.43 
Lower Middle Class 71.85*** 0.79 2.15 9.71 7.82 0.33 4.99 2.35 
Working Class 9.35 1.73 0.39 34.64*** 15.76*** 0.16 28.99*** 8.99*** 
Poor 0.11 0.00 0.17 7.77 18.51*** 8.98 44.09*** 20.37*** 
Total 48.38 14.64 1.63 5.75 2.42 24.60 0.95 1.62 
2010 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 34.47 19.00*** 1.27 6.42 7.46 30.61*** 0.17 0.61 
Upper Middle Class 76.19*** 5.72 2.07 4.43 5.22 1.57 4.06 0.73 
Lower Middle Class 75.46*** 1.63 1.14 6.52 6.33 0.65 7.07 1.20 
Working Class 11.83 0.53 0.25 22.65*** 14.82*** 0.04 40.13*** 9.75*** 
Poor 14.80 0.89 0.16 4.49 16.31*** 0.63 49.07*** 13.65*** 
Total 41.46 16.15 1.34 6.35 7.24 25.02 1.64 0.80 
2013 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 33.68 14.83*** 1.61 2.31 3.66 42.05*** 0.48 1.39 
Upper Middle Class 75.12*** 6.56 1.82 4.69 3.54 2.27 6.01 0.00 
Lower Middle Class 73.76*** 1.49 1.24 7.13 5.10 0.16 11.12 0.00 
Working Class 15.74 0.17 0.22 21.66*** 10.99*** 0.82 50.40*** 0.00 
Poor 0.02 0.00 0.03 4.47 12.05*** 0.10 77.30*** 6.02*** 
Total 40.62 12.85 1.59 3.13 3.87 34.38 2.70 0.86 
2016 
 
Primary 
Residence 
Real  
Estate**  
Home 
Improvement 
Vehicle Goods and 
Services 
Investment Educational Other 
Upper Class 33.98 11.41*** 1.9 2.31 3.85 45.02*** 0.15 1.39 
Upper Middle Class 75.84*** 5.35 1.82 4.69 3.54 2.27 5.83 0.67 
Lower Middle Class 66.76*** 1.49 1.24 7.13 5.1 0.16 18.12 0.00 
Working Class 9.18 0.17 0.22 19.13*** 14.5*** 0.82 55.98*** 0.00 
Poor 0.02 0.00 0.03 3.97 15.01*** 0.10 71.73*** 9.14*** 
Total 37.16 3.68 1.04 7.45 8.4 9.68 30.36 2.24 
*Calculated as a percentage of total aggregate debt held by each social class category 
**Excludes any real estate used as an investment; limited to properties used for vacation/leisure. 
+Within Class Bonferroni Comparisons test whether mean aggregate percentages (which are devoted to different purchase types) of 
social classes’ total aggregate debt for each year are significantly different from most others. 
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Table 2A. Descriptive Statistics of 6 Independent Variables by Social Class 
  
Class        Liquidity   Transfer Income   Net Worth Luxury Assets   Debt Acceptance* 
 
Upper 
Mean      2,198,217.0   13,498.1   29,900,000.0   278,675.3  0.76 
SD            11200000.0   33333.05   83800000.0    2061604.0   0.4 
Upper Middle        
Mean          75,407.2   11,031.7   396,855.8   3,041.7   0.70 
SD            62552.9    20419.6    231494.6   16881.4  0.5 
Lower Middle        
Mean   45,019.2  6,964.8      96,517.8   1,342.9  0.65 
SD            37407.1   12879.5    82386.3   10417.7  0.5 
Working 
Mean         32,037.7      4,154.1    3,856.9     303.1  0.60 
SD           28094.2     8651.9    33707.5   2443.6  0.5 
Poor 
Mean  14,057.5  4,842.1  -9,533.6  24.3  0.55 
SD  35104.6  6589.7     214145.4  296.8  0.5 
*The aggregated mean, where 0 indicates no debt acceptance, while 1 indicates debt acceptance 
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Table 2C. Full Sample Tobit Regression of Indebtedness on Independent Variables  
       
 Model 1   
Structural 
Income Liquidity   0.36*** 
Net Worth   -0.017***     
State Transfers  0.90***     
   
 
Cultural 
Luxury Assets  0.047      
Debt Acceptance  18794.63***      
  
 
Age   2185.88*** 
Age Squared                  -37.67*** 
Black                   -1453.37      
Latino                    -5652.20      
Single Head                  -20933.85*** 
Children (No.)  19756.97***   
Employed   103370.60*** 
Home Ownership  94110.78***     
Credit Eligibility  69966.20***  
 
Upper Middle  -43056.64***      
Lower Middle  -137722.10***     
Working   -82739.21*** 
Poor                                              -232257.80*** 
         
 
Pseudo R Squared  0.1824***      
 
Sample Size (N)  32410      
 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two tailed test 
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Table 2D. Tobit Regression of Indebtedness on Independent Variables by Social Class 
       
Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
 
 Upper  Upper Mid  Lower Mid Working  Poor  
  
Structural  
Income Liquidity     -0.00  0.74***  0.71***  0.24***   0.17*** 
Net Worth    0.19***                  -0.38***                  -0.63***                  -0.88***  -0.63*** 
State Assistance  -0.31  0.56***  0.67***  0.23***   0.21*** 
 
Cultural 
Luxury Assets     0.07***     0.23**                  -0.32***                  -0.49**                  -1.28 
Debt Acceptance     119460.90*** 18496.31*** 6354.93*** 1628.11**  711.39 
  
 
Age   27202.12*** -72.44                  -288.93                 -210.32**  -50.50       
Age Squared                  -349.96***  -0.63  2.13  3.56***  -0.58    
Black      162878.4** 1340.1                 -1758.4                 -2394.93***                 -2788.5*** 
Latino                     188737.10**    18461.13** -4669.55                  -2709.67***                -3568.7*** 
Single Head  21772.95  17192.81*                  -2393.79  400.97                  -1068.93   
Children (No.)  47774.95*** 13690.15*** 3549.11***    -657.83*  323.77*    
Employed   324360.80*** 94656.27*** 32556.11*** -2130.66**                  4466.4***  
Home Ownership  177447.90*** 83621.10*** 75503.18*** 21473.04*** 2034.78    
Credit Eligibility  349642.00*** 56839.32*** 6206.28*** 3072.17*** 5353.5***   
         
Pseudo R Squared  0.1708***  0.5165***  0.4862***  0.7114***  0.5600*** 
 
Sample Size (N)  7853  6616  7557  5328  5056 
 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two tailed test 
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Table 3A. Full Sample Mean Acceptance Scores  
  Mean Debt Acceptability Score:  
Year 
Debt 
Generally  
Finance 
Vacation 
Supplement 
Lost Wages 
Jewelry/ 
Fur 
coat+ 
Finance 
Vehicle 
Fund 
Education 
1989 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.13*** 0.41*** 0.07*** 0.76 
1992 0.34 0.34*** 0.13*** 0.41*** 0.06*** 0.76 
1995 0.32 0.15 0.44 0.07 0.79 0.82 
1998 0.30 0.14 0.43 0.06 0.78 0.80 
2001 0.28 0.14 0.46 0.07 0.77 0.79 
2004 0.31 0.15 0.46 0.06 0.79 0.82 
2007 0.29 0.13 0.50 0.05 0.78 0.82 
2010 0.23*** 0.14 0.49 0.05 0.77 0.82 
2013 0.26 0.13 0.50 0.04 0.77 0.80 
2016 0.27 0.10* 0.53* . 0.76 0.78 
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Table 3B. Class Differences in Mean Acceptance Score + ** ** 
Year   
Debt 
Generally  
Finance 
Vacation 
Supplement 
Lost Wages 
Jewelry/ 
Fur 
coat+ 
Finance 
Vehicle 
Fund 
Education 
1989 UC 0.37** 0.36*** 0.12 0.41 0.07 0.77 
  UMC 0.39 0.39 0.13 0.40 0.06 0.76 
  LMC 0.41 0.42 0.13 0.41 0.07 0.77 
  WC 0.44 0.46** 0.13 0.42 0.07 0.76 
  P 0.46** 0.48*** 0.13 0.42 0.06 0.78 
1992 UC 0.31 0.33 0.13 0.42 0.06 0.75 
  UMC 0.30 0.30 0.13 0.40 0.05 0.77 
  LMC 0.32 0.33 0.13 0.42 0.06 0.77 
  WC 0.33 0.35 0.13 0.41 0.06 0.76 
  P 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.13 0.42 0.06 0.76 
1995 UC 0.28*** 0.16 0.45 0.07 0.79 0.82 
  UMC 0.29*** 0.15 0.44 0.08 0.79 0.81 
  LMC 0.34 0.16 0.44 0.07 0.79 0.82 
  WC 0.35 0.15 0.44 0.07 0.79 0.82 
  P 0.40*** 0.15 0.44 0.07 0.79 0.82 
1998 UC 0.31 0.15 0.42 0.06 0.78 0.80 
  UMC 0.27 0.14 0.43 0.07 0.77 0.80 
  LMC 0.28 0.14 0.43 0.06 0.77 0.79 
  WC 0.33 0.15 0.44 0.06 0.78 0.80 
  P 0.35 0.14 0.43 0.06 0.78 0.80 
2001 UC 0.26 0.15 0.46 0.07 0.77 0.79 
  UMC 0.27 0.14 0.45 0.07 0.77 0.79 
  LMC 0.28 0.15 0.46 0.07 0.77 0.79 
  WC 0.32 0.14 0.47 0.07 0.76 0.79 
  P 0.33 0.15 0.48 0.06 0.77 0.79 
2004 UC 0.30 0.14 0.45 0.07 0.79 0.82 
  UMC 0.29 0.15 0.46 0.06 0.80 0.83 
  LMC 0.30 0.14 0.45 0.06 0.80 0.82 
  WC 0.34 0.14 0.46 0.06 0.78 0.82 
  P 0.34 0.16 0.46 0.07 0.80 0.83 
2007 UC 0.28 0.13 0.49 0.05 0.78 0.82 
  UMC 0.27 0.13 0.51 0.05 0.79 0.83 
  LMC 0.30 0.13 0.49 0.05 0.77 0.81 
  WC 0.30 0.13 0.49 0.05 0.78 0.81 
  P 0.30 0.13 0.48 0.05 0.79 0.82 
2010 UC 0.28*** 0.14 0.50 0.05 0.77 0.82 
  UMC 0.23 0.13 0.49 0.05 0.76 0.82 
  LMC 0.22 0.14 0.48 0.05 0.76 0.81 
  WC 0.20 0.15 0.50 0.05 0.77 0.83 
  P 0.20 0.14 0.50 0.05 0.76 0.82 
2013 UC 0.33*** 0.14 0.50 0.04 0.76 0.80 
  UMC 0.26 0.13 0.50 0.05 0.77 0.80 
  LMC 0.22 0.14 0.50 0.05 0.77 0.80 
  WC 0.24 0.13 0.51 0.04 0.77 0.80 
  P 0.22 0.13 0.50 0.05 0.77 0.80 
2016 UC 0.27 0.08 0.38***  0.74 0.76 
  UMC 0.25 0.10 0.51  0.82*** 0.81** 
  LMC 0.25 0.10 0.58**  0.79 0.77 
  WC 0.29 0.13** 0.65**  0.77 0.80** 
  P 0.27 0.10 0.70***  0.63*** 0.73*** 
+ Mean scores which are outlined in boxes signify a score which is significantly lower than those of all the remaining 4 
(or in some cases, 3) classes in that specific year, within that specific category of credit facilitated purchase type. Those 
mean acceptance scores which are highlighted in gray are those which are significantly higher than other classes’ 
aggregate yearly acceptance scores for the same specific debt sub-type.  
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Table 4A. Hierarchical Linear Models: Country & Household Level Independent Variables on Household Indebtedness 
. . Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
. . .. . . . . 
Level 2 gdp . .  0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 
. socspend . .  4.53***  4.52***  4.52*** 
.. year . . .  8.53***  8.48*** 
. finzn . . . .  1.76*** 
Level 1 income . -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
. transfer .  0.03***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04*** 
. fingap .  0.02***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01*** 
. dwelltype .  7.56***  5.15***  5.15***  5.15*** 
. tenstat .  2.46*  1.24*  1.24*  1.23* 
. tothouscost .  0.07***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04*** 
. hhsize .  5.30***  8.06***  8.06***  8.06*** 
. cons  22204.26*** 10478.94***  980.98***  100.00***  100.00*** 
Level 2 sd(R.year)  .  34.08***  31.19***  29.92***  18.77*** 
Level 2 sd(income) .  0.13***  0.13***  0.13***  0.13*** 
Level 2 sd(transfer) .  0.11***  0.10***  0.10***  0.10*** 
. sd(cons) .  276.12***  115.98***  115.97***  115.57*** 
Level 1 sd(Residual)  872.30***  239.33***  220.79***  220.79***  220.79*** 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two tailed test 
. 
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 3C. Mean Acceptability of Debt to Finance a Vacation, by Social Class, Over Time 
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Figure 3D. Mean Acceptability of Debt to Supplement Lost Wages, by Social Class, Over Time 
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Figure 3E. Mean Acceptability of Debt to Buy Jewelry/Fur Coat, by Social Class, Over Time 
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Figure 3F. Mean Acceptability of Debt to Finance Vehicle, by Social Class, Over Time 
 
  
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Acceptability: Debt to Finance Vehicle
UC UMC LMC WC P
161 
 
 
Figure 3G. Mean Acceptance of Debt To Fund an Education, by Social Class, Over Time 
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Figure A4.1. Leverage Plot: by case ID 
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Figure A4.2. Plot of Income*Socspend Interaction Term 
 
 
 
  
164 
 
 
Figure A4.3. Plot of Transfer*Socspend Interaction Term 
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Figure A4.4. Plot of Year*Socspend Interaction Term 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES 
 
 
 
Table B4.1. VIF Scores: Independent Variables 
Variable   VIF 1/VIF   
GDP  1.74 0.576265 
Socspend  1.67 0.597348 
Adeqtransfer 1.43 0.700485 
Tothouscost  1.33 0.75465 
Year  1.12 0.895302 
Income  1.09 0.921428 
Hhsize  1.08 0.929174 
Tenstat  1.07 0.931742 
Dwelltype  1.05 0.953715 
Countryid  1.04 0.964368 
Transfer   1 0.997669 
Mean VIF        1.24   
 
  
167 
 
 
Table B4.2. List of Influential Points by Cook’s Distance 
 logdebt0  absr1 
    0  47.01325 
    0  33.19508 
    0  32.41976 
    0  20.95452 
    0  19.89813 
    0  17.964 
    0  17.07857 
    0  16.21888 
    0  15.1033 
    0  14.48361 
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Table B4.3. Hierarchical Linear Models: Country & Household Level Independent Variables on Household Debt 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Level 2 GDP .  0.005***  0.005***  0.005*** 
 socspend .  4.53***  4.64***  4.65*** 
Level 1 income . -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
 transfer .  0.05*  0.04*  0.13*** 
 transferadeq .  0.01***  0.05***  0.01*** 
 dwelltype .  5.15***  5.16***  5.15*** 
 tenstat .  1.24*  1.22*  1.22* 
 tothouscost .  0.04***  0.04***  0.04*** 
 hhsize .  8.06***  8.02***  8.02*** 
 cons 28543.28***  980.98***  961.86***  954.57*** 
Level 1*Level 2 income*socspend . .  0.0002***  0.0002*** 
 transfer*socspend . . . -0.0036*** 
Level 2 sd(_cons 0.00***  31.19***  31.12***  30.54*** 
Level 2 sd(income) .  0.13***  0.12***  0.12*** 
Level 2 sd(transfer) .  0.10***  0.10***  0.09*** 
. sd(cons) 493.17***  115.98***  115.63***  115.46*** 
Level 1 sd(Residual) 289.06***  220.79***  220.69***  220.67*** 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two tailed test 
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Table B4.4. Hierarchical Linear Models-with Country, Time and Household Level Independent Variables on Household Indebtedness 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Level 2 Year .       . 
. 2005 . . . .  -9.22*** -56.65*** 
. 2006 . . . .   15.61*** -46.50*** 
. 2007 . . . .  -27.11*** -62.03*** 
. 2008 . . . .  -45.15*** -84.33*** 
. 2009 . . . .  -28.58*** -71.38*** 
. 2010 . . . .  -17.59*** -72.64*** 
. 2011 . . . .  -31.78*** -57.44*** 
. 2012 . . . .  -19.36*** -47.71*** 
. 2013 . . . .   35.58**  126.00 
. 2014 . . . .   26.67*  348.11** 
. 2015 . . . .   16.90*** -73.79*** 
. GDP .   0.005***   0.005***   0.005***   0.005***  0.005*** 
. socspend .   4.522***   4.631***   4.646***   4.658***  0.53 
Level 1 income .  -0.081***  -0.086***  -0.086***  -0.086*** -0.086*** 
. transfer .   0.046***   0.046*   0.128***   0.124***  0.121*** 
. finneed .   0.011***   0.011***   0.011***   0.011***  0.011*** 
. dwelltype .   5.148***   5.161***   5.156***   5.361***  5.362*** 
. tenstat .   1.237*   1.215*   1.217*   0.954  0.946 
. tothouscost .   0.04***   0.04***   0.04***   0.039***  0.039*** 
. hhsize .   8.055***   8.018***   8.024***   8.038***  8.040*** 
. cons 28543.28*** -100.00*** -100.00*** -100.00*** -100.00***  2911.60*** 
Level 2*Level 2 year*socspend . . . . . . 
. 2005 . . . . .  3.18*** 
. 2006 . . . . .  2.89*** 
. 2007 . . . . .  2.72*** 
. 2008 . . . . .  5.82*** 
. 2009 . . . . .  4.13*** 
. 2010 . . . . .  4.93*** 
. 2011 . . . . .  2.04*** 
. 2012 . . . . .  1.93*** 
. 2013 . . . . . -2.08 
. 2014 . . . . . -5.14* 
. 2015 . . . . .  6.89*** 
Level 1*Level 2 income*socspend . .  0.0002***  0.0002***  0.0002***  0.0002*** 
. transfer*socspend . . . -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.0034*** 
Level 2 sd(R.year)    0.000***  29.919***  29.775***  29.348***  104.347***  0.000*** 
Level 2 sd(income) .  0.126***  0.125***  0.125***  0.126***  0.126*** 
Level 2 sd(transfer) .  0.097***  0.097***  0.089***  0.088***  0.088*** 
. sd(cons)  493.168***  115.97***  115.618***  115.457***  118.558***  116.218*** 
Level 1 sd(Residual)  289.058***  220.795***  220.694***  220.673***  220.007***  219.987*** 
